


Lebanon Crisis Update

July 2026



Source: AP

- 03 ● Key Takeaways
- 04 ● Conflict Updates
- 16 ● Political Updates
- 19 ● Economic Updates
- 26 ● Access to Services Updates



The Monthly Lebanon Crisis Update provides an overview of economic and political developments to alert the international aid response to new and emerging challenges that could impact the humanitarian situation in Lebanon. In the context of the multiple crises affecting Lebanon, the update tracks the impact of political developments on the economy, relevant international developments, updates on service delivery and governance issues, and analysis of the drivers of humanitarian need as they develop. The report also aims to provide nuanced forecasting on contextual shifts relevant to shifting needs and the implementation of humanitarian programming. The report draws upon a desk review of currently available literature, analysis of relevant quantitative data, and key informant interviews with a range of experts and individuals with knowledge of Lebanon's economy.

The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.

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


Key Takeaways:

- The truce between Israel and Hezbollah has largely held since June 20, even as military exchanges between the United States (US) and Iran, along with their respective allies, have escalated across the region. Israeli military operations continued throughout July in southern Lebanon, albeit at significantly lower pace compared to March through late June and within a far more geographically limited area.
- The main diplomatic track for resolving the conflict in Lebanon is the US-brokered June 26 Trilateral Framework, featuring a “pilot zones” initiative under which Israeli forces withdraw from designated areas and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deploy to prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing an armed presence.
- President Joseph Aoun visited Washington to meet with US officials concerning the truce in Lebanon, Hezbollah disarmament, support for the LAF, and post-conflict recovery. The visit drew a range of reactions in Lebanon, with some political figures hailing it as a step toward Israeli withdrawal, aid mobilization, and economic relief, while Hezbollah declared it a failure. Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri has adopted a more nuanced stance, backing an end to the war and LAF deployment in the south while publicly rejecting direct talks with Israel.
- Lebanon’s draft Media Law could mark a major step toward greater protection for journalists, including decriminalizing defamation, banning pre-trial detention for journalists, and creating an independent media regulator. Yet, the draft faces considerable criticism, with many arguing that provisions undermine its reformist intent, including one that could see journalists face criminal charges over “false news”.
- Parliament’s Finance and Budget Committee approved several articles of the Law on Bank Resolution and Restructuring, though its implementation is contingent on the government also passing the Financial Stabilization and Deposits Repayment Act, which remains under International Monetary Fund review. Doubts remain over the feasibility of Lebanon’s financial recovery plan, given the government’s inability to fund its share of recovery and the estimated 2.3 billion US dollars that will be needed to recapitalize the country’s banks.
- The Council of Ministers suspended Decree 3214, which imposes a 1–3% environmental tax on imported goods that generate solid waste under the “polluter pays” principle. The government cited concerns that importers, wholesalers, and retailers might use the environmental fees as a pretext for arbitrary price increases.
- Parliament passed the Fisheries and Aquaculture Law on July 17, opening the fisheries and aquaculture sectors to foreign investment and permitting foreign vessels to fish in Lebanese waters. While the ministry framed the law as protecting small-scale fishers, unions warned that its provisions and apparent loopholes could enable monopolization. Dubbing it a “disguised privatization”, fishers have petitioned for amendments and threatened protests.
- In July, several regions coped with water shortages, including a multi-day shutdown of Beirut’s Dbayeh pipeline, twice-weekly cuts in Tripoli, and reduced supply in southern Lebanon. With the public water system unable to meet demand, many households have turned to costly, unregulated private water tankers, which researchers warn carry contamination risks.



Conflict Updates :



¹ Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif via X, @CMShehbaz April 8, 2026

² Times of Israel, [Netanyahu: Ceasefire doesn't cover Lebanon, US told Israel it's committed to achieving our shared goals in talks with Iran](#) April 8, 2026

³ L'Orient Today, [Israel says planted flag on medieval Beaufort Castle, near Nabatieh](#) May 31, 2026

⁴ The New York Times, [Iran and Israel Exchange Strikes for First Time Since April Cease-Fire](#) June 7, 2026

⁵ The New York Times, [Israel Strikes Beirut Outskirts as Fighting With Hezbollah Escalates](#) June 14, 2026

⁶ US President Donald Trump via Truth Social, @realDonaldTrump June 15, 2026

⁷ BBC, [US-Iran memorandum of understanding in full](#) June 18, 2026

⁸ Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs via X, @MofaQatar_EN June 22, 2026

⁹ US State Department, [Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon](#) June 26, 2026

¹⁰ US Central Command, [U.S. Forces to Resume Naval Blockade Against Iran](#) July 13, 2026;

Reuters, [Iran expands attacks on Gulf states after US strikes, says Strait of Hormuz closed](#) July 13, 2026

¹¹ US Department of State, [Launch of First Pilot Zones in Lebanon](#) July 20, 2026;

Lebanese Army, قيادة الجيش: الوحدات العسكرية دخلت بلدة زوطر الغربية ولم تدخل زوطر الشرقية July 21, 2026



Security

High-intensity hostilities in Lebanon have paused, although the risk of expanded conflict remains significant amid escalating military exchanges between the US, Iran, and their respective allies.

- Since June 20, 2026, levels of Israeli fire in Lebanon have decreased significantly in both scope and tempo (see conflict trend analysis below). This tentative truce came as part of US pressure to implement the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Iran and the United States.¹²
- Signed on June 17, the MoU calls for a cessation of hostilities (CoH) in Lebanon between the “allies” of Washington and Tehran¹³ – an implicit reference to Israel and Hezbollah – and the establishment of a deconfliction cell. However, this cell has yet to be formed,¹⁴ while the MoU has effectively collapsed.
- On July 11, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed to shipping after renewed US military strikes.¹⁵ The US, in turn, resumed its naval blockade of Iran three days later.¹⁶ The regional conflict has since escalated, with Iran-aligned Ansarallah forces in Yemen exchanging fire with Saudi Arabia and declaring a naval blockade of the Kingdom in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Iran-backed militias in Iraq have launched cross-border drone attacks targeting Saudi Arabia, prompting joint US-Saudi retaliatory strikes in Iraq, thus widening the conflict.¹⁸
- In Lebanon, the US has sought to resolve the conflict through a diplomatic track between Beirut and Tel Aviv. On June 26, Israel, the US, and Lebanon agreed to a Trilateral Framework that established a conditional arrangement linking the Lebanese state's “disarmament of non-state armed groups” to Israel “progressively redeploy[ing] out of Lebanese territory.” The framework is not supported by Iran and Hezbollah.²⁰
- The June 26 Framework is predicated on preventing or deescalating potential military actions by Hezbollah or Israel.²¹ While it does establish “pilot zones” – areas from which the Israeli military should withdraw and to which the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will deploy to prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing an armed presence – the mechanism's success depends on Israel's continued commitment to the framework,²² the LAF's capacity to execute its mission, and sustained US engagement as the chief guarantor of the process.

¹² Reuters, [Lebanon ceasefire agreed after US-Iran talks in Switzerland scrapped](#) June 19, 2026;

PressTV, [Iran closes Strait of Hormuz after US-Israeli violations of MoU](#) June 20, 2026

¹³ BBC, [US-Iran memorandum of understanding in full](#) June 18, 2026

¹⁴ In a meeting with the press on July 11, 2026, President Aoun stated that Lebanon has not yet named its representative to the deconfliction cell, despite a request from the US to do so, but added that Iran had also not named a representative.

