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Lebanon Crisis Update

October 2026



Credit: Reuters

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The Monthly Lebanon Crisis Update provides an overview of economic and political developments to alert the international aid response to new and emerging challenges that could impact the humanitarian situation in Lebanon. In the context of the multiple crises affecting Lebanon, the update tracks the impact of political developments on the economy, relevant international developments, updates on service delivery and governance issues, and analysis of the drivers of humanitarian need as they develop. The report also aims to provide nuanced forecasting on contextual shifts relevant to shifting needs and the implementation of humanitarian programming. The report draws upon a desk review of currently available literature, analysis of relevant quantitative data, and key informant interviews with a range of experts and individuals with knowledge of Lebanon's economy.

The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.


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Key Takeaways:

- The likelihood of a renewed US-Israeli campaign against Iran is increasing, raising concerns that widescale conflict could restart in Lebanon. Hezbollah has not announced whether it would support Iran militarily if such a campaign were to take place. Israeli officials have threatened major retaliation if Hezbollah targets Israeli forces, hinting that they may launch a broad ground offensive.
- The number of Israeli strikes on Lebanese territory declined in October compared to the previous month, and Hezbollah launched no attacks on Israeli forces. Despite the relative downtick in military action, Israeli forces continue to target southern Lebanon and occupy some 650 square kilometers of the country, areas from which most of the 330,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Lebanon fled.
- Following the Internal Security Forces (ISF) seizure of several hundred kilograms of explosives belonging to Hezbollah, Justice Minister Adel Nassar asked the Cabinet to transfer the case from the Military Court to the Judicial Council. The Cabinet postponed ruling on the matter pending further investigation, and the Military Court indicted 13 people in relation to the seizure.
- In October, Hezbollah announced that it would initiate a cash assistance program offering up to 14,000 US dollars (USD) for families whose primary homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable during the 2026 War. The program was explicitly framed as a challenge to the government while its own reconstruction framework remains stalled. Hezbollah claims the payments will not be limited to its supporters, and has called on landlords and furniture dealers not to raise prices in response to the program.
- By supplementing public sector wages with a series of additional payments, more than half of the 2027 Draft Budget is earmarked for public sector remuneration. However, these payments could be cancelled or reduced, and even if fully applied, salaries remain at roughly one-third of pre-crisis value.
- President Joseph Aoun lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Council to challenge amendments to the Banking Resolution Law. The Court's decision restored references to the Code of Money and Credit, a ruling that is likely to reignite the dispute between the Central Bank-aligned camp and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-aligned officials.
- On November 3, Électricité du Liban (EdL) began cutting service to some regional water establishments and other public institutions. The move followed the national electricity company's late-October announcement that it would cut off electricity supply to state bodies that had not settled their outstanding invoices.
- Qatar has pledged to finance, implement, and operate a program to increase Lebanon's electricity generating capacity. Implementing the program, the largest pledged foreign investment in the sector in years, is scheduled to take at least three years.
- The Council of Ministers adopted emergency measures to contain Tripoli's waste crisis, which include reopening an existing landfill and commissioning the construction of a new one. The decision drew widespread criticism and legal challenges. Meanwhile, waste collection in central Lebanon is set to be handled by municipalities when current contracts expire on December 31. This places operational responsibility on municipalities before the revenues to sustain such operations are in place.

Conflict Updates:

Key Lebanon–Hezbollah Conflict Events



[1] BBC, US-Iran memorandum of understanding in full June 18, 2026
[2] Reuters, Lebanon ceasefire agreed after US-Iran talks in Switzerland scrapped June 19, 2026
PressTV, Iran closes Strait of Hormuz after US-Israeli violations of MoU June 20, 2026
[3] US State Department, Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon June 26, 2026
[4] L'Orient Today, Naim Qassem rejects Lebanon-Israel agreement, declares it 'null and void' June 27, 2026
Radio Free Europe, Skepticism In Iran Over Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement June 29, 2026
Amwaj, Israel-Lebanon deal, clashes in Hormuz put Iran-US diplomacy to the test June 29, 2026
[5] National News Agency, ارتفاع حصيلة غارات العدو اليوم إلى 11 شهيدا و19 جريحا August 15, 2026
Israeli military via Telegram, @idfofficial August 15, 2026
[6] L'Orient Today, Ali Taher demolition: How significant is the loss for Hezbollah and Iran? September 12, 2026

Current situation

Renewed large-scale regional conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran could be imminent, threatening to once again engulf Lebanon. Amid reports that Washington and Tel Aviv are considering major strikes on critical Iranian infrastructure,[7] the US has stepped up its deployment of military assets to the region[8] and evacuated diplomatic outposts.[9] The White House has said that any military campaign would begin only after the US midterm elections on November 3.[10]

Since early September, Iran has refrained from directly targeting US bases,[11] even as the US has stepped up its economic warfare[12] and facilitated increased oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz over Tehran's objections and despite attacks on tankers in the vital waterway.[13] Alongside military threats, Washington and its regional partners are pursuing diplomatic overtures, even though prospects of a breakthrough appear limited.[14]

As it did prior to the start of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran on February 28, 2026, Tel Aviv has threatened Beirut with large-scale military action if Hezbollah enters the conflict.[15] On October 14, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that Israel would forcibly displace Shia Muslim residents of southern Lebanon and strike Beirut's southern suburbs if Hezbollah joined Iran in attacking Israel.[16] Hezbollah, meanwhile, has remained publicly ambiguous about whether it would open a front in support of Tehran.[17] During the June 13-24, 2025 conflict, Hezbollah did not conduct any military operations against Israel in support of Iran, arguing that Tehran was capable of confronting Tel Aviv on its own.[18] In the event of a major campaign against Iran, however, it may choose to act militarily, as it did on March 2, 2026.

