

Thematic Report

Informal Social Protection Amid Conflict in Lebanon

October 2026



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The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.

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Introduction

Lebanon's overlapping crises have rapidly eroded households' abilities to meet basic needs and absorb shocks. Successive wars between Israel and Hezbollah in 2024 and 2026 displaced more than 1 million people each, damaged homes and livelihoods, and deepened an already severe poverty and food security crisis. Lebanon's limited formal social protection regime forces many households to rely on family, friends, neighbors, community actors, and diaspora connections to meet their immediate needs and cope with displacement.

Communities are often their own first responders during crises, and informal support drawn from a household's own network is more readily accessible than state or aid actor assistance.¹ Informal support includes tangible transfers such as cash, credit, and food, as well as intangible forms of assistance including market information, physical assistance, and emotional support that conventional vulnerability assessments often overlook. However, informal networks often have limited capacity to absorb repeated shocks, especially when an entire community is affected at once. They may support survival in the immediate term but cannot supplant state-administered social protection or humanitarian assistance.

Focusing on households affected by conflict and displacement in Lebanon, this report examines what assistance informal social protection (ISP) networks provide, how dependable the networks are, and whether households receiving ISP can support others in return. Drawing on post-distribution monitoring (PDM) data collected by Mercy Corps' Cash for Lebanon's Emergencies and Recovery (CLEAR) program, the report applies an ISP framework structured around six dimensions: network size, resources, diversity, reliability, reciprocity, and dynamics.²

¹ A. Humphrey, M. Elsamahi, M. Chohaney, et al., [Monitoring Informal Social Protection for Improved Humanitarian Diagnostics in Lebanon – Round 1](#) January 2024

² The findings of the study reflect the experience of assisted households who were part of the CLEAR program, and is not necessarily indicative of the experiences of all households in the studied regions.



Credit: AP

Conceptual Framework

The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah that began in October 2023 escalated into full-scale war in September–October 2024. Extensive bombardment, forced evacuation orders, and an Israeli ground operation led to mass displacement from southern Lebanon and other regions of the country. By November 2024, approximately 1.2 million people had been displaced, and 64,000 buildings were damaged or destroyed.³ Large-scale returns began immediately after a ceasefire was reached on November 27, 2024,⁴ and continued through 2025.⁵ Although the scale and the frequency of military actions declined following the November 2024 cessation of hostilities, Israeli forces continued to target Lebanon, particularly the south of the country, constraining livelihood recovery. Renewed hostilities between March 2026 and June 2026 displaced more than 1 million people, hundreds of thousands of whom fled areas to which they had only recently returned.⁶ More than 3 months after Lebanon and Israel signed the framework agreement on June 26, some 329,686 people remain displaced.⁷

Poverty and Vulnerability in Lebanon, 2024–2026

Between 2019 and 2024, real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by roughly 40%⁸ and the Lebanese pound had lost more than 98% of its value.⁹ Monetary poverty increased from 12% in 2012 to 44% in 2022, while multidimensional poverty affected around 73% of Lebanese and almost all non-Lebanese residents by 2023.¹⁰ While these figures pre-date the 2024–26 conflict escalation, they provide the most recent comprehensive baseline for understanding poverty.¹¹

³ United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, [The UN Calls for Urgent Recovery to Prevent Prolonged Crisis in Lebanon](#) July 24, 2025

⁴ Al Jazeera, [A year after Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire, over 64,000 Lebanese displaced](#) February 2, 2026

⁵ International Organization for Migration, [Lebanon: Mobility Tracking—Assessment Report, 23 September–3 October 2025](#) October 16, 2025

⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Flash Appeal: Lebanon, March - May 2026 \(March 2026\)](#) March 13, 2026


⁷ International Organization for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, [Lebanon Mobility Snapshot Round 118](#) October 1, 2026

⁸ World Bank Group, [Lebanon's Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Estimated at US\\$11 Billion](#)

⁹ World Bank Group, [Lebanon: New World Bank Project to Restore Basic Fiscal Management Functions in Support of Public Service Delivery](#) February 15, 2024

¹⁰ World Bank Group, [Lebanon Poverty and Equity Assessment 2024: Weathering a Protracted Crisis](#) May 2024

¹¹ Poverty was heavily concentrated in peripheral governorates, with rates in Akkar reaching 62% in 2022.