Nida al-Watan, [عون: السلطة السياسية وقائد الجيش على قلب واحد](#) July 11, 2026

¹⁵ Reuters, [Iran expands attacks on Gulf states after US strikes, says Strait of Hormuz closed](#) July 13, 2026

¹⁶ US Central Command, [U.S. Forces to Resume Naval Blockade Against Iran](#) July 13, 2026

¹⁷ The New York Times, [How the Houthis Cornered Saudi Arabia Into a New Conflict](#) July 27, 2026

¹⁸ The Guardian, [US-Saudi strikes in Iraq push region into 'uncharted territory', analysts warn](#) July 29, 2026

¹⁹ US State Department, [Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon](#) June 26, 2026

²⁰ LOrient Today, [Naim Qassem rejects Lebanon-Israel agreement, declares it 'null and void'](#) June 27, 2026;

Radio Free Europe, [Skepticism in Iran Over Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement](#) June 29, 2026;

Amwaj, [Israel-Lebanon deal, clashes in Hormuz put Iran-US diplomacy to the test](#) June 29, 2026

²¹ L'Orient Today, [The Lebanon-Israel 'Security' annex agreement revealed](#) June 29, 2026

²² Axios, [Behind the scenes: How shared fear of Iran led to an Israel-Lebanon deal](#) June 28, 2026



- The US has thus far pressured Israel to limit its military activities in Lebanon while it pursues diplomacy with Iran.²³ Hezbollah, for its part, has avoided escalation, as it likely believes a favorable US-Iran framework can still be reached – Iran has asserted that ending the conflict in Lebanon must be part of any such framework.²⁴
- However, the likelihood of Hezbollah resuming military operations against Israel would increase if US-Iran hostilities escalate beyond the current tit-for-tat exchanges.²⁵ The US has reportedly warned Lebanese authorities that if Hezbollah were to reenter the regional conflict, Israel would launch a large-scale military retaliation in Lebanon.²⁶




Figure 1. Heatmap of Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon from June 21 through August 2. Source: LCAT analysis

Israel's military activity in Lebanon has fallen to its lowest level since the most recent widescale hostilities with Hezbollah began on March 2, 2026.

- From June 21 through August 2, 2026, Israel conducted an average of 2.1 airstrikes per day in Lebanon. This rate is consistent with its operational tempo following the November 27, 2024 CoH,²⁷ albeit with a far more limited geographic scope.

²³ On June 29, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that US President Donald Trump had linked Washington's standoff with Iran to the conflict in Lebanon, adding that Tel Aviv would "not interfere with the US president's course of action vis-à-vis the Iranians."

Times of Israel, [Katz: Israel has 'no territorial ambitions in Lebanon,' but will not withdraw further until Hezbollah disarmed; IDF would have destroyed Hezbollah were it not for US constraints](#) June 29, 2026

²⁴ On July 23, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah said that "in the end, no matter how long the attacks last, the Americans will return to the agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the first item in that agreement will be Lebanon."

National News Agency, [النائب فضل الله: لم يحصل أي انسحاب للعدو من أرض محتلة والسلطة تستثمر باستعراضات لانجاز وهمي](#) July 23, 2026

July 7, 2026 [حشي في تكريم شهداء "حزب الله" في دبعال: لسنأ في وارد أن نعطي العدو ذريعة لتخريب اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار ولكن لصبرنا حدود](#)

²⁵ On March 2, 2026, Hezbollah opened a military front against Israel following the start of the joint large-scale US-Iran military campaign targeting Iran, which killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Hezbollah recently sent a letter to Mojtaba Khamenei reaffirming their loyalty to Iran's new supreme leader. On July 23, *L'Orient Today* reported that if the US were to launch a new war against Iran in an attempt to overthrow the regime, Hezbollah would "be compelled to respond."

Al-Mayadeen, [السيد محتبي لمجاهدي حزب الله: أنتم رواد فضائل الجهاد... وصون سيادة لبنان شرط أول لإيران](#) July 26, 2026

L'Orient Today, [Aoun-Trump meeting: Will Lebanon be able to separate itself from the Islamabad process?](#) July 23, 2026

²⁶ Nida al-Watan, [إنذار أميركي للميليشيا: لا صواريخ ولا مستترات ولا فأبواب جهنم](#) July 28, 2026;

Al-Jadeed News via X, [@ALJADEEDNEWS](#) July 29, 2026

²⁷ LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. Between June 21 and August 2, 2026, Israel conducted a total of 91 strikes. From November 27, 2024 through March 1, 2026, Israel conducted an average of 2.75 airstrikes a day.




Figure 2. Daily rate of Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon (March 2–August 2, 2026). Source: LCAT analysis

- During this period, Israel has concentrated 60% of its airstrikes toward the Ali al-Taher hills outside Nabatieh and neighboring towns.²⁸ The Israeli military says it is besieging an underground Hezbollah military compound in Ali al-Taher and has struck what it claims were Hezbollah operatives emerging from the site.²⁹
- Israel has also conducted another 31 airstrikes since June 21 in villages along the “Yellow Line” demarcating the extent of its military occupation along the border. Of these, Mansouri has been the hardest-hit, with nine airstrikes. Some 70% of the town – which is divided by the Yellow Line and is home to approximately 4,000 residents – has been destroyed by Israeli military operations.³⁰




Figure 3. Daily rate of Israeli airstrikes between the Yellow Line and the Zahrani River (March 2–August 2, 2026) Source: LCAT analysis

²⁸ LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. Between June 21 and July 31, 2026, Israel conducted 54 strikes within a 30-square-kilometer area around the Ali al-Taher Hills that includes the towns of Nabatieh, Nabatieh al-Fauqa, Kfar Tebnit, Maifadoun, Kfar Roummane, Choukine, and Maifadoun.

²⁹ Israeli military via Telegram, [@idfofficial](#) July 10, 2026;

Times of Israel, [IDF confirms Hezbollah drone hit bulldozer, breaking Lebanon truce](#) July 29, 2026

³⁰ L'Orient Today, [In Mansouri, 70% destroyed by Israel, just a few dozen returnees out of 4,000 residents](#) June 22, 2026

L'Orient Today, [Mansouri, the village divided by Israel's 'yellow line'](#) July 25, 2026



- Israel has also intermittently shelled areas close to its military positions, and launched at least 110 attacks with first-person view (FPV) drones. One such attack in Bourj Qalaouiye on June 28 injured two people, consistent with Israel's policy of using FPVs to harass returning residents along the border after the November 27, 2024 CoH.³¹ Several of these FPV attacks have also ignited fires, including a July 12 attack outside Marjayoun that set wheat fields and olive groves ablaze.³²




Figure 4. Heatmap of Israeli FPV attacks in southern Lebanon (June 21–August 2, 2026). Source: LCAT analysis

- Since June 20, Israel has not attacked alleged Hezbollah weapons infrastructure or conducted targeted assassinations of the group's operatives outside southern Lebanon. This suggests that its freedom of action is more constrained than Israeli officials have publicly indicated,³³ given that it regularly carried out such strikes since the start of hostilities on October 8, 2023, including following the November 27, 2024 CoH.
- The unpublished Security Annex to the June 26 Trilateral Framework reportedly includes a clause granting Israel "freedom of action against emerging and immediate threats" within territory controlled by its military in southern Lebanon.³⁴ However, reports do not clarify the extent of Israel's freedom of action elsewhere in Lebanon. On June 29, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz suggested that Washington had imposed significant restraints on Tel Aviv's military actions in Lebanon amid talks with Tehran.³⁵
- In a sign of this, Israel conducted a relatively restrained retaliation to a July 29 FPV attack on a military vehicle that it claimed was carried out by Hezbollah.³⁶ On July 31, the Israeli military staged a large demolition near the Beaufort Castle within its occupied zone,³⁷ amid reports of US pressure to refrain from more escalatory responses that could undermine the Trilateral Framework.³⁸

³¹ LCAT logged all Israeli FPV attacks across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen* following the November 27, 2024 CoH. LCAT resumed this logging after the most recent escalation on June 19–20, 2026.

³² National News Agency, *قنابل حارقة من مسيرة معادية على خراج جديدة مرجعيون تسببت باندلاع حريق كبير*, July 12, 2026

³³ Times of Israel, *Katz reiterates IDF's 'complete freedom of action' to counter threats in Lebanon and elsewhere*, June 22, 2026

³⁴ Times of Israel, *Source: Israel-Lebanon security annex preserves full IDF freedom of action; Jerusalem remains wary of Iran interference*, June 28, 2026

³⁵ On June 29, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said that US President Donald Trump had linked Washington's standoff with Iran to the conflict in Lebanon, adding that Tel Aviv would "not interfere with the US president's course of action vis-à-vis the Iranians."

Times of Israel, *Katz: Israel has 'no territorial ambitions in Lebanon,' but will not withdraw further until Hezbollah disarmed; IDF would have destroyed Hezbollah were it not for US constraints*, June 29, 2026

³⁶ Israeli military via Telegram, *@idfofficial*, July 29, 2026

³⁷ Israeli military via Telegram, *@idfofficial*, July 31, 2026

³⁸ Israeli Channel 14, *בזמן שנתניהו בארה"ב: בחיזבללה מנצלים את ההזדמנות להסלמה*, July 30, 2026



Since the most recent truce, Hezbollah has not claimed responsibility for military operations targeting Israeli territory.