Context

Since mid-June, fighting in Lebanon has eased amid US pressure on Israel to scale back military operations and facilitate diplomatic efforts. Israeli and Lebanese military delegations met in the US on October 20–22 but made no

[7] ABC News, US and Israel drawing up plans to resume attacks on Iran post-election, sources say October 22, 2026
Axios, Iran pressed to make nuke concessions as massive post-midterms strikes loom October 28, 2026
CNN, US has plans for major Iran strikes if Trump chooses October 26, 2026
New York Times, U.S. and Israel Draw Up Plans for Renewed Strikes on Iran After Elections October 21, 2026

[8] The US is deploying three aircraft carriers to the Middle East, a rare show of force last seen in April 2026 and, before that, in 2003 during the Iraq War. The US is also deploying a Marine Expeditionary Unit and air defense batteries to the region. Meanwhile, open source intelligence spotters have noted a surge of US military cargo flights to Israel in the final days of October.
Fox News chief national security correspondent Jennifer Griffin via X, @JenGriffinFNC October 20, 2026
The Wall Street Journal, U.S. Warns Gulf of Possible Short, Intense Renewal of Iran War After Midterms October 28, 2026
Breaking Defense, Three carriers operate in Middle East for first time since 2003: CENTCOM April 24, 2026
Haaretz OSINT reporter Avi Scharf via X, @avischarf October 29, 2026

[9] Wall Street Journal, U.S. Evacuates Mideast Outposts After Suspected Iranian Plot to Target Americans October 24, 2026
NBC News, U.S. troops and diplomats evacuating Middle East posts, sources say October 21, 2026

[10] US President Donald Trump via Truth Social, @realDonaldTrump October 8, 2026

[11] Reuters, Iran attack on base in Jordan damaged American military aircraft, US official says September 10, 2026

[12] Financial Times, Iranians face energy squeeze from war as natural gas runs short October 28, 2026
Wall Street Journal, Iran's Fleet of Shadow Tankers Has Run Out of Oil After Monthslong U.S. Blockade October 21, 2026

[13] The Guardian, Crude oil exports from strait of Hormuz largely return to pre-war levels October 1, 2026

[14] The Guardian, JD Vance letter may offer last chance to avert fresh conflict between US and Iran October 29, 2026
Reuters, Iran sees only unacceptable ideas in latest mediation to end war, official says October 28, 2026

[15] Al-Akhbar, تحييد لبنان قبل ضرب إيران: مفاوضات تاميا في خدمة ترتيب الجبهات October 19, 2026
L'Orient Today, Tampa meeting: One key condition — direct military coordination between Beirut and Tel Aviv October 19, 2026
Nida al-Watan, لبنان أمام رسم المنطقة: هل يختار "حزب الله" اللينة قبل فوات الأوان؟ October 27, 2026

[16] Times of Israel, Katz says IDF will capture more of south Lebanon if Hezbollah 'joins Iran in an attack on Israel' October 14, 2026
Naharnet, Katz threatens Hezbollah with 'severe blow' if it joins any Iran attack on Israel October 14, 2026

[17] On October 26, 2026, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah denied that Hezbollah made its decisions based on "foreign requests," adding that "Iran has not asked us in the past, nor does it ask us today, to support it in confronting the American-Israeli aggression." In July 2026, Hezbollah military figures recently sent a letter to Mojtaba Khamanei reaffirming their loyalty to Iran's new supreme leader.
National News Agency, النائب فضل الله: قرار المقاومة لبناني نابع من ارادتها وايران لم تطلب منا مساندتها October 26, 2026
Al-Mayadeen, السيد مجتبى لمجاهدي حزب الله: أنتم رؤّاد فصائل الجهاد.. وصون سيادة لبنان شرط أوّل لإيران July 26, 2026

[18] Al Arabiya English, Hezbollah says it's 'not neutral' in Iran-Israel conflict, will 'act as we see fit' June 19, 2025
L'Orient Today, Joumblatt to L'Orient-Le Jour: What's happening could harden Iran's stance June 17, 2025




Figure 1. *Heatmap of Israel's 680 airstrikes in southern Lebanon since the start of the latest truce on June 20, 2026. The vast majority of these strikes have hit areas along the so-called Yellow Line marking Israel's occupation zone.*
Source: LCAT analysis

progress toward resolving the conflict.[19] The US-brokered Trilateral Framework, which calls for Hezbollah's disarmament in return for Israel's military withdrawal from Lebanon, appears unlikely to advance in the near term (for more detailed analysis and background of the Trilateral Framework, see the LCAT September Crisis Update). On October 20, Israel accused the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) of allowing Hezbollah to continue its military activities, highlighting Tel Aviv's mistrust of Beirut and the obstacles to implementing the Framework.[20] Washington, meanwhile, has reportedly grown increasingly frustrated with Lebanon's stalled efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[21] A breakdown in the Trilateral Framework process would heighten the risk of Israeli military escalation in Lebanon, even if the uneasy regional truce between the US and Iran holds.

Israeli Military Action in Lebanon

Israeli military activity in southern Lebanon declined throughout October.[22] During the month, Israel conducted a daily average of 4.29 airstrikes, less than half the rate of

[19] Al-Hadath Television via X, @Alhadath_Leb October 22, 2026
Al-Modon, نتنياهو يرفع الضغط قبيل الانتخابات: مناورات في الشمال والوسط October 23, 2026
Al-Akhbar, من تامبا إلى البرزة: واشنطن تدفع الجيش إلى مواجهة حزب الله October 23, 2026
[20] Israeli military via Telegram, @idfofficial October 20, 2026
[21] Nida al-Watan, واشنطن عشية الانتخابات النصفية الأميركية: على لبنان تقديم أكثر من الوعود October 31, 2026
Al-Modon, خيبة أمل أميركية من السلطة اللبنانية: صبر إسرائيل لن يدوم October 25, 2026
Al-Akhbar, مسؤول أمني أميركي في بيروت: لماذا تخافون الحرب الأهلية؟ رئيس الحكومة منخرط في تجدّد الحملة على الجيش October 8, 2026
[22] Israel has not attacked alleged Hezbollah weapons infrastructure or conducted targeted assassinations of the group's operatives outside southern Lebanon since June 20. This suggests that the Israeli military's freedom of action has been more constrained than its officials have publicly indicated, given that Israeli forces regularly carried out such strikes after October 8, 2023, including after the November 27, 2024 CoH.