Widespread conflict in 2024 and 2026 substantially deepened existing vulnerabilities. The World Bank's Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimated the overall economic cost of the war period 2023–2024 at 14 billion US dollars (USD), comprising USD 6.8 billion in physical damage and USD 7.2 billion in economic losses.¹² The renewed war beginning in March 2026 added further destruction and economic disruption. Although comprehensive damage estimates for the 2026 war are not yet available, preliminary assessments put physical damage in southern Lebanon at approximately USD 1.38 billion.¹³ The wider economic impact is considerably higher, with the World Bank estimating that the 2026 war could cost USD 3.57 billion in lost tourism and domestic consumption revenues in 2026¹⁴ and result in a 6.4% contraction in GDP.¹⁵

Acute food insecurity affected approximately 1.6 million people in late 2024¹⁶ before declining to around 874,000 during November 2025–March 2026.¹⁷ However, renewed hostilities subsequently increased the number of people facing Crisis-level food insecurity or worse to an estimated 1.24 million for April–August 2026.¹⁸

Labor market insecurity further limits household resilience. High unemployment, widespread informal employment, and declining access to stable livelihoods mean that many households have limited income security. Displacement and conflict disproportionately affect daily workers, informal workers, small businesses, and self-employed households whose income depends on physical access to workplaces, markets, and productive assets.¹⁹

In this context, informal support mechanisms have become an important component of household resilience. With limited formal protection, households rely on family and community assistance, remittances, borrowing, and drawing on savings to maintain consumption and respond to shocks. This makes household and community networks particularly important for understanding how people cope with poverty and repeated shocks.

Informal Social Protection

ISP refers to the support that households mobilize through non-state channels – including family, friends, community, diaspora, religious institutions, and associational or political networks – to manage risk and absorb shocks where formal, state-provided protection is absent or insufficient.²⁰ Unlike formal social protection, ISP rests on relationships of solidarity, reciprocity, or obligation rather than legal entitlement. Its reach is shaped not only by the level of need but by the availability, strength, and resilience of a household's social network.

¹² World Bank Group, [Lebanon's Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Estimated at US\\$11 Billion](#) March 7, 2025

¹³ United Nations Development Programme, [Building-Level Damage Assessment: South Lebanon](#) June 2026

¹⁴ World Bank Group, [Lebanon Economic Monitor, Summer 2026: A Conflict-Torn Economy](#) August 2026

¹⁵ World Bank Group, [Lebanon](#) September 2026

¹⁶ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, [Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for October–November 2024 and Projection for December 2024–March 2025](#) December 2024

¹⁷ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, [Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for November 2025–March 2026](#) 2025

¹⁸ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, [Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for April–August 2026](#)

¹⁹ United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, [The Socioeconomic Impacts of the 2024 War on Lebanon](#) July 24, 2025

²⁰ R. Calder and T. Tanhchareun, [Informal Social Protection: Social Relations and Cash Transfers](#) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014



Lebanon provides a particularly important context for examining ISP, as the weakness of formal state provision has historically placed greater reliance on informal, community-based, and politically mediated forms of support. Access to assistance is often shaped by political and communal affiliations, rather than need alone, leaving unaffiliated and poorer groups more vulnerable.²¹ This system has been described as “sectarian welfare”; an informal form of redistribution and protection that fills gaps left by the state.²² Despite the prolonged crisis since 2019, this system has largely persisted, reinforcing fragmented and politicized forms of social protection rather than producing a fundamentally different welfare model.²³

Displacement increases the risk of heightened vulnerability at a time when access to formal protection may be disrupted. In Lebanon, over the past three years, displacement has not been solely a temporary condition. It has taken various forms: some households remain displaced, others move repeatedly, return partially, or return while still facing livelihood and housing insecurity.