Figure 5. Daily rate of Hezbollah attacks since March 2, 2026.
Source: LCAT analysis of Hezbollah claims of responsibility of attacks.

- In the initial days after the June 20 truce, Hezbollah issued statements listing Israeli military actions it considers violations. In these announcements, the group warned that it “reserves its right to defend its homeland and people,” suggesting it could retaliate against Israeli action that crosses a threshold.³⁹
- On July 7, Hezbollah MP Hussein Jeshi said that Hezbollah would refrain from any action that would give Israel a pretext to launch military strikes and undermine the June 17 MoU between Iran and the US.⁴⁰ While the MoU has since fallen apart, Hezbollah has not taken any overt action against Israel. Hezbollah reportedly views the US-Iran military exchanges as not crossing mutually recognized red lines and has thus refrained from reentering the conflict.⁴¹
- Amid regional military escalations, Israel said that Hezbollah conducted an FPV attack on one of its vehicles in southern Lebanon in the early hours of July 29.⁴² Hezbollah denied responsibility.⁴³
- Hezbollah military figures recently sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamanei reaffirming their loyalty to Iran’s ultimate decision-maker.⁴⁴ Hezbollah is ideologically bound to adhere to the decisions of Iran’s supreme leader under the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih.⁴⁵ A renewed major US and/or Israeli military campaign against Iran would likely prompt Hezbollah to attack Israel, as it did on March 2 in retaliation for the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei.⁴⁶

³⁹ The group ceased issuing these communiques in late June 2026. The following is an example of one:

National News Agency, “نراقب انتهاكات العدو ونحفظ بحق الدفاع عن وطننا وشعبنا” June 29, 2026

⁴⁰ National News Agency, “جيشي في ديبال: لسانا في وارد أن نعطي العدو ذريعة لتخريب اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار ولكن لصبرنا حدود” July 7, 2026

⁴¹ L’Orient Today, “Aoun-Trump meeting: Will Lebanon be able to separate itself from the Islamabad process?” July 23, 2026

⁴² Israeli military via Telegram, @idfofficial July 29, 2026

⁴³ L’Orient Today, “Zamir says Israeli troops will ‘advance deeper’ into south Lebanon if necessary” July 29, 2026

⁴⁴ Al-Mayadeen, “السيد محنتي لمجاهدي حزب الله: أنتم رواد فصائل الجهاد... وصون سيادة لبنان شرط أول لإيران” July 26, 2026

⁴⁵ L’Orient Today, “Could Hezbollah survive the fall of the Iranian regime?” January 15, 2026

⁴⁶ National News Agency, “المقاومة الإسلامية” تستهدف موقع “مشار الكرمل” في حيفا بالصواريخ والمسيرات” March 2, 2026



Displacement

While hostilities have significantly reduced since June 20, displacement will remain one of Lebanon's most pressing humanitarian concerns.

- Israel's occupation of some 650 square kilometers of Lebanese territory along the border – about 6% of the country – is preventing the return of residents. According to an analysis of WorldPop Global Demographic Data,⁴⁷ the zone is home to approximately 147,000 people. **LCAT estimates that nearly all of them – with the exception of those from Christian-populated villages – are unable to return, comprising an estimated 134,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).**




Figure 6. The Israeli military's Yellow Line laid over a population density map of southern Lebanon (darker shades of red indicate higher population levels). Source: LCAT analysis [WorldPop](#)

- Just prior to the most recent truce, an estimated 1 million people were displaced in Lebanon.⁴⁸ Since then, some 750,000 have begun returning to their homes.⁴⁹ The number of IDPs in communal shelters has fallen from a high of 141,440 to 29,729.⁵⁰
- Several factors will hamper residents' permanent return to homes outside of Israeli-occupied territories, primarily heavy property damage across southern Lebanon. Additionally, any new Israeli shelling risks displacing returnees again. Indeed, since March 2, there have been several waves of returns followed by renewed displacements. For example, an intense wave of Israeli shelling in southern Lebanon between June 19-20, sparked displacement from the Bint Jbeil and Sour districts.⁵¹

⁴⁷ LCAT cross-referenced geographic data on Israel's evacuation notices, airstrikes, and artillery shelling with WorldPop's global demographic data, which uses satellite imagery and geospatial analysis to estimate population distribution.

WorldPop, [Population Data](#).

⁴⁸ OCHA, [Lebanon: Flash Update #36 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon](#) June 18, 2026

⁴⁹ IOM, [Lebanon — Mobility Snapshot - Round 109](#) July 23, 2026

⁵⁰ IOM, [Lebanon — Mobility Snapshot - Round 109](#) July 23, 2026;

L'Orient Today, [40% of forcibly displaced return to home regions, announces Haneen Sayed](#) June 29, 2026

⁵¹ National News Agency, [حركة نزوح كثيفة من قضاءي صور و بنت جبيل باتجاه صيدا و بيروت](#) June 19, 2026



Political and Social Tensions

Lebanon's diplomatic process with Israel is heightening political tensions, but a dramatic escalation remains unlikely in the near term.

- Hezbollah has repeatedly warned of strife if direct diplomacy with Israel is pursued, or if efforts are made to disarm the group. The party has strongly rejected the Trilateral Framework, though its leaders have stopped short of directly threatening to take down the government in the near term.⁵² On June 29, Hezbollah official Mahmoud Qomati said that his organization does not plan to resign from the government in the near future or to stage mass protests in response to the Trilateral Framework.⁵³ In March, Qomati said Hezbollah could overthrow the government, but added that any such move would come after the conflict with Israel was resolved.⁵⁴
- Hezbollah would likely coordinate any political escalation in Lebanon with the Amal Movement.⁵⁵ However, it is unclear whether the Amal Movement's leader, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, would support such a move. While Berri has publicly rejected the Trilateral Framework, he has reiterated his opposition to domestic conflict in Lebanon and has demonstrated tacit support for President Aoun following the latter's visit to Washington.⁵⁶ In the wake of the July 21 White House meeting, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and US President Donald Trump both praised Berri, reflecting hopes in Washington and Beirut that Berri will support the Trilateral Framework.⁵⁷
- At present, Hezbollah lacks the political leverage to topple the Lebanese government through constitutional means, such as the resignation of a sufficient number of cabinet ministers or a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Without the support of Berri and other major allies, Hezbollah would struggle to challenge the Lebanese government's legitimacy or attempt to unseat it through mass protests or armed action, as it did during Lebanon's political crisis between November 2006 and May 2008.⁵⁸
- Following the June 26 announcement of the Trilateral Framework, Hezbollah supporters staged limited protests and briefly closed Beirut's airport road, which the LAF later reopened.⁵⁹ This mirrors similar limited protests in Beirut in mid-April.⁶⁰ Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement, the two main Shia Muslim political parties in the country, called off the protests to "protect civil peace."⁶¹

⁵² Alaraby Aljadeed, [قباي في حزب الله: لن نسمح بتطبيق اتفاق واشنطن ولن نستقبل من الحكومة](#) June 29, 2026

Al-Modon, [فضل الله: السلطة عاجزة عن تنفيذ الاتفاق إلا بحرب أهلية](#) June 26, 2026

⁵³ Alaraby Aljadeed, [قباي في حزب الله: لن نسمح بتطبيق اتفاق واشنطن ولن نستقبل من الحكومة](#) June 29, 2026

⁵⁴ Ashaq Alawsat, [Hezbollah Escalates its Rhetoric, Threatens Lebanese Govt](#) March 24, 2026

⁵⁵ On June 29, Hezbollah MP Hassan Ezzedine said that Hezbollah would "assess the current situation to determine the necessary mechanisms and methods of action" with the Amal Movement.

National News Agency, [حسن عز الدين من معزوب: السلطة الحاكمة تنقض الدستور وتتجاوز القوانين النافذة](#) June 29, 2026

⁵⁶ L'Orient Today, [Nabih Berri to L'OLJ: The Israel-Lebanon agreement 'will not pass'](#) June 28, 2026;

TRT World, [Aoun and Trump see Lebanon Speaker Nabih Berri, a Hezbollah ally, coming on board with their plans](#) July 21, 2026

⁵⁷ The White House via YouTube, [President Trump Participates in a Bilateral Meeting with the President of the Republic of Lebanon](#) July 21, 2026 (quotes starting at 05:44)

⁵⁸ In May 2008, Hezbollah spearheaded an armed challenge to political rivals and the government at the time with the support of Amal Movement. At the time it had political backing from the Free Patriotic Movement, which is now politically distanced from Hezbollah, and the armed support of the Amal Movement.