Figure 2. *Map of the Trilateral Framework pilot zones, launched on July 20, 2026, for Israeli withdrawals and LAF deployment to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament. Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh was the first zone handed over by the Israeli military to the LAF, but the project has since stalled.*
Source: LCAT analysis




Figure 3. *Heatmap of the 133 airstrikes in southern Lebanon in October 2026. Unlike previous months since the June 20 truce, Israel did not stage deadly airstrikes in towns and villages north of the Yellow Line. Israel also staged an airstrike in northeast Lebanon, beyond the scope of this map.*
Source: LCAT analysis

September.[23] These strikes have almost all been concentrated in localities within or near the so-called Yellow Line marking Israel's occupation zone. Likewise, Israeli demolitions of homes and infrastructure slowed in October following an increase in such activity the previous month.[24]

The slowdown in military activity follows Israel's September announcement that it had completed major operations to destroy alleged Hezbollah infrastructure in Mansouri, overlooking the coast, and at Ali al-Taher, outside Nabatieh (see the LCAT September monthly).[25] Throughout October, Israel concentrated 17.2% of its airstrikes near Wadi Salouki,[26] amid reports of Israeli military concerns that Hezbollah could attempt to breach the Yellow Line. Israel also conducted limited artillery fire and airstrikes on Jarmaq, which lies along the route from Nabatieh to the Iqlim al-Tuffah highlands, an area that press reports have identified as a potential target of future Israeli ground operations.[27]




Figure 4. *A heatmap of artillery fire in southern Lebanon in October 2026. Israel has concentrated fire in rural valleys along the Yellow Line with limited shelling as far north as Jarmaq in the Jezzine district.*
Source: LCAT analysis

[23] LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. Israel conducted an average of 4.29 strikes per day between October 1 and 31, 2026, an average of 9.3 between September 1 and 30, 2026, and an average of 5.7 strikes a day between August 1 and 31, 2026.
During the CoH period from November 27, 2024 through March 1, 2026, Israel conducted an average of 2.75 airstrikes a day.

[24] LCAT logs all reports of Israeli demolitions and property destruction such as bulldozing across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. It should be noted that reports of demolitions do not distinguish between major demolitions destroying several structures at once and incidents that destroy one structure. Nevertheless, LCAT assesses that the logs provide a useful proxy of overall activity. Between October 1 and 31, 2026, LCAT logged [x] reports of demolitions per day. Between September 1 and 30, 2026, LCAT logged 9.8 such reports a day. Between August 1 and August 31, 2026, LCAT logged 8.1 such reports a day. Between July 1 and 31, 2026, LCAT logged 5.9 such reports a day.

[25] Israeli military via Telegram, @idfofficial September 28, 2026
Times of Israel, Katz: Ali Taher takeover cements Israeli control over south Lebanon 'security zone' September 4, 2026

[26] LCAT logged 23 airstrikes in the vicinity of Wadi Salouki during the past month, out of a total of 133 strikes in the month of October 2026.

[27] AFP, Where does Israel's destruction of underground Hezbollah base leave the group? September 14, 2026
Asharq Alawsat, Attention Shifts to Lebanon's Iqlim al-Tuffah amid Israeli Military Moves September 28, 2026

For the first time since the June 20 truce, Israel carried out a targeted assassination outside southern Lebanon, striking a vehicle in the northeastern town of Hermel on October 9. The Israeli military claimed that the targeted individual was responsible for planning attacks against Israeli forces in southern Syria, with support from Iran.[28] Amid concerns over further Israeli escalation and a resumption of the regional war, Hezbollah carried out no attacks in October, down from six attacks attributed to the group by Israel in southern Lebanon the previous month. LCAT recorded one death from Israeli fire in October, down from 33 the previous month.




Figure 5. *Daily totals of reported Hezbollah attacks since June 21, 2026.*
Source: Israeli military statements on purported Hezbollah attacks

Domestic Tensions and Displacement

Although recent standoffs between Hezbollah and Lebanese security agencies highlight the risk of unrest and violence, political leaders have sought to contain tensions. On October 5, ISF personnel at a checkpoint on the Dahr al-Baydar mountain road to Beirut seized a Hezbollah shipment containing hundreds of kilograms of C-4 and TNT explosives and detained two members of the group.[29] On October 16, ISF personnel attempting to search a warehouse in Beirut's southern suburbs for expired medicines were prevented from doing so by Hezbollah supporters.[30] Hezbollah condemned the seizure of the explosives and demanded the release of the two detainees, and asserted that the confrontation at the warehouse was due to lack of coordination in a "sensitive security area."[31] However, tensions between the party and the government over the two incidents appeared to have eased by the end of the month.[32]

The Lebanese government, the LAF, and the country's security agencies are unlikely to initiate a direct military confrontation with Hezbollah over its weapons, in a move aimed at containing domestic tensions. Any isolated standoffs could trigger protests, as occurred on a limited scale on the night of October 16.[33] However, Hezbollah, its main ally the Amal Movement, and other political leaders are likely to seek to contain tensions and prevent further escalation (for analysis see the LCAT September Crisis Update).

[28] Israeli military via Telegram, @idfofficial October 9, 2026
[29] L'Orient Today, ISF seizes hundreds of kilograms of explosives at Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint, arrests two October 10, 2026
Reuters, Hezbollah says it owned confiscated explosives, meant to attack Israel October 15, 2026
[30] Lebanon's Internal Security Forces, @LebISF October 16, 2026
L'Orient Today, Tensions between the ISF and Hezbollah: Army deploys in Beirut's southern suburbs as Nassereddine defends strike October 17, 2026
[31] National News Agency, حسن فضل الله عرض لملابسات توقيف "سيارة ضهر البيدر" وحذر من مغبة الإجراءات المتخذة في حق المقاومة والمقاومين: الحملة على مقاومتنا لن يثنينا عن التمسك بحقوقنا والدفاع عن بلدنا October 15, 2026
National News Agency, "حزب الله"عن ملابسات حادثة "المستودع" في غالبري سمعان: ما جرى يعود إلى قيام دورية بمداهمة في منطقة أمنية حساسة دون اعتماد الآلية المتفق عليها October 16, 2026
[32] L'Orient Today, Hezbollah bloc welcomes Cabinet's delay in referring explosives case to Court of Justice October 23, 2026
National News Agency, حسن فضل الله عرض لملابسات توقيف "سيارة ضهر البيدر" وحذر من مغبة الإجراءات المتخذة في حق المقاومة والمقاومين: الحملة على مقاومتنا لن يثنينا عن التمسك بحقوقنا والدفاع عن بلدنا October 15, 2026
[33] Nida al-Watan, بالفيديو - احتجاجًا على توقيفات ضهر البيدر... مسيرة لعناصر من حزب الله في بيروت October 17, 2026

Displacement remains a pressing humanitarian issue that could exacerbate social and political tensions. As of September 29, 329,686 people are internally displaced in Lebanon, 60% of whom are seeking refuge in the urban centers of Beirut, Saida, and Sour.[34] Most of these IDPs are renting accommodation, placing a sustained financial burden on displaced households. Israel's occupation of some 650 square kilometers of Lebanese territory along the border – about 6% of the country – is preventing the return of at least 147,000 residents, according to LCAT's analysis of WorldPop Global Demographic Data.[35] Several factors will hamper residents' permanent return to homes outside of Israeli-occupied territories, primarily heavy property damage across southern Lebanon. Additionally, any intensified Israeli shelling risks displacing returnees again.