²¹ M. Cammett and S. Issar, [Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon](#) World Politics, 2010, 62, 381-421

²² B. F. Salloukh, R. Barakat, J. S. Al-Habbal, et al., [The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon](#) Pluto Press 2015

²³ P. Proudfoot and S. Zoughaib, [The Politics of Social Assistance in Lebanon: Social Protection, Sectarianism and Lebanon's Fragmented Social Contract](#) BASIC Research Working Paper 32, Institute of Development Studies, 2025



Credit: AP

Methodology

This analysis draws on PDM data from the Mercy Corps CLEAR program, a multi-purpose cash assistance initiative implemented in Lebanon from March 2024 to July 2026 by Mercy Corps Lebanon. From this dataset, LCAT drew a sample of 1,082 households from South Lebanon, Baalbek-Hermel, and Akkar to study informal social support.

Since the PDM survey was conducted prior to the ceasefire of March 2026, another more recent dataset was used to update and complement some of the findings. The second dataset is drawn from a focused July 2026 survey that LCAT conducted on displacement, livelihoods, and remittances, with 321 households sampled from a Rapid Needs Assessment by Mercy Corps in April 2026. Data from this survey are analyzed in the callout boxes below.

This analysis examines six distinct dimensions of a household's support network, presented in Table 1 below. Each dimension comprises several indicators. The dimensions are analyzed separately to help understand how different forms of informal support vary across households.²⁴ Results for each dimension are disaggregated by governorate, gender of the head of household, and displacement status. The analysis is descriptive and intended to identify associations across household groups. Therefore, the findings should not be interpreted as causal; they do not establish that differences in support networks cause differences in household wellbeing outcomes.

²⁴ These six dimensions comprise the ISP Index. Scores from the dimensions are summed to produce a score ranging from 0 to 6, with higher scores indicating stronger informal support. The index was applied in previous LCAT studies to monitor changes in households' informal support networks over time. This analysis draws on cross-sectional rather than longitudinal data; it therefore does not rely on a single ISP score but examines each dimension individually. Mercy Corps Lebanon, [Monitoring Informal Social Protection \(ISP\) for Improved Humanitarian Diagnostics in Lebanon – Round 1](#) January 22, 2024; Mercy Corps Lebanon, [Monitoring Informal Social Protection in Lebanon – Round Two](#) August 20, 2024; Mercy Corps Lebanon, [Informal Social Protection and Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance](#) October 31, 2025



Dimension	What it captures
Network size	The number of people beyond an immediate household that can be turned to for help.
Resources	The variety of tangible and intangible resources received through a network (food, cash, loans, credit, market information, advice, psychosocial support).
Diversity	The different types of connections a household can rely on (relatives, friends, shopkeepers, employers, diaspora, and so on).
Reciprocity	A household's capacity to provide support to others, relative to what it receives.
Reliability	Confidence that a network will still provide support over the coming 12 months.
Dynamics	Self-reported change in a household's ability to receive and offer help over a recall period.

Table 1. Defining the six dimensions of ISP.



Findings

Network Size

Households reported relatively small and increasingly constrained support networks.

The “network size” dimension measures the number of people outside an immediate household that can be turned to for help. Respondents generally reported having few people in their social network whom they can rely on, with a weighted average network size of just 1.13 people. Female-headed households, households in South Lebanon, and those with an unemployed head of household reported slightly larger support networks.

	Average Network Size
<i>Head of Household Gender</i>	
Female	1.20
Male	1.08
<i>Origin of residence governorate</i>	
Akkar	0.973
Baalbek-Hermel	0.994
South Lebanon	1.38
<i>Head of household employment status</i>	
Unemployed	1.16
Employed	1.06

Table 2. Average network size.



Similarly, when asked to assess the size of their networks, most households described them as small. Nineteen percent reported that they did not have support networks at all. Demographic characteristics, including the head of household's gender and geographic location, were not significantly associated with differences in perceptions around network size.