⁵⁹ L'Orient Today, [Hezbollah supporters protest in Beirut against deal with Israel](#) June 27, 2026

⁶⁰ L'Orient Today, [Hezbollah supporters protest in Beirut against negotiations with Israel](#) April 10, 2026;

Al-Jadeed, [العلم الأزرق إلى جانب الأصفر... والمستقبل يستلزم](#) April 11, 2026

⁶¹ National News Agency, [قيادة "أمل" و"حزب الله" في بيروت: ندعو أهلنا الشرفاء إلى عدم التظاهر في هذه المرحلة الدقيقة](#) April 11, 2026



- Lebanese state authorities will likely seek to quickly quash any future Hezbollah attempt to block the airport road, a common protest tactic. Following Trump's directive to resume direct civilian flights between the US and Lebanon,⁶² the Lebanese government will likely seek to demonstrate that it can secure access to the airport. The LAF has reportedly drawn up plans for immediate intervention in the event of protests on the road.⁶³ In mid-July, Qomati threatened that “no planes would be allowed to land” at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport if the Lebanese government continued to ban Iranian flights.⁶⁴

Efforts to implement Hezbollah's disarmament under the Trilateral Framework could exacerbate civil strife over the medium to long term.

- The Trilateral Framework calls for the “verified disarmament” of Hezbollah, with the LAF assuming control of pilot zones and Israel “progressively” redeploying out of Lebanese territory.⁶⁵ Hezbollah has rejected the implementation of such zones or efforts aimed at disarmament that are outside a framework of domestic Lebanese dialogue.⁶⁶
- As the LAF begins its implementation of the pilot zone project in designated areas, recent precedent suggests it will not pursue a forceful disarmament of Hezbollah that risks civil strife.⁶⁷ Instead, the LAF will likely favor containment measures such as setting up checkpoints to restrict Hezbollah’s access to and movement of arms.⁶⁸




Figure 7. The Israeli military's Yellow Line overlaid the pilot zones of Zawtar Al-Gharbiye, Froun, and Srifa (shaded in pink).
Sources: US Department of State, LAF

⁶² US President Donald Trump via TruthSocial, @realDonaldTrump July 21, 2026

⁶³ Nida al-Watan, [الميليشيا تهدد بخطف المطار](#) July 28, 2026

⁶⁴ Asharq Alawsat, [«حزب الله» يلوح بشلّ مطار بيروت دفاعاً عن «الطيران الإيراني»](#) July 21, 2026

⁶⁵ US State Department, [Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon](#) June 26, 2026

⁶⁶ National News Agency, [قاسم عن اتفاق الاطار: مذلة وعار وتنازل عن السيادة وحرمان اللبنانيين من العودة إلى أرضهم](#) June 27, 2026

⁶⁷ On March 2, Lebanon's government banned the group's security and military activities and ordered the LAF and security agencies to prevent further attacks. Shortly after, LAF Commander in Chief Rodolphe Haykal implicitly rejected direct action against Hezbollah.

National News Agency, [سلام بعد انتهاء جلسة مجلس الوزراء : حظرفوري لنشاطات حزب الله الأمنية والعسكرية والزامة بتسليم سلاحه وخصي عمله في المجال السياسي](#) March 2, 2026;

Lebanese Armed Forces, [اجتماع قائد الجيش مع أركان القيادة وقادة الوحدات والأفواج العملاقية](#) March 7, 2026

⁶⁸ Lebanese Armed Forces, [بيان من قيادة الجيش – مديرية التوجيه](#) March 4, 2026



- It is unclear whether Hezbollah will choose to block the LAF's implementation of any pilot zones in the coming months. On June 27, the mayor of Froun, a village in southern Lebanon outside Israeli military control, rejected the town's inclusion in one of the zones.⁶⁹ Since the LAF began implementing the pilot zone project in Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar Al-Gharbiye on July 20,⁷⁰ there have been no reported incidents of local opposition in these municipalities. Notably, on July 21, Israeli forces fired in the vicinity of LAF soldiers in Zawtar Al-Gharbiye.⁷¹
- Lebanon and Israel are still negotiating elements of the pilot zone project.⁷² These include the verification mechanism for Hezbollah's disarmament and whether the LAF will enter private property as part of this effort.⁷³ The areas selected as pilot zones will be a point of contention.⁷⁴ If Israel's occupation continues indefinitely, it will undermine confidence in the Trilateral Framework and increase the likelihood of political opposition to the agreement.
- Opponents of a confrontational approach to Hezbollah's disarmament warn that pursuing this objective without a broader political settlement further destabilize an already fragile situation.⁷⁵
- During his visit to the White House, Aoun reportedly presented Trump with a long-term plan for Hezbollah's gradual nationwide disarmament based on economic and political incentives rather than solely on the use of force.⁷⁶ The Trump administration has yet to publicly articulate its preferred policy on Hezbollah's disarmament.
- On April 27, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Washington was working on a plan to train and equip select LAF units "to go after elements of Hezbollah and dismantle them so Israel doesn't have to do it,"⁷⁷ suggesting a more confrontational approach. The US sanctioned a senior LAF officer on May 21 for allegedly sharing intelligence with Hezbollah and obstructing the group's disarmament,⁷⁸ further indicating Washington could pursue a policy of vetting select Lebanese military officials and units. US Vice President JD Vance, meanwhile, reportedly supports a more cautious disarmament approach that avoids triggering civil strife in Lebanon.⁷⁹ Ultimately, Washington's strategy will be shaped by the regional conflict with Iran and the security concerns of its ally Israel.

⁶⁹ National News Agency, [بلدية فرون: بلدتنا تقع خارج الخط الأصفر ونستنكر الحديث عن ضمها إلى ما يسمى بالمناطق التجريبية](#) June 27, 2026

⁷⁰ Lebanese Army, [الجيش يواصل تنفيذ مهماته في المناطق الجنوبية بما فيها بلدتا فرون - بنت جبيل وصرى - صور](#) July 20, 2026;

US State Department, [Launch of First Pilot Zones in Lebanon](#) July 20, 2026

⁷¹ Lebanese Army Command, [Israeli Occupation Forces Opened Fire Near Lebanese Army Units as They Were Deploying in Zawtar al Gharbiyeh — Nabatieh](#) July 21, 2026

⁷² L'Orient Today, [US confirms new round of Lebanon-Israel talks set Aug. 4 in Rome](#) July 28, 2026

⁷³ L'Orient Today, [Zawtar Gharbieh's experience: A promising start, but nothing more](#) July 25, 2026;

Axios, [Trump hosts Lebanon's president as Israel begins first pullback](#) July 21, 2026;

Nida al-Watan, [التحقق في الجنوب بعهدة شركات أمنية؟](#) July 23, 2026

⁷⁴ Al-Modon, [جراك سعودي قطري: لنلا يصبح لبنان "على صورة" نتنياهو-الصحناوي](#) July 29, 2026;

L'Orient Today, [Lebanon caught between Netanyahu's endless war and Sharaa's regional bet](#) July 28, 2026;

The Jerusalem Post, [Katz rejects Trump's claim that Israel will withdraw from Lebanon, confirms IDF will remain there](#) July 9, 2026;

The Times of Israel, [Katz: Israel has 'no territorial ambitions in Lebanon,' but will not withdraw further until Hezbollah disarmed](#) June 29, 2026

⁷⁵ An-Nahar, [الأمّن الذاتي... هاجس يتقدّم مواقع يتراجع](#) March 20, 2026;

Independent Arabia, [هل تتحصن البلديات اللبنانية بالأمّن الذاتي؟](#) November 18, 2024;

Al-Akhbar, [جاس كسيوان... عودة إلى نغمة الأمّن الذاتي](#) March 18, 2026

⁷⁶ Al-Modon, [نقاشات واشنطن: اتفاق دفاعي يحصّن لبنان مقابل إسرائيل وإيران](#) July 25, 2026;

Nida al-Watan, [التحقق في الجنوب بعهدة شركات أمنية؟](#) July 23, 2026;