Figure 6. *The Israeli military's Yellow Line laid over a population density map of southern Lebanon (darker shades of red indicate higher population levels).*
Sources: LCAT analysis, WorldPop

Looking Forward:

To inform contingency and preparedness planning among humanitarian actors and other relevant stakeholders in Lebanon, LCAT analyzed three potential pathways the regional conflict could take amid growing tensions. Each is presented as a scenario in the matrix below, detailing its likelihood, as well as its projected effects on US policy toward Iran; Iranian policy toward the US, Israel, and regional states; Israeli policy toward Iran; and Israeli policy in Lebanon.

The first scenario covers the regional status quo, characterized by the ongoing US military buildup and embargo on Iran. It assumes that tensions continue to fluctuate; that Iranian forces refrain from striking US military bases or

[34] International Organization for Migration, Lebanon — Mobility Snapshot - Round 118 October 1, 2026
[35] LCAT cross-referenced geographic data on Israel's evacuation notices, airstrikes, and artillery shelling with WorldPop's global demographic data, which uses satellite imagery and geospatial analysis to estimate population distribution.
WorldPop, Population Data

Israel, limiting their actions to disrupting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz; and that, more broadly, the conflict does not cross the threshold of region-wide confrontation.

The second scenario assumes that a breakdown in diplomatic efforts, growing perceptions in Washington that the economic pressure campaign is insufficient, and stepped-up Iranian targeting of shipping in the Persian Gulf lead to a deterioration of the status quo in the form of limited waves of US military action against Iran. Under this scenario, there is no escalation in Lebanon; the US continues to pursue a diplomatic resolution to the regional standoff; the US seeks to contain escalation through regional partners and limit Israeli involvement; and Iran calibrates military responses targeting US bases in the region to establish deterrence and avoid a wider regional war.

The third scenario is a high-intensity regional war, brought on either by a breakdown in diplomacy driven by Washington's perception that economic pressure is insufficient to compel Tehran to reach a deal, or by Iranian fears of an imminent attack prompting preemptive strikes. Under this scenario, the US and Israel launch large-scale military operations similar to those of the February 28–April 8, 2026 War, including strikes on high-ranking Iranian officials and critical infrastructure; Iran responds by targeting US bases, key regional infrastructure, and Israel;[36] and Tehran calls on Hezbollah to take part in the campaign in an effort to divert Israeli military resources from the Iranian front, as it did earlier in 2026.[37]

> *Note: An escalation in Lebanon amid the prevailing regional status quo or limited waves of US military strikes has been assessed as **unlikely in the near term** since Washington has pressured Israel to rein in its military activities in Lebanon while it pursues a regional deal.*


***Table 1.** Scenario matrix: pathways for the regional conflict and their implications for Lebanon*

Scenario	Regional Status Quo	Limited US Military Action Against Iran	Regional, High-Intensity War
Likelihood	• Ongoing, highly likely to continue in immediate term • High chance of escalations that overtake this scenario	• Highly likely in near term • This scenario could play out quickly, with a return to Regional Status Quo or escalate to widescale US-Israeli military campaign against Iran • Variations could play out multiple times amid the ongoing regional standoff	• Possible in near term • Similar possibility of abrupt US announcement of backing off from military escalation, returning to status quo
US policy toward Iran	• Either no strikes on Iran or localized small-scale strikes along Strait of Hormuz • Continued diplomatic engagement and economic warfare	• Limited waves of strikes on Iranian military infrastructure along the Strait of Hormuz, similar to intermittent strikes since the June 17, 2026 MoU • Possible symbolic strikes against non-critical civilian facilities	• Heavy waves of strikes against Iranian military targets, similar to the February 28-April 8, 2026 War • Assassinations of Iranian political and security figures • Strikes on critical Iranian infrastructure, such as power plants, bridges, refineries, and telecommunication systems

[36] Reuters, Trump's Iran threat renews Gulf fears of a war it didn't choose November 2, 2026
The Guardian, Iran threatens to strike oil and AI facilities across Gulf if US and Israel renew attacks October 22, 2026
[37] Financial Times, Israel expects Lebanon offensive to outlast Iran conflict March 10, 2026

Scenario	Regional Status Quo	Limited US Military Action Against Iran	Regional, High-Intensity War
Iranian policy	• Continued attempts to hinder oil transit through Strait of Hormuz • Missile tests and other demonstrations of military capacities • Continued indirect diplomatic engagement with the US, no nuclear concessions, and demands for upfront release of frozen assets as a condition for a deal • Continued support to regional proxies	• Retaliatory missile barrages and drone attacks against US bases in the region calibrated to avoid further escalation while attempting to establish deterrence • No strikes on Israel • Increase in direct and indirect military actions via proxies against Gulf countries	• Retaliatory strikes against US bases in the Middle East • Missile and drone barrages aimed against Israel, including civilian infrastructure • Missile and drone barrages against regional energy infrastructure • General mobilization of regional proxies • Escalation against Gulf countries, including against civilian infrastructure in the Gulf, as previously witnessed against desalination facilities, etc.
Israeli policy toward Iran	• Covert actions not publicly claimed • Demonstrations of military capacities, including flights along Iraq-Iran border • No overt military attacks	*See "Regional Status Quo" scenario*	• Heavy waves of strikes against Iranian military targets, similar to February 28-April 8, 2026 War • Assassinations of Iranian political and security figures • Strikes on critical Iranian infrastructure, such as power plants, bridges, refineries, and telecommunication systems
Israeli policy in Lebanon	• Continued airstrikes, artillery fire and demolitions within Yellow Line • No new ground campaign • Infrequent military actions beyond the Yellow Line	*See "Regional Status Quo" scenario*	• Heavy strikes in southern Lebanon, southern Beirut suburbs, and Bekaa valley • Mass evacuation notices up to the Awwali River and for the southern Beirut suburbs • Frequent strikes in IDP destination areas, including the Chouf and Saida • Intermittent strikes in the municipal Beirut area • Possibility of aerial and naval blockade of Lebanon, however, US is likely to pressure against such an escalation • Possibility of a ground invasion toward the southern cities of Sour and Nabatieh
Hezbollah policy toward Israel	• Infrequent attacks against Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon, not publicly acknowledged • No attacks on targets within Israel	*See "Regional Status Quo" scenario*	• Rocket and drone barrages against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon • Strikes on Israeli military positions and civilian infrastructure in northern Israel • Attempted barrages targeting central Israel, including the Tel Aviv metropolitan area