Figure 1. Perceived network size.

Support networks appear to have shrunk for a sizable minority of households over the past year amid war-related instability, displacement, and economic hardship; 43% of households reported that their networks had become smaller, and 56% believed that they had not changed.




Figure 2. Perceived change in network size by governorate.



While the size of many households' support networks appears to have contracted, the quality, reliability, and effectiveness of these networks warrant further examination. Furthermore, qualitative analysis is needed to assess whether households with smaller but still "influential" networks may have access to more reliable support, and how relationships influence which resources and assistance are available to them.

Network Diversity

ISP networks were relatively narrow, relying mainly on family and friends, with the diversity of support also depending on the presence of formal humanitarian actors in war-affected areas.

The diversity dimension captures the range of sources households turned to for help. The strength of a household's ISP network is in large part determined by the diversity of resources that it can access from its informal support system.²⁵ Overall, households did not report that their networks were very diverse, with support heavily concentrated around kin and friends; relatives and family members were by far the most common source (52%), followed by friends (23%) and community volunteers (12%). Religious institutions, political parties, and businesses each accounted for less than 4%.




Figure 3. Sources of support.

²⁵ A. Humphrey, M. Elsamahi, M. Chohaney, et al., [Monitoring Informal Social Protection for Improved Humanitarian Diagnostics in Lebanon – Round 1](#) January 2024



Across all three governorates, households reported that relatives were the primary source of help (Figure 4), peaking at 61% in Akkar, followed by South Lebanon (54%) and Baalbek-Hermel (43%). NGOs were a major source of help in South Lebanon (46%) and Baalbek-Hermel (23%) but almost absent in Akkar (3%); a similar pattern emerged for local charities (20% in South Lebanon versus 2% in Akkar). This suggests that households in Akkar relied almost entirely on family and friends for support, whereas in the more heavily conflict-affected South formal humanitarian actors supplemented informal ties, reflecting the concentration of the humanitarian response in the areas most affected by the 2024 war.




Figure 4. Where did the household receive help from? By governorate.

The household head's gender made minimal difference (Figure 5). Female-led households drew somewhat more on relatives (57% versus 49%), NGOs (29% versus 22%), and religious institutions (5% versus 2%), while male-led households relied slightly more on friends (25% versus 21%). These broadly similar profiles indicate that the composition of support networks is shaped more by geography and the local presence of formal actors than by the gender of the household head.




Figure 5. Where did the household receive help from? By gender of head of household.



Resources

Households mainly received cash and food from their support networks, with households in South Lebanon receiving more support than those in other governorates.

The “resources” dimension examines what households actually received through their support networks, distinguishing tangible resources (cash, credit, food, and non-food items) from intangible resources (help finding work, market information, physical assistance, and emotional support). Overall, cash (25%) – which may include remittances sent from abroad, as well as cash shared between households residing in Lebanon – and food (23%) were the most commonly received forms of support, followed by emotional support (15%) and credit or loans (10%).




Figure 6. Type of support received from network.

Tangible support dominated the resources households drew from their networks, but its composition varied significantly by governorate (Figure 7). Cash was the most widely received tangible resource everywhere, and highest in South Lebanon (45%, versus 34% in both Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel). South Lebanon also reported the highest receipt of food (39%) and credit or loans (30%), consistent with a population under more acute strain. Akkar stood out for non-food items (14%, against 7% in Baalbek-Hermel and 5% in South Lebanon), while credit was nearly absent there (below 1%), pointing to distinct local support economies across the three regions.




Figure 7. Tangible resources received by households by governorate.

Regarding intangible support, emotional support was by far the most common resource received in every governorate (see Figure 8). Market information (11%) and help finding work (7%) were reported almost exclusively in South Lebanon and were minimal elsewhere.





Figure 8. Intangible resources received by households by governorate.