Al-Arabiya via X, [@AlArabiya_Eng](#) July 21, 2026

⁷⁷ US Department of State, [Secretary of State Marco Rubio With Trey Yingst of Fox News Channel](#) April 27, 2026

⁷⁸ US Department of the Treasury, [Treasury Targets Hizballah-Aligned Officials Obstructing Peace and Disarmament](#) May 21, 2026

⁷⁹ Al-Modon, [الحرب الأهلية في لبنان خطّ أحمر لواشنطن](#) July 17, 2026;

L'Orient Today, [Barrack, Sharaa, and Zaidi: An American plan to stifle Hezbollah?](#) July 18, 2026



Looking Ahead:

In its [June Crisis Update](#), LCAT presented three possible short- to medium-term scenarios for the trajectory of the Hezbollah-Israel conflict:

Status Quo	Infrequent Israeli strikes along Yellow Line, none deeper into Lebanon; few/no Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces or Israel; occupation continues, limited pilot-zone withdrawals; Hezbollah does not undermine Trilateral Framework; IDP returns vary by location.
Deteriorating Status Quo	Regular Israeli strikes between Yellow Line and Zahrani River, infrequent elsewhere; occasional bombardment spikes, esp. post-Hezbollah attack; tensions rise if Hezbollah strikes Israel or the Israeli military acts outside south Lebanon; diplomacy caps escalation; Hezbollah avoids popular mobilization against Trilateral Framework; IDP returns obstructed.
Resumption of Widescale Conflict	Full-scale Israeli military operations resume; targeting expands deeper into Lebanon, possibly major infrastructure/urban areas incl. Beirut; ground operations expand in south Lebanon.

Following the collapse of the US-Iran MoU, both countries and their allies have engaged in stepped-up tit-for-tat military exchanges. Israel and Hezbollah have so far not been drawn back into wider conflict, though Israel and Iran have adopted highly escalatory deterrence measures in Lebanon:

- In June, Israel adopted a policy of striking Beirut's southern suburbs in retaliation for any cross-border Hezbollah attack.⁸⁰ It made good on this threat by launching strikes against Beirut's southern suburbs on June 7 and 14, shortly after Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel.⁸¹
- Iran announced that it would launch missile barrages at Israel in response to any strike on Beirut's southern suburbs.⁸² Tehran followed through on this threat on June 7, but refrained from striking Israel on June 14 ahead of a US announcement on a diplomatic deal.⁸³

While the advancing US-Iran diplomatic track helped contain the incidents described above, the current breakdown in regional talks increases the likelihood that these actors may act in accordance with these measures. Any minor security incident potentially could set off a chain reaction triggering a large-scale conflict.

⁸⁰ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu via X, [@Netanyahu](#) June 1, 2026


⁸¹ Times of Israel, [IDF strikes Hezbollah targets in Beirut's southern suburbs after 3 drones hit northern Israel](#) June 14, 2026;

Times of Israel, [IDF strikes Beirut's Dahiyeh after Hezbollah fires rockets at northern Israel](#) June 7, 2026

⁸² PressTV, [Iran announces suspension of operations after 'painful response' to Zionist regime](#) June 8, 2026;


Kayhan, [Resistance Axis Hails 'New Equation' Established by Iran](#) June 8, 2026

⁸³ CBS News, [Iran and U.S. reach deal, Trump and Pakistani prime minister say, as Israeli strikes in Lebanon threaten agreement](#) June 15, 2026



Limited Hezbollah attacks in southern Lebanon, even if calibrated to remain below Israel's escalation threshold entailing strikes on Beirut, are still likely to prompt intense Israeli responses at levels comparable to wartime operations. This dynamic was demonstrated between June 19 and 20, when Israel carried out 225 airstrikes across southern Lebanon after Hezbollah inflicted casualties on Israeli troops, resulting in renewed displacement.

These factors make the Deteriorating Status Quo scenario significantly less likely, as any major military action risks drawing belligerents into a wider conflict, given the current inability to leverage diplomatic means to head it off.



Source: AP

Political Updates:

2026

JULY

Lebanon's Internal Security Forces arrest the Islamic State's Security Emir for the "Southern Province" and "Central Province" in Syria.⁸⁴



Iraq places Hezbollah and associated entities on its banking sanctions list.⁸⁵



Prime Minister Nawaf Salam visits Zawtar Al-Gharbiye, a southern Lebanese town that was designated a pilot zone under the terms of the Trilateral Framework between Israel, Lebanon, and the US.⁸⁶



Salam meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in Baghdad and other Iraqi leaders to discuss security coordination and greater cooperation in the energy sector, as Beirut seeks to secure a steady supply of Iraqi fuel for electricity production.⁸⁷



Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri visits President Joseph Aoun to discuss the Lebanese head of state's trip to Washington DC, marking the first such visit between the two in four months.



Public Prosecutor Ahmed Rami Al-Hajj issues a search and investigation warrant for Lebanese banker Antoun Sehnaoui, after a photo circulates showing Sehnaoui interacting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a dinner in Washington DC.⁸⁸



During a one-day trip to Ankara, President Aoun meets with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.⁸⁹



⁸⁴ Lebanon Internal Security Forces, [ضربة أمنية استباقية لشعبة المعلومات تُطيح بالأمير الأمني العام لـ"ولايتي الجنوب والوسط" التابعتين لتنظيم داعش الإرهابي في سوريا](#) July 13, 2026

⁸⁵ L'Orient Today, [Unprecedented Iraqi sanctions against Hezbollah and its affiliates](#) July 15, 2026

⁸⁶ L'Orient Today, [In Zawtar Gharbieh, Nabatieh, Salam plants the Lebanese flag, promises 'complete Israeli withdrawal'](#) July 22, 2026

⁸⁷ New Arab, [Lebanon's PM Salam visits Iraq for energy, security talks](#) July 26, 2026

⁸⁸ National News Agency, [النائب العام التمييزي يسقط بلاغ بحث وتحجّ بحق أنطوان الصحنوي بحرم التعامل مع العدو الإسرائيلي](#) July 29, 2026

⁸⁹ Middle East Eye, [Aoun's Ankara visit seeks clarity in Lebanon-Turkey relationship](#) July 30, 2026



President Aoun's Visit to the US

President Joseph Aoun's meeting with US President Donald Trump in Washington on July 21 – the first visit by a Lebanese president to the White House in 20 years – was the high point of an official trip during which Lebanese and US officials discussed the Trilateral Framework agreement between Lebanon, the US, and Israel; support for the LAF; and post-conflict reconstruction and economic recovery efforts.⁹⁰ The visit drew a range of reactions in Lebanon.

Several MPs, ministers, and political figures hailed the visit. Tripoli MP Ashraf Rifi, a staunch opponent of Hezbollah and nominal ally of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam's government, described it the "starting point of a national effort to restore Lebanon's sovereignty", while the Parliamentary Finance and Budget Committee Chair Ibrahim Kanaan stated that it will hasten the withdrawal of Israeli forces and end Israel's military action in Lebanon. Minister of Information Paul Morcos said that the visit could pave the way for an aid conference and more US investment to support Lebanon's ailing tourism sector, and more broadly, economic recovery.⁹¹

By contrast, Hezbollah dubbed Aoun's visit to Washington a "failure", and claimed that it will not guarantee Israel's withdrawal from Lebanese territory or support the safe return of IDPs to villages and towns in southern Lebanon.⁹² Speaker of Parliament and head of the Amal Movement Nabih Berri – who has acted as an intermediary between Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and the US – offered a more nuanced view of the visit, calling for an end to the war, Israeli withdrawal, and LAF deployment in the south, while maintaining his long-standing rejection of direct negotiations with Israel.⁹³ Notably, in a show of tacit support for the visit, Berri met with Aoun in person upon the head of state's return from Washington – the first such encounter in four months.⁹⁴

Aoun's visit appears to be a sign of renewed US engagement in Lebanon and reaffirmed Washington's commitment to the Framework – widely viewed as a significant US diplomatic breakthrough. Sources close to the Lebanese delegation expressed relief at Washington's strong support for the LAF, and its continued backing for a phased Israeli withdrawal under the Framework.⁹⁵

Draft Media Law

On July 9, a joint parliamentary committee approved the draft Media Law. The current version of the draft is the result of a lengthy reform process first launched by UNESCO in 2010.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ National News Agency, [الرئيس عون لترامب: جان الوقت لينعم لبنان بالسلام ومفًا يمكننا الوصول إلى ذلك](#) (*) July 21, 2026;