Political Updates:



Cabinet and Judicial Action in Response to Seizure of Hezbollah Explosives

On October 5, security forces intercepted a vehicle carrying several hundred kilograms of explosives at the Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint and arrested two of its occupants, one of whom is the son of a Hezbollah official.[43,44] Ten days later, on October 15, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah announced that the explosives belonged to the party and were

[38] SANA, Syria, Lebanon seek to activate joint higher committee October 7, 2026
[39] Middle East Eye, Lebanon to join trilateral talks with Israel and US in Florida next week, Aoun says October 17, 2026
[40] Iran International, Lebanon asked Iran to appoint new ambassador to Beirut, deputy PM says October 18, 2026
[41] Al-Liwaa, "القوات" تتقدم باقتراح قانون لتقصير ولاية مجلس النواب October 20, 2026
Legal Agenda, جلسة لعدم انتخاب أعضاء مكتب المجلس واللجان النيابية October 20, 2026
[42] Annahar, زيارة الرئيس جوزف عون إلى طرابلس: من رمزية الحضور إلى استحقاق الإنماء October 27, 2026
Beirut 24, الرئيس عون يعيد طرابلس إلى حضن الدولة: زمن التهميش والإقصاء ولّى October 25, 2026
[43] Beirut 24, متفجرات ضهر البيدر: ماذا تعني الإحالة إلى المجلس العدلي؟ October 21, 2026
Al-Araby al-Jadeed, لبنان: تصعيد وزاري لإحالة "متفجرات ضهر البيدر" على المجلس العدلي October 29, 2026
[44] This was one of three seizures during the month, alongside 245 kg of TNT seized on October 1 and 200 kg of explosives seized in the same border area on October 12.
Al-Modon, الجيش يضبط 245 كلغ TNT مهرَّبة من سوريا October 1, 2026
Nidaa al-Watan, متفجرات ضهر البيدر: مَن أطفأ عيون الطريق وأين كانت ستُخزَّن؟ - ريشار حرفوش October 13, 2026

slated to be used against Israeli forces in the south. He also asserted that Hezbollah had contacted Lebanese authorities to both acknowledge ownership of the explosives and demand that the two detained men be released.[45]

At the October 22 Council of Ministers session,[46] Justice Minister Adel Nassar asked the Cabinet to transfer the case from the Military Court to the Judicial Council, a special court for crimes against state security.[47] The Cabinet postponed its decision pending further investigation, a move that drew criticism from Hezbollah opponents, including the Lebanese Forces party,[48] whose ministers walked out of that session, and also boycotted the October 29 session because the referral was not on the agenda.[49]

On October 31, the Military Court issued charges against 13 people, including the two individuals already in custody. The charges reportedly do not include terrorism and sedition provisions – a justification for keeping the case before the Military Court and a way to avoid a confrontation with Hezbollah within the Cabinet. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Forces' continued boycott risks escalating into a broader governmental crisis.[50]

Hezbollah 2026 War Cash Assistance Program

On October 13, Hezbollah announced a cash assistance program for families whose primary homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable during the 2026 War.[51] Distributions reportedly began on November 2.[52] The program offers up to USD 14,000 in Beirut and its southern suburbs and USD 12,000 elsewhere, combining a flat USD 8,000 furniture allowance with a rent allowance of USD 6,000 (or USD 4,000 outside Beirut). Payments are slated to be made in four installments over a year, and the program does not cover rebuilding homes. The announcement followed reports, denied by Washington, that Iran had transferred USD 200 million to the party for this purpose.[53]

The program was explicitly framed as a challenge to the government, with Hezbollah accusing the cabinet of failing to take responsibility for reconstruction while the government's own draft reconstruction framework remains stalled. Analysts assert that the payments, which Hezbollah claims will not be limited to its supporters, will help the party rebuild support during a period of financial pressure.[54]

Overall, the program may ease shelter costs for some displaced households but could trigger some negative effects as well, including price gouging. In its announcement of the program, Hezbollah called on landlords and furniture dealers not to raise prices in response to the payouts, indicating that the party recognizes the risk of rent inflation in areas hosting displaced families, a development that could have knock-on negative effects for non-beneficiaries.[55]

[45] Arab News, Lebanese army seizes explosives as smugglers flee across Syria border October 12, 2026
Axios, Rubio urges Lebanon to resist Hezbollah pressure over seized explosives October 15, 2026
Reuters, Hezbollah says it owned confiscated explosives, meant to attack Israel October 15, 2026
[46] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, جلسة 22 تشرين الأول 2026 October 22, 2026
[47] Beirut 24, متفجرات ضهر البيدر: ماذا تعني الإحالة إلى المجلس العدلي؟ October 21, 2026
Al-Araby al-Jadeed, لبنان: تصعيد وزاري لإحالة "متفجرات ضهر البيدر" على المجلس العدلي October 29, 2026
[48] Janoubia, اشتباك حكومي تحت سقف المؤسسات.. هل تنجح الحكومة في تمرير إحالة متفجرات ضهر البيدر إلى المجلس العدلي؟ October 22, 2026
Lebanon24, جلسة لمجلس الوزراء في السرايا اليوم لبحث ملف النفايات و"القوات" تقاطع October 29, 2026
[49] Al-Modon, مجلس الوزراء أرجأ البت بالإحالة للعدلي ووزراء القوات انسحبوا October 22, 2026
Lebanese Forces, وزراء "القوات": لن نشارك في جلسة مجلس الوزراء October 29, 2026
[50] Al Jazeera, Lebanon charges 13 over confiscated Hezbollah explosives October 31, 2026
Annahar, في قضية متفجرات ضهر البيدر... السلطة والحزب مواجهة لن تصل إلى انفجار November 1, 2026
[51] Reuters, Hezbollah outlines financial aid plan for Lebanese with destroyed homes October 13, 2026
[52] L'Orient Today, Hezbollah announces first payment of aid to war victims and displaced since March November 2, 2026
[53] BBC Arabic, حزب الله يعلن برنامج مساعدات للنازحين، فهل تلقى 200 مليون دولار من إيران؟ October 13, 2026
Asas Media, من أعطى "الحزب" 200 مليون دولار؟ October 27, 2026
[54] Al-Marsad, التعويضات بدل إيواء وأثاث... ماذا عن الخسائر؟ October 14, 2026
Al Jazeera, Hezbollah funding plan indicates a new challenge to Lebanon's government October 19, 2026
[55] BBC Arabic, حزب الله يعلن برنامج مساعدات للنازحين، فهل تلقى 200 مليون دولار من إيران؟ October 13, 2026


