Introduction:
Lebanon faces the possibility of an Israeli military escalation amid mounting domestic and geopolitical tensions over Hezbollah’s arms, though recent US-backed diplomatic engagement between Beirut and Tel Aviv could stave off a significant escalation in the near term. This LCAT report presents three scenarios that map how escalations could unfold and analyzes their potential impacts. It aims to better inform contingency and preparedness planning by humanitarian actors and other relevant stakeholders in Lebanon. The report provides forward-looking assessments in each scenario on whether key elements of Lebanon’s economy and humanitarian conditions would be likely to improve, decline, or remain stable, and evaluates the expected severity of these changes.
Since summer 2025, Washington has promoted a roadmap that calls for Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah in exchange for Israel ending its military operations in Lebanon and withdrawing from five hilltops near the border with Israel. In response, on September 5, Lebanon’s cabinet approved a confidential Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) disarmament plan, which reportedly sets out a five-stage process – without timetables – that starts south of the Litani River. The plan reportedly does not stipulate the use of force against Hezbollah, and builds on the November 27, 2024 Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) between Israel and Lebanon that calls for a disarmament process starting south of the Litani. Although the CoH prohibits offensive Israeli military actions, Tel Aviv has continued its campaign of airstrikes – reportedly backed by confidential US assurances – in a bid to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capacities and compel the group to disarm.
On November 2, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that Tel Aviv would intensify its strikes if the disarmament process were prolonged. Leaks in Israeli, Lebanese, and regional media suggest that Israel is considering a significant expansion of its military campaign in Lebanon. On November 23, Israel assassinated senior Hezbollah military official Haitham al-Tabatabai in the southern suburbs of Beirut, its first airstrike near the capital since June 5 and its most high-profile targeted killing since start of the CoH.
Lebanon’s government will face a potentially critical juncture in January, when the LAF is expected to complete the first stage of its weapons dismantlement plan south of the Litani. Without political consensus, the government is unlikely to greenlight further stages – such consensus appears doubtful since Hezbollah has only accepted disarmament south of the Litani. The LAF’s reported strategy of “containment” north of the Litani to prevent Hezbollah from transporting weapons into and within Lebanon is unlikely to satisfy Israel, which accuses Hezbollah of continuing to smuggle and manufacture arms. In mid-December, the US ambassador to Lebanon raised the possibility of pursing a containment strategy if disarmament could not be achieved.
Notably, on December 3, Lebanon appointed diplomat Simon Karam to head talks via the CoH Monitoring Mechanism with Israel following US pressure, leading to the first civilian-led talks between both states in decades. Even if initial negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv were to expand in frequency and scope, Israel would likely maintain its military pressure to extract concessions from Lebanon, particularly if it perceives that Hezbollah is rearming. US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa stated on December 8 that “Israel does not link its military operations in Lebanon to the indirect negotiations.” However, these talks could enable Washington to dissuade Israel from launching a wide-scale offensive.
By Crisis Analytics Team, Mercy Corps Lebanon