National News Agency, [وصول الرئيس عون إلى البيت الأبيض للقاء الرئيس ترامب](#) (*) July 21, 2026;

رئاسة الجمهورية: عون بحث مع ترامب في البيت الأبيض في الانسحاب الإسرائيلي ودعم الجيش والتعافي الاقتصادي وتعزيز الشراكة اللبنانية- July 21, 2026;

قمة أميركية- لبنانية في البيت الأبيض: ترامب يعلن أن الاسرائيليين في طور الانسحاب من المناطق اللبنانية وعون يؤكد التطابق في الرؤية لجهة, National News Agency, [السلام والاستقرار في لبنان والمنطقة](#) July 21, 2026

⁹¹ L'Orient Today, [Back from Washington, Aoun receives support from officials and ministers who bank on the outcomes of his visit](#) July 23, 2026;

IMLebanon, [الحجوزات السياحية تتحسن... زيارة عون إلى واشنطن أعادت الثقة](#) July 28, 2026

⁹² Aljadeed, [الوفاء للمقاومة: زيارة واشنطن لم تحقق أي مطلب سيادي للبنان](#) July 23, 2026;

L'Orient Today, [Back from Washington, Aoun receives support from officials and ministers who bank on the outcomes of his visit](#) July 23, 2026

⁹³ Aljazeera, [كيف ينظر الداخل اللبناني إلى زيارة عون لواشنطن؟](#) July 21, 2026;

Alarabiya, [عون في واشنطن بين التقدير وتحذيرات ما بعد الزيارة](#) July 15, 2026

⁹⁴ National News Agency, [رئيسا الجمهورية والمجلس بحثا في الوضع جنوبا وزيارة واشنطن ويرى مرتاح للقاء ولقاءات متنوعة في عيدا عون: الحروب لا تعود على البلدان](#) July 29, 2026;

بالدمار ولا تجلب للشعوب إلا الفقر, July 29, 2026

⁹⁵ Aliwaa, [هل تفتح زيارة بري لعون كوة في الجدار مع "حزب الله"؟](#) July 29, 2026

⁹⁶ Janoubia, [واشنطن تُعزز دعم الجيش اللبناني... واتفاق أممي مرتقب ومفاوضات روما تبحث آليات تنفيذ المناطق التجريبية](#) July 25, 2026

⁹⁶ National News Agency, [مؤسسة مي شدياق ترحب بتقديم مسار قانون الإعلام الجديد في البرلمان](#) July 7, 2026



The draft Law proposes core reforms to Lebanon's media landscape. Multiple organizations, unions, MPs, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have hailed its provisions, including shifting potential slander and libel claims from criminal to civil liability, an explicit ban on pre-trial detention for journalists, the creation of an independent national media regulatory body, stronger protections for sources, journalists' right to access information, and the abolition of the Press Court in favor of specialized civil chambers.⁹⁷ These reforms would bring Lebanon's media framework into alignment with international standards on freedom of speech and expression.

However, the draft law also contains what many consider to be controversial amendments.⁹⁸ For example, a vaguely worded article reintroduces criminal liability for promulgating "false news" – a move that is viewed by some as an attempt to suppress investigative journalism.⁹⁹ Other amendments involve the lifting of anti-monopoly clauses on ownership of media and advertising agencies, the elimination of clauses on public media regulation, and restrictive provisions on establishing media syndicates and unions.¹⁰⁰

Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri slated the draft law for a vote in a plenary session.¹⁰¹ However, it was not passed during the July 15 and 16 plenary sessions, and civil society and media groups are calling for a thorough revision.¹⁰² Talks of a possible legislative plenary session in mid-August raised expectations that the draft might be approved. However, it has so far not been placed on the agenda for a session in August.¹⁰³

One of three scenarios will likely play out in the upcoming weeks. The law may pass with an expedited vote and with limited amendments focusing on the criminalization of "false news". Second, the law may undergo extensive revision, thus inducing delays and further political bargaining over its most controversial clauses. Finally, passage could be delayed indefinitely, while parliament focuses on other pressing legislation on financial sector restructuring, a general amnesty, and abolishing the death penalty.

⁹⁷ National News Agency, [مؤسسة مي شدياق ترحب بتقديم مسار قانون الإعلام الجديد في البرلمان](#), July 7, 2026;

Legal Agenda, [قانون الإعلام: بين الإصلاحات الإيجابية والأفخاخ الجديدة](#), July 14, 2026;

National News Agency, [مهارات دعت إلى إقراره في أول جلسة عامة: النقاش حول اقتراح قانون الإعلام يجب أن يستند إلى النصوص الفعلية لا إلى المعلومات المضللة](#), July 28, 2026;

National News Agency, [عقيص: كفى تضليلاً وتجنبا بشأن مضمون مشروع قانون الإعلام](#), July 29, 2026;

National News Agency, [مؤسسة "مي شدياق" تدعم مشروع قانون الإعلام وتدعو لإقراره](#), July 29, 2026

⁹⁸ Legal Agenda, [قانون الإعلام: بين الإصلاحات الإيجابية والأفخاخ الجديدة](#), July 14, 2026;

National News Agency, [مهارات دعت إلى إقراره في أول جلسة عامة: النقاش حول اقتراح قانون الإعلام يجب أن يستند إلى النصوص الفعلية لا إلى المعلومات المضللة](#), July 28, 2026

⁹⁹ The draft law did not present clear definitions for "hate speech", "false news", and "harmful content".

Legal Agenda, [قانون الإعلام: بين الإصلاحات الإيجابية والأفخاخ الجديدة](#), July 14, 2026;

Legal Agenda, [النسخة الجديدة لاقتراح قانون الإعلام: توجه خطير نحو احتكار الإعلام وتقييد الحرية النقابية](#), July 8, 2026;

¹⁰⁰ National News Agency, [إعلاميون من أجل الحرية: لتعديل مشروع قانون الإعلام بما يضمن حماية الحرية وتعزيز المهنية ومكافحة التحول الرقمي](#), July 15, 2026;

National News Agency, [نقابة المحررين ترفض اقتراح قانون الإعلام بصيغته الحالية وتطالب بسحبه وإعادة درسه](#), July 27, 2026

¹⁰¹ National News Agency, [اللجان النيابية المشتركة تقر قانون الإعلام بوضع: يرى دعا لاجتماع هيئة مكتب المجلس تمهيداً لجلسة عامة الأسبوع المقبل](#), July 9, 2026

¹⁰² Annahar, [مهارات: النقاش حول اقتراح قانون الإعلام يجب أن يستند إلى النصوص الفعلية لا إلى المعلومات المضللة](#), July 30, 2026

¹⁰³ Annahar, [هل جلسة منتصف آب كلام للاستهلاك في ظل تخمة القوانين غير المنجزة وغير المتفق عليها؟](#), July 29, 2026



Source: EPA

Economic Updates:

2026
JULY

Effective July 1, the Housing Bank reduces the yearly interest on housing loans from 6% to 5.75%. The new rate applies to all outstanding loans related to the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.¹⁰⁴ This adjustment was based on the Central Bank's decision to exempt the Housing Bank from a 2.5% annual management fee.



The Finance and Budget Committee approves several articles in the Law on Bank Resolution and Restructuring, including Articles 3 and 13.



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Parliament's Finance and Budget Committee signs off on a proposal aimed at speeding up the approval of housing loans for some 50,000 families, and also allowing 1,000 new families to obtain housing loans. Applicants seeking an expedited approval, however, will need to pay an additional fee of LBP 100 million (around USD 1,120).¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ National News Agency, مصرف الإسكان يخفّض الفائدة على القروض السكنية من 6% إلى 5.75% July 1, 2026

¹⁰⁵ National News Agency, لجنة المال تقرّ اقتراحاً لتسهيل قروض الإسكان لـ 50 ألف عائلة وإتاحة قروض جديدة لـ 1000 عائلة July 1, 2026; National News Agency, لجنة المال تقرّ اقتراح أبي رميا لتسهيل قروض الإسكان وتشكل لجنة فرعية لصندوق القضاة July 1, 2026



Finance and Banking Reform

On July 14, Parliament's Finance and Budget Committee approved Articles 3 and 13¹⁰⁶ of the Law on Bank Resolution and Restructuring, after amending them in coordination with the government, the Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), thereby resolving a primary source of contention between the various stakeholders.¹⁰⁷ Committee Head MP Ibrahim Kanaan stressed that deposit recovery cannot be achieved solely through lawmaking; it will require a cash injection and serious political will. He called for a comprehensive audit of state, bank, and Central Bank assets as part of efforts to fairly distribute the burden imposed by the financial collapse.