Constitutional Council Narrows the Scope of the General Amnesty Law

On October 12, the Constitutional Council rejected an appeal against the General Amnesty Law, keeping it in force, but amended several of its provisions in a ruling that substantially narrows its scope.[56] According to the ruling, the law will apply to crimes committed before March 1, 2026; the court removed wording that could have extended the amnesty to offenses committed later. It also imposed "binding interpretations" that exclude individuals convicted of corruption in both the public and private sectors, forgery, repeat drug offenses, and intentional murder from benefiting from the law.[57]

Prisoners and detainees at the Roumieh prison ended their hunger strike after the Court released its decision, though some expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome.[58] The Free Patriotic Movement, which had filed the appeal, welcomed the outcome, while Sunni MPs argued that the Council had bypassed Parliament's intent and demanded that Parliament elect its share of the Council's members.[59] Implementation has since proceeded through prosecutorial circulars that follow the Constitutional Council's interpretations, although no reliable estimate of the number of eligible detainees had emerged by late October.[60] Releases are therefore likely to be slower and narrower than detainees expected, sustaining the risk of renewed unrest in overcrowded prisons.

[56] Al-Modon, "الدستوري" يبت طعن العفو العام: رد المراجعة وتعديلات مختلفة October 12, 2026
[57] Al-Jareeda, قرار المجلس الدستوري في الطعن بقانون العفو العام ـ النص الحرفي October 12, 2026
Legal Agenda, أهمّ المكتسبات الحقوقيّة في قرار المجلس الدستوريّ October 12, 2026
L'Orient Today, General amnesty: Constitutional Council approves law, but excludes corruption crimes October 12, 2026
[58] Now Lebanon, Lebanon's General Amnesty Law faces questions over implementation after Constitutional Council ruling October 17, 2026
[59] Daily Beirut, After Amending the Amnesty Law... How Did 'Strong Lebanon' React to the Constitutional Council's Decision? October 13, 2026
Al-Liwaa, النواب السنّة يحثّوا تداعيات قرار «الدستوري» على «العفو» October 2026
[60] Beirut 24, مشلب: المجلس الدستوري لم يتعدَّ على صلاحيات مجلس النواب في قانون العفو العام October 22, 2026
Libnanews, General amnesty in Lebanon: behind the magistrates' agreement, a battle over sentences and release October 23, 2026

Economic Updates:



The 2027 Draft Budget: Public Sector Remuneration

The government approved the 2027 Draft Budget Law and sent it to Parliament on October 1.[64] The budget is estimated at 615 trillion Lebanese pounds (USD 6.9 billion) and proposes higher spending on public sector remuneration through bonuses and allowances, without changes to the underlying salary structure or scale. Public sector remuneration under the current draft budget would account for as much as 55% of total spending.[65]

Under the draft budget, each full-time public sector employee would receive an amount up to six times their base salary, calculated in USD at the pre-2019 LBP salary rate. Public sector workers would receive three additional base salaries starting January 2027, followed by three more as of August 2027.

However, this initiative is not without risk – payments could be reduced or suspended at the government's discretion, with no legal obligation to maintain them, if revenues fall or external shocks push up spending. Assuming the additional wages are paid, it would leave public sector salaries at roughly one-third of their pre-crisis level.[66] Finally, end-of-service indemnities are still calculated on the base LBP salary, which has lost 98% of its USD (or real) value.

[61] National News Agency, تجمع العمال دعا الى تصحيح الأجور October 3, 2026
[62] National News Agency, مصرف لبنان يفتح "حساب استرداد الودائع": يندرج في إطار إعادة الحقوق إلى أصحابها وتكريس مبدأ المساءلة وتعزيز الثقة بالنظام المالي اللبناني October 8, 2026
[63] National News Agency, الوفد اللبناني يواصل لقاءاته في بانكوك والوزير جابر يبحث دعم الإصلاحات وتمويل الإعمار والقطاع الخاص October 13, 2026
[64] National News Agency, وزير الإعلام: مجلس الوزراء اقر موازنة 2027 ووافق على إلغاء عدد من الوظائف في ملاك وزارة الصحة في اطار الاصلاحات وتعديل قيمة بدل النقل للقطاع العام October 1, 2026
[65] L'Orient Today, Lebanese budget 2027: Behind the balanced appearance, the same old weaknesses October 3, 2026
[66] Ibid.

Financial Sector Reform

A long-running dispute[67] over the Law on the Reform and Reorganization of Banks in Lebanon escalated in October when President Joseph Aoun lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Council over the wording of the law's Article 3. In its original form, the article stated that bank restructuring should proceed in accordance with Article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit (CMC). However, before the law was passed by Parliament, this phrase was removed. The Central Bank and the Finance and Budget Committee were in favor of retaining the reference to the CMC to maintain the Central Bank's oversight role in bank restructuring, whereas several MPs, ministers, and officials argued that – given issues about the Central Bank's neutrality – the Higher Banking Committee (HBC)[68] should have full autonomy over restructuring; a position in line with IMF requirements.[69]

President Aoun filed an appeal with the Constitutional Council to reinstate the reference to the CMC in the law. On October 20, the Constitutional Council approved the appeal and issued a ruling that removed several provisions from the amended law. Specifically, the Council annulled Article 3 on procedural grounds, thereby allowing the original wording from Law No. 23 of August 14, 2025 – which retains the CMC reference – to stand.[70]

The President's decision and subsequent ruling will likely reignite the underlying dispute and delay agreement on the final format and implementation of the Banking Resolution Law. The government may prepare a new draft, or Parliament may take the lead by advancing its own version of the bill. Notably, retaining language in the law referencing the CMC could complicate ongoing negotiations with the IMF, since the IMF supported the version of the law passed by Parliament that does not mention the CMC.[71] The decision may also fuel tensions between President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam; a minister close to Salam has indicated that Aoun is backing Central Bank Governor Karim Souhaid at the expense of meeting IMF benchmarks.[72]

Inflation

According to the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) September CPI report, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 1.35% month-on-month and 17.53% year-on-year. In the first nine months of 2026, the CPI increased by 16.3%. With the exception of food and non-alcoholic beverages (-0.23%), prices for all essential goods and services were up in September (Figure 7).