Remittances Among Vulnerable Displaced Households

The LCAT team surveyed 321 internally displaced households in the final two weeks of July 2026. The survey covered war-affected areas of Lebanon and examined households' displacement and return experiences, as well as changes in the support they received throughout the conflict.

Results from the survey show that cash remittances from abroad are a marginal and fragile support channel for vulnerable IDPs, blunting immediate hardships for only a small minority of households. Only 5% of the surveyed households received cash from abroad between April and June 2026.

These findings are in line with an earlier Mercy Corps/LCAT report from 2023 that showed how remittances are distributed unequally: higher-income households (59%) received them more regularly than lower-income households (7%). The report also showed that remittances flow mainly through close family, who send larger and more regular amounts than extended family or friends; the most vulnerable households are those least likely to have close family members abroad.

The main findings from the IDP household survey can be summarized as follows:

- **Remittances rose only marginally with displacement.** The percentage of households receiving remittances rose from 2% in the year before displacement to 7% while displaced, before settling at 5% at the time of the survey (July 2026). Very few households began receiving transfers only after displacement in response to the shock.
- **Extended-family solidarity took precedence over the breadwinner model.** Those sending remittances were mainly siblings (44%) and other relatives (25%), rather than sons or daughters (19%) or a spouse (Figure 6). This shows that remittances during displacement were a form of support from extended family and community solidarity, which is closer to informal social protection than to the classic labor-migration remittance model.




Figure 9. Main sender of remittances.

- **The majority of transfers were small, and nearly half were only sent “when needed”.** The transferred amounts were modest. More than half (59%) were between USD 50 and 99. The timing was irregular, with just under half sent “when needed” (47%) or otherwise ad hoc. Only 12% of recipients received money on a regular basis (Figure 10).




Figure 10. Frequency and average dollar amount of transfers.

- **Remittances were used for food and healthcare, not recovery.** Food was the dominant purchase (100% of recipients used a portion of remittances to purchase food during displacement, up from 71% before) followed by healthcare (53%, up from 14%), with rent a distant third and virtually none allocated to business expenses, debt, or reconstruction. Only 4 of 19 recipient households used remittances to help repair their home (Figure 11).





Figure 11. Uses of remittances before and during displacement.



Reliability

Households had only moderate trust in domestic support networks and had very low confidence in support from abroad.

The “reliability” dimension measures households’ confidence that their support networks could provide help over the coming 12 months. Respondents rated their confidence in networks inside Lebanon and abroad as “not confident”, “somewhat confident”, or “very confident”.

Confidence in domestic networks was moderate and rarely strong. Across governorates, “somewhat confident” was the most common response – 64% in Baalbek-Hermel, 55% in South Lebanon and 49% in Akkar – while “very confident” responses were consistently low (6–8%). Akkar households were the least assured, with 45% not confident at all, compared with 37% in South Lebanon and 28% in Baalbek-Hermel. The near absence of strong confidence anywhere signals that, even where informal networks remain active, households are uncertain about their durability under continued strain.




Figure 12. Confidence in support network inside Lebanon to provide support in the next 12 months.

Confidence in networks outside Lebanon was markedly lower. A majority of households were not at all confident in support from abroad, and “very confident” responses were virtually nil. This likely reflects the fact that only 6% of households reported at least one support person outside Lebanon within their networks, and very few reported receiving concrete support from these network members.




Figure 13. Confidence in support network outside Lebanon to provide support in the next 12 months.

Relying on Social Networks During Displacement

For some households, social networks were a reliable source of information when making decisions during displacement.

- **Networks influenced the choice of destination for many displaced households.** Forty percent of displaced households reported that the presence of a specific person at the destination influenced their decision to go there; for the other 60%, considerations such as safety, cost, or distance took precedence.
- **Family and friends were most influential.** Among households whose destination was shaped by someone's presence, that person was most often a close relative (35%), a friend (30%), or an extended relative (25%), reflecting the reliance on family and extended family pattern seen across the informal-support findings.