Implementation of the law, however, is contingent on the government approving the Financial Stabilization and Deposits Repayment Act, which it is again reviewing with the IMF.¹⁰⁸ The pace of reform raises doubts as to whether the government's financial recovery plan can be implemented. There are two major obstacles: the government's apparent inability to fund both its share of recovery efforts and bank recapitalization. In July, the Central Bank indicated that recapitalizing the nation's banks would require USD 2.27 billion, of which USD 1.82 billion would be earmarked for the 14 largest banks, with USD 450 million going to 25 smaller institutions.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, the Central Bank is still owed money by the Lebanese government, which is already crippled by a constrained annual budget dating back to the onset of the economic crisis in 2019.¹¹⁰

Suspended Import Tax

On June 29, the Council of Ministers suspended Decree 3214,¹¹¹ an environmental¹¹² protection measure that imposes a 1-3% tax on imported goods that generate solid waste (the "polluter pays" principle).¹¹³ Although it appears to be aimed at securing funds for waste management, the decree can also be considered a tax, since 35% and 15% of the revenue generated will be directed to the government treasury and the Ministry of Environment, respectively.¹¹⁴ The government suspended implementation to head off potential price increases by importers, wholesalers, or retailers to account for the environmental fees.

Officials also argued that Decree 3214 should be judged based on whether it actually improves waste management and environmental conditions, rather than on how much revenue it brings in. In an acknowledgement of public concern,¹¹⁵ they indicated that any customs duties on basic food items should be reconsidered so they do not inadvertently worsen living conditions.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁶ Article 3 is now aligned with the Monetary and Credit Law and international standards, while Article 13 stipulates the Higher Banking Commission's powers to restructure and liquidate banks, separate from broader monetary policy. A key sticking point was the composition of the Higher Banking Commission and the roles played by the Central Bank and the head of the Commission, as well as whether commercial banks should be represented.

Parliament of Lebanon, [لجنة المال والموازنة أنهت النقاش بقانون إصلاح وضع المصارف في لبنان وإعادة هيكلة القطاع المصرفي](#) July 6, 2026

¹⁰⁷ Parliament of Lebanon, [لجنة المال والموازنة أقرت تعديلات قانون إصلاح المؤسسة العامة للإسكان](#) July 14, 2026

¹⁰⁸ Parliament of Lebanon, [لجنة المال والموازنة تابعت درس قانون إصلاح وضع المصارف في لبنان وإعادة تنظيمها وأقرت 11 مادة](#) July 22, 2026

¹⁰⁹ L'Orient Today, [Bank recapitalization: BDL estimates capital needs at \\$22 billion — on its own terms](#) July 17, 2026

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹¹ The Presidency of the Council of Ministers, [الرئيس سلام يعقد جلسة استثنائية](#) June 29, 2026

¹¹² The environmental tax aims at funding waste management through consumption taxes rather than treasury advances and independent municipality funds; Daily Beirut, [Ministries Assure Citizens of Consideration Regarding New Environmental Fees](#) June 26, 2026.

¹¹³ These three tax brackets are based on the nature of the taxed goods. The 1% tax is generally levied on essential goods and basic raw materials, since a higher rate would cause disproportionate hardship. The higher brackets are for products deemed more polluting or more challenging to handle at end-of-life. Daily Beirut, [Ministries Assure Citizens of Consideration Regarding New Environmental Fees](#) June 26, 2026;

Blominvest Bank, [Estimating the Fiscal Impact of Lebanon's Environmental Tax under Decree No. 3214](#) July 8, 2026

¹¹⁴ L'Orient Today, [Waste fees: Suspending the decree leaves key questions unanswered](#) July 3, 2026

¹¹⁵ On July 3, the Lebanese General Labor Union had a meeting that concluded in favor of the necessity of cancelling Government Decree 3214.

National News Agency, [الاتحاد العمالي: لإلغاء المرسوم 3214 بكامل مندرجاته](#) July 2, 2026

¹¹⁶ Daily Beirut, [Ministries Assure Citizens of Consideration Regarding New Environmental Fees](#) June 26, 2026



Inflation

According to the June CPI index issued by the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS), prices decreased across all Lebanese governorates during the month. The drops in the prices of essential goods largely drove the price deflation. Figure 8 below shows the deflating components of the CPI. Prices for the remaining CPI commodities rose in June.




Figure 8. CPI components that decreased in June 2026.
Source: Central Administration of Statistics.

Looking at the CPI's fuel price data, the falloff is likely due to lower prices for gas (-15.55%), liquid fuels (-11.45%), and fuel and lubricants for personal transport equipment (-6.39%). The intermittent closures of the Strait of Hormuz between June and mid-July and the subsequent sustained closure¹¹⁷ will likely trigger the same fuel market dynamics that drove peak inflation in March and April (Figure 9).¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ L'Orient Today, [Rise in prices after resumption of Hormuz Strait blockade](#) July 17, 2026.

¹¹⁸ Mercy Corps Lebanon, [April Crisis Update](#) May 6, 2026;

Mercy Corps Lebanon, [May Crisis Update](#) June 5, 2026;

Global Issues, [Full Effects of Strait of Hormuz Disruption May Not Be Felt Until Second Half of 2026, UNCTAD Warns](#) July 16, 2026.




Figure 9. The evolution of the Consumer Price Index through 2026.
Source: Central Administration of Statistics.

Food costs, nonetheless, are proving more rigid, constituting the greatest burden on the most financially vulnerable displaced households, which prioritize stable access to food (see analysis below).

According to the Analysis and Assessment Working Group's (AAWG)¹¹⁹ May 2026 Emergency Rapid Needs Assessment (ERNA),¹²⁰ 67% of displaced households in surveyed host communities cited the cost of food as their most pressing challenge. Food was also the second most frequently reported priority expenditure, behind support/cash for rent. This demonstrates how displaced households outside shelters are often forced to make trade-offs between housing and food costs.




Figure 10. Off-shelter IDP households' access to food as reported by cadasters.
Source: AAWG May 2026 Emergency Rapid Needs Assessment.

LCAT used ERNA data to categorize surveyed cadasters based on their food security typology. The categories were selected using a population-weighted principal component analysis (PCA),¹²¹ ensuring that larger numbers of registered displaced households within a given cadaster have a greater influence on the results. LCAT classified displaced household food security and nutrition indicators for each cadaster; namely, overall food concern, food access, and nutrition concern, which were rated from none to severe.

Grouping cadasters by these components produced five distinct food-security typologies:

- **Least Concern:** Few food access and nutrition concerns (best-supplied cadasters).
- **Modest Nutrition Concern:** Adequate food situation, with nutrition the only slightly elevated concern.
- **Moderate Food & Nutrition Concern:** Moderate food and nutrition concerns, while food is accessible.
- **Food Access Problems:** Households are frequently unable to obtain enough food; food access is the defining gap.
- **Severe Food & Nutrition Crisis:** High concern across all three measures (most food-insecure cadasters).

¹¹⁹ AAWG is a coordination platform within Lebanon's humanitarian and development architecture that brings together UN agencies, national and international NGOs, and technical partners to align and oversee joint needs assessments and data analysis.

¹²⁰ LCAT analyzed AAWG's survey of individuals temporarily residing in shelters and community leaders, which was carried out from April 24 to May 18, 2025. In total, AAWG surveyed individuals at 583 shelter sites in June 2026 and 399 from selected cadasters.

¹²¹ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) simplifies complex data by aggregating related variables into summary variables that capture the most important patterns. This highlights the main trends in the data while keeping as much of the original information as possible.





Figure 11. The compound food and nutrition situation outside of collective shelters.
Source: Analysis and Assessment Working Group May 2026 Emergency Rapid Needs Assessment.