[67] Mercy Corps Lebanon, August Crisis Update September 3, 2026
[68] The Higher Banking Committee (HBC) is a conceptual committee that is newly developed through the Banking Resolution Law. It would oversee the banking restructuring process.
[69] L'Orient Today, Bank resolution: Joseph Aoun resorts to Constitutional Council, reigniting the battle over powers October 1, 2026
[70] The original version states that "Subject to compliance with the Code of Money and Credit, this law aims to strengthen the stability of the financial system, address cases of bank distress, protect deposits during liquidation and restructuring, and limit the use of public funds in restructuring any distressed bank."
[71] L'Orient Today, Banking resolution: Who will take charge after the ruling? October 23, 2026
[72] L'Orient Today, Banking reform: Constitutional Council ruling leaves power struggle unresolved October 21, 2026




Figure 7. *Monthly inflation of CPI components*
Source: Central Administration of Statistics (CAS)

LCAT ANALYSIS

Displacement and Inflation

LCAT examined the relationship between displacement and inflation by evaluating whether heightened economic activity across governorates that received large numbers of IDPs during the 2024 and 2026 wars in Lebanon contributed to changes in their CPI. To estimate the level of increased economic activity in Lebanese governorates, the analysis below adopts satellite Night Light Radiance (NLR) as a proxy indicator for economic activity (Figure 8).[73]

The results suggest that the prices of CPI components react differently to increased economic activity in the governorates of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, North, and Akkar – all of which hosted high numbers of IDPs – compared to other governorates. Figure 9 shows that the cost of rent (new leases), personal care, and insurance services rose more quickly from September 2023 to August 2026 in host governorates. Notably, clustering analysis does not suggest that displacement heavily affected the prices of healthcare; clothing and shoes; or water, electricity, gas, and fuel in host governorates over the same period.




Figure 8. *The Night Light Radiance change in Lebanese governorates in the last three years*
Source: LCAT analysis

[73] Satellite night light radiance analysis is the measurement and comparison of light observed from Earth at night by satellites, used to track changes in human activity across places and over time. These measurements are often used as an indirect indicator for economic activity, urban development, and electricity availability, particularly where conventional statistics are limited.
Mercy Corps Lebanon, Night-time Light Reflectance: A New Economic Vulnerability Score (EVS) For Lebanon October 5, 2023





Figure 9. *The change in CPI (September 2023–September 2026) against the change in NLR in Lebanese governorates*
Sources: LCAT analysis and Central Administration of Statistics (CAS)

Access to Services Updates:



[74] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, مقررات جلسة 1 تشرين الأول 2026 October 1, 2026
[75] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, مقررات جلسة 8 تشرين الأول 2026 October 8, 2026
[76] Annahar, كهرباء لبنان: محاولات عرقلة لإعادة تشغيل الزوق والجية October 8, 2026
Beirut24, الصدي: تشغيل معملي الزوق والجية يؤمّن ساعة ونصف إضافية من التغذية October 8, 2026
[77] The New Arab, Why Lebanon's long-awaited second airport is still not open October 15, 2026
[78] Nidaa al-Watan, اعتصام حاشد في البداوي رفضًا لإقامة مطمر للنفايات October 25, 2026
Al-Jadeed, مطمر نفايات قرب مدرسة.. وطلاب البداوي ينتفضون October 27, 2026
[79] Al-Modon, المطار بلا كهرباء: تنفيذ التهديد بالقطع بدأ باكراً October 28, 2026

EdL Cuts Power Due to Arrears

On November 3, EdL began cutting electricity supply to some public institutions, nearly one and a half weeks after announcing on October 23 that it would stop providing power to institutions that had not settled outstanding invoices. Among the institutions that EdL reportedly cut services to are the South Lebanon Water Authority and Bekaa Water Authority. Other water authorities reported that they remained connected to the grid after agreeing to begin paying outstanding bills.[80] As of December 2025, Lebanon's water establishments collectively owed USD 135.6 million, according to EdL.[81]

The measure extends an earlier campaign, previously addressed in LCAT's August Crisis Update, during which EdL began disconnecting public institutions and municipalities that had neither settled their overdue bills nor agreed on a payment plan. The dispute escalated as Minister of Energy and Water Joe Saddi announced on October 6 that he would not attend Cabinet sessions until the government addresses exemptions and arrears owed to EdL.[82]

EdL also gave Palestinian camps 20 days to pay before their supply is cut, although the government reportedly advised against cutting power to the camps over fears that it could lead to protests.[83] In Palestinian camps, cutting off the public electricity supply would deepen dependence on private generators and increase health and protection risks for an already vulnerable population.[84]

Qatari Plan to Overhaul Lebanon's Electricity Sector

On October 16, Qatar pledged to finance, implement, and operate a program to rehabilitate Lebanon's electricity generation under a build-operate-transfer model that requires no upfront investment from the Lebanese Treasury. The first project is a solar power plant slated to be developed by QatarEnergy and TotalEnergies. The broader program covers gas-fired generation, liquid natural gas supply, renewables, battery storage, and regional interconnection. However, payment obligations and guarantees remain under negotiation, and implementation would take at least three years.[85] By October 22, negotiations had advanced, and the finalized offer was submitted to the Cabinet.[86]

This represents the largest pledged foreign investment in Lebanon's power sector in years and comes at a time when reconstruction financing remains sparse: as of early 2026, only USD 250 million of the World Bank's USD 1 billion Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project is financed, and its USD 455 million reconstruction works component remains unfunded.[87]