Figure 14. Relationship of that person to the household (base: 129)

- **Networks mostly provided shelter support.** Among households that received support from their networks, half (50%) reported help finding accommodation and nearly half (49%) were hosted in a network member's home. Networks also provided help registering for aid (20%), reassurance that the area was safe (19%), transport (12%), or information about the area (12%). Financial help was rare.




Figure 15. Help provided by people known at the destination (multiple response)

Note on the sample: the module covers 321 displaced households (no missing responses). The relationship between influential contacts and the help provided are based on the 129 households (40%) whose destination choice was shaped by a specific person; the help question allowed multiple answers, so those percentages sum to more than 100%.



Reciprocity

Reciprocity was limited, reflecting economic constraints, and most contributions were non-material, particularly emotional support.

Reciprocity captures whether households not only draw on their networks but also give back to them. As the figure below shows, only about a third of households reported giving any form of support back to their networks. This asymmetry between receiving and giving is consistent with a population under acute economic strain, in which many households retain access to supportive networks but have little surplus to share.

Reciprocation was lowest in South Lebanon (24%), compared with Baalbek-Hermel (34%) and Akkar (32%). This moderate gap is likely attributable to the heavier and more recent conflict exposure and displacement in South Lebanon, which eroded households' capacity to give. Differences by gender of household head were minimal, indicating that gender is not, on its own, a strong determinant of a household's ability to reciprocate. Employment status was associated with the widest gap: 35% of households with an employed head of household reciprocated assistance, against 26% of those with an unemployed head of household. This nine-point difference shows that access to earned income directly impacts capacity to contribute to a network. Taken together, these patterns suggest that reciprocity is shaped primarily by economic capacity rather than demographic characteristics. As economic pressures and displacement intensify, fewer households may be able to reciprocate, weakening informal support networks precisely when they are needed most.





Figure 16. Households who reciprocated assistance to their networks by governorate, gender of household head, and employment status.



As the figure below shows, the support offered was overwhelmingly non-material. Emotional support was the most common contribution (22%), exceeding every tangible transfer. Material assistance was rare, including food (7%) and cash gifts (2%). Under severe financial constraints, households appear to reciprocate with emotional and informational support, substituting for material resources.




Figure 17. Resources households provided to their networks.



Credit: Mercy Corps

Conclusion

Informal social support among vulnerable households affected by conflict is real but fragile. It is consumption-oriented, family-dependent, geographically uneven, and erodes amid repeated conflict. Cash and shelter assistance remain essential, and the households that most need external support are those with no or shrinking networks, an unemployed head of household, and without a support channel.

The following recommendations are based on the report's findings:

Pair emergency cash with livelihoods and asset-recovery support. Both informal networks and remittances fund food, healthcare, and emotional support almost exclusively, with virtually nothing used for jobs, business, or reconstruction. Combining consumption support with cash-for-work, business-restart grants, and skills-to-employment pathways would help households move from coping to recovery.

Stabilize household incomes to protect the informal system itself. Reciprocity is constrained by economic capacity. As poverty deepens, fewer households can give back, eroding networks precisely when they are needed most. Predictable income support helps recipients and preserves the reciprocal social capital on which the whole system depends.




Embed mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) in programming. Emotional support was the single most exchanged resource in these networks, the most common form both received (15%) and given (22%). Community-based psychosocial support should be a standard component of support.





Add a short network/ISP module to vulnerability assessment surveys to capture the "network-poor." Nineteen percent of households reported having no network at all, and these types of households are largely not accounted for in income- and consumption-based targeting. Incorporating a few indicators such as network size, presence of at least one reliable contact, and receipt of any informal support would flag households that lack an informal buffer entirely and should be prioritized for assistance.

Institutionalize ISP monitoring as an early-warning diagnostic. Shifts in network size and reliability are leading indicators of deteriorating resilience that standard vulnerability metrics miss. Repeating this post-distribution monitoring-based ISP measurement across rounds would enable humanitarian actors to detect rising need between shocks, anticipate where informal buffers are collapsing, and proactively adjust targeting.



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