Tax Exemption Mechanism for War-Affected Households

Finance Minister Yassin Jaber issued an implementing decree¹²² for Article 5 of Law No. 22/2025, which exempts individuals and communities affected by Israeli attacks from some taxes and fees. The Law also suspends tax deadlines and addresses issues related to destroyed property. However, all monetary donations and in-kind assistance must first be cleared by the LAF Command and the Supreme Relief Commission before beneficiaries can claim their exemptions.

Distributing entities must keep detailed records, including the identities of beneficiaries, receipts, and documentation concerning damage. These will be forwarded by the Supreme Relief Commission to the LAF Command to safeguard against abuse, with violators subject to fines and legal action. The implementing decree also directs the Supreme Customs Council to exempt aid imports from surcharges and service fees and establishes a refund mechanism for taxes previously paid on such imports, effective July 14.¹²³

Requirements vary by category of beneficiary:

- Certified donations and in-kind or cash assistance to **public entities** – including public administrations, institutions, municipalities, and municipal unions – are exempt from customs duties, port fees, stamp duty, domestic consumption tax, and value-added tax on related imports.
- **Civil society and religious organizations** are eligible for the same exemptions; the receiving entity must report exempted transactions to the Ministry of Finance within one month of the final transaction.
- **Households and individuals** may receive donations and assistance under the same process, with applications specifying the donor and beneficiary details, a description and value of the goods or services, the distribution mechanism, and storage locations.
- **VAT-registered service providers** are eligible and have the right to claim a tax credit, provided invoices include the beneficiary and funding entity's names, the Supreme Relief Commission's certification letter number and date, and the beneficiary's signature or seal.

¹²² National News Agency, [قرار لوزير المالية حدد آلية تطبيق المادة الخامسة من القانون رقم 22/2025 المتعلق بإعفاء المتضررين من الاعتداءات الإسرائيلية على لبنان](#), July 14, 2026

¹²³ *ibid.*



Source: AFP

Access to Services Updates:

2026
JULY

The Shura Council suspends the Council of Ministers's April 2026 decisions granting cement companies quarrying licenses in Koura, Batroun, and Chouf, as well as its reversal of Kafr Hazir municipality's ban on quarrying.¹²⁴



14

16

Minister of Energy and Water Joe Al-Sadi and Cypriot Energy Minister Michael Damianos announce the launch of a World-Bank-supported feasibility study of a project to supply Lebanon with Cypriot electricity.



UNESCO adds Sour to its List of "World Heritage in Danger," citing damage sustained from repeated Israeli airstrikes and concerns over further threats to archeological site conservation.¹²⁵



21

21

US President Donald Trump announces that commercial US carriers will resume direct flights to Lebanon.



Sky Lounge Services, the operator developing President René Moawad-Qleiat Airport in Akkar, announces its first 21 job openings, with hiring priority given to candidates from northern Lebanon.¹²⁶



23

¹²⁴ Legal Agenda, [شورى الدولة يوقف المجزأة البيئية في الكورة: وانتصر القانون على التشيخ مجدداً](#) July 15, 2026

¹²⁵ L'Orient Today, [Lebanon's ancient city of Sour listed as World Heritage in Danger by UNESCO](#) July 22, 2026

¹²⁶ Al-Modon, [مطار القليعات يفتح باب التوظيف استعداداً لبدء التشغيل](#) July 23, 2026



US Announces that Direct Flights to Lebanon Will Resume After 40-Year Suspension

During President Aoun's July 21 visit to Washington, US President Donald Trump announced that he is directing US airlines to resume non-stop flights to Lebanon. Flights between the two countries were suspended in 1985, following the TWA Flight 847 hijacking.¹²⁷ No timeline has been set: the US Federal Aviation Administration has not published a certification schedule, and Beirut Airport must first meet US security requirements before US carriers receive clearance.¹²⁸ Lebanon's Civil Aviation Authority has indicated that a feasibility study would take one to two months, after which formal bilateral negotiations on resuming flights could begin.¹²⁹

Rental Market Distortions in Beirut's Southern Suburbs

Displacement from neighborhoods in Beirut's southern suburbs that were heavily targeted during the March-June 2026 War has driven up rents by 25-50%, primarily in areas considered safer by residents along the suburb's outskirts. Real estate brokers attribute the surge to landlords exploiting acute housing needs and the lack of rental market regulations. Demand is strongest in Haret Hreik, Chiyah, Al-Mureijeh, and Borj al-Barajneh, where apartments once priced at USD 400–450 per month now command USD 550–1,000, sometimes accompanied by demands for six months' rent upfront. Some report being unable to secure housing elsewhere in Beirut due to high prices and sectarian discrimination.¹³⁰

Fisheries and Aquaculture Law

On July 17, parliament passed the Fisheries and Aquaculture Law, designating the Ministry of Agriculture as the sole legal and administrative authority over marine and inland fisheries and aquaculture, opening the sector to investment in aquaculture and fish farming, and permitting foreign vessels to fish in Lebanese waters and sell their catch locally. The ministry hailed the law as a "historic" step toward a sustainable economy, stating that it aligns Lebanon with Food and Agriculture Organization and General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean standards, protects small-scale artisanal fishing, gives fishing cooperatives priority investment in aquaculture projects, and seeks to curb illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.¹³¹

Fishers' unions and cooperatives have criticized the law over the same provisions that the ministry touted as protective. They claim that the law lacks a clear definition of "professional fisher," warning it could extend licenses to recreational or amateur operators rather than those who fish for their livelihood. They also highlighted the law's failure to differentiate marine fishing from aquaculture and fish farming, warning that aquaculture licenses could be issued to non-fishing entities rather than be reserved for the sector's own cooperatives.

¹²⁷ On June 14, 1985, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked shortly after departing Athens, leading to a 17-day hostage crisis. The hijackers released some passengers, held many others hostage, and killed US Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem after identifying him as an American serviceman.

Annahar, [قصة اختطاف الطائرة الأميركية إلى بيروت عام 1985: الرأس المدير عماد مغنية... والتتبع وقف الرحلات](#) July 23, 2026;

Deutsche Welle (DW), [Trump allows direct US flights to Lebanon in historic move](#) July 22, 2026

¹²⁸ Arabian Business, [US airlines allowed to resume flights to Lebanon after 40-year ban](#) July 22, 2026

¹²⁹ Middle East Eye, [Trump's move to restore direct Lebanon flights raises diaspora hopes](#) July 27, 2026

¹³⁰ Al-Modon, [الإيطارات في الضاحية الجنوبية ترتفع رغم المخاطر الأمنية](#) July 21, 2026

¹³¹ National News Agency, [وزارة الزراعة: إقرار قانون الصيد المائي وتربية الأحياء المائية يرسخ الصيد الجرفي الصغير النطاق ويؤسس لاقتصاد أزرق مستدام](#) July 17, 2026;

Annahar, [جيتان متحفزة... لماذا يرفض الصيادون قانون الصيد المائي؟](#) July 22, 2026;

Megaphone News, [النواب يبيعون السمك مع بحره](#) July 21, 2026



Finally, the opening of Lebanese waters to foreign fishing vessels – justified by the ministry as a means of boosting production – introduces competition for local fishers, who also risk being marginalized under provisions that do not distinguish small-boat operators from large commercial fleets. A nine-point petition submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and Parliament called for distinguishing fishing from aquaculture, linking licenses to verified professional status, and requiring foreign companies operating in the sector to comply with Lebanese law, employ Lebanese workers, and sell locally.¹³²

Fishers characterized the law's ambiguities as deliberately serving an unspecified beneficiary and warned they amount to the "disguised privatization" of marine resources. They also asserted that the law was passed without consulting those it directly affects. In response, fishers have appealed to Parliament and the Ministries of Agriculture, Public Works and Transportation, Environment, and Labor to reconsider it. They have vowed further escalation, including demonstrations, if the law is enacted without amendment.¹³³

Water Shortages

Several regions of Lebanon contended with water shortages in July, primarily due to aging infrastructure, maintenance, and electricity cuts. The Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment shut down the main pipeline from the Jeita spring to the Dbayeh treatment plant from July 17 to July 20 for maintenance. Water supply to the plant was subsequently limited to the Antelias spring and wells, triggering severe rationing across the northern Metn coast, and Ashrafieh and Burj Abu Haidar in Beirut.¹³⁴ In a bid to increase water pressure in central Tripoli, every Monday and Thursday the North Lebanon Water Authority is cutting the water supply to areas west of Fouad Chehab Boulevard.¹³⁵ Power outages have