Waste Management Challenges

Waste Collection in Central Lebanon Set to be Handed Over to Municipalities

On October 14, Parliament's joint committees took up proposed amendments to the 2018 Solid Waste Management Law, as waste collection contracts are set to expire at the end of the year, shifting more responsibility to

[80] L'Orient Today, EDL follows through on threat, cutting power to public institutions across Lebanon November 3, 2026
MTV Lebanon, الكهرباء ستُقطع اليوم عن مجلس النواب والسراي ومؤسّسات أخرى November 2, 2026
Beirut 24, ما هي الدوائر الرسميّة التي ستُقطع عنها الكهرباء اليوم؟ November 2, 2026
[81] Annahar, كهرباء لبنان تقطع التيار عن الإدارات المتخلّفة عن الدفع بدءاً من 2 تشرين الثاني October 23, 2026
Mercy Corps LCAT, August 2026 Crisis Update September 3, 2026
[82] Sky News Arabia, الكهرباء تفجر الحكومة اللبنانية.. وزير الطاقة "يعتكف" October 6, 2026
[83] IMLebanon, "كهرباء لبنان" تمهل 20 يوماً للمخيمات الفلسطينية: الدفع وإلا القطع October 24, 2026
[84] Ministry of Energy and Water, تسعيرة المولدات الخاصة في شهر ايلول 2026 October 1, 2026
MTV Lebanon, "كهرباء لبنان" تمهل ٢٠ يوماً للمخيمات الفلسطينية: الدفع وإلا القطع October 24, 2026
[85] The National, Qatar pledges to help modernise Lebanon's energy sector with electricity project October 16, 2026
Asharq Al-Awsat, Qatar Offers Comprehensive Plan to Ease Lebanon's Electricity Crisis October 17, 2026
Al Jazeera, Qatar announces 'massive' solar plant project in Lebanon October 16, 2026
[86] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, جلسة 22 تشرين الأول 2026 October 22, 2026
[87] World Bank Group, Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project: Frequently Asked Questions February 17, 2026

municipalities.[88] Under newly enacted Law 38/2026, municipalities will be tasked with waste collection and transport, while the state, through the National Solid Waste Management Authority, will finance and manage sorting, treatment, recycling, and operating sanitary landfills using earmarked fee revenues.[89]

Collection and street-sweeping contracts for Beirut, Metn, Keserwan, Baabda, Aley and the Chouf expire on December 31, 2026. Under a September 10 Cabinet decision, the CDR will tender two-year contracts, extendable by one year, for municipalities that choose to join, while others are free to manage such services themselves.[90] As of the September decision, municipalities had not yet started collecting the new fees.

The transition places operational responsibility on municipalities before the revenues to sustain it are being collected. Many municipalities are already financially strained or have absorbed the costs of hosting displaced populations, raising the risk of waste service gaps in parts of Beirut and Mount Lebanon in early 2027. It also points to a gradual shifting of waste-related costs onto households through fees, with service quality likely to become more uneven across areas.


Tripoli's Landfill Crisis


On October 22, in response to weeks of disruptions after the city's landfill reached capacity, the Council of Ministers adopted emergency measures to contain Tripoli's waste crisis.[91] Waste had begun accumulating in the streets after the landfill operator closed the facility, and neighboring Akkar, Minieh, and Deir Ammar refused to receive Tripoli's waste.[92] The measures, based on a decision issued by the Tripoli Municipality,[93] will see operations continue at the Tripoli landfill temporarily, while the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) works to reinforce the site, refurbish a waste treatment plant, and, most controversially, create a new landfill in Beddawi.[94]


The Council of Ministers' decision triggered strong local opposition, as the site of the new landfill is near homes and schools.[95] Concerns over its legality have also been raised, primarily because the landfill's construction was sanctioned under a 1969 decree, which authorizes the building of an incinerator at the site, but not explicitly a landfill. Moreover, no environmental impact assessment has been carried out at the site, and some critics have asserted that the Tripoli municipality acted outside its jurisdiction.[96] The plan, despite strong opposition, is likely to go ahead, as not doing so would render waste management in Tripoli unfeasible.

[88] Al-Modon, إشكالية الجمع والطمر والتمويل: كي لا نغرق مجدداً بالنفايات! September 28, 2026
[89] Legal Agenda, هل يعيد النقاش حول إدارة النفايات الصلبة حول نسب الرسوم البلدية؟ October 14, 2026
National News Agency, توضيح من وزارات البيئة والمالية والاقتصاد والتجارة حول الرسوم البيئية الجديدة | الوكالة الوطنية للإعلام June 26, 2026
Jbeil Today, توضيح من وزارات البيئة والمالية والاقتصاد والتجارة حول الرسوم البيئية الجديدة June 26, 2026
[90] Al-Modon, إشكالية الجمع والطمر والتمويل: كي لا نغرق مجدداً بالنفايات! September 28, 2026
[91] Al-Manar, مجلس الإنماء والإعمار: شاحنات دخلت عنوة الى مطمر طرابلس October 2, 2026
[92] Safir al-Chamal, بعد اغلاق مطمر النفايات.. اللجان الأهلية: طرابلس تغرق بالنفايات September 30, 2026
Nidaa al-Watan, حلواني يفنّد خطة نفايات طرابلس ويحذّر من المطمر البحري والمحرقة - مايز عبيد | نداء الوطن October 26, 2026
[93] On October 14, the Tripoli Municipal Council issued Decision No. 380, which invokes Decree No. 12623 of 1969 to place nine plots at the disposal of the National Solid Waste Management Authority.
MTV, بلدية طرابلس تستحضر مرسومًا من 1969 لحل أزمة النفايات في 2026 October 28, 2026
[94] The Cabinet authorized a temporary resumption of operations at the city's existing landfill until a new site is operational, and tasked the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) with reinforcing the site to increase capacity. The Cabinet also ordered the National Solid Waste Management Authority with rehabilitating the waste treatment plant used by the Union of Municipalities, in cooperation with the CDR.
Presidency of the Council of Ministers, جلسة 22 تشرين الأول 2026 October 22, 2026
[95] Al-Ahed, رئيس بلدية البداوي: قرار إنشاء مطمر النفايات تهديد للبيئة والصحة العامة October 23, 2026
[96] MTV, بلدية طرابلس تستحضر مرسومًا من 1969 لحل أزمة النفايات في 2026 October 28, 2026

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






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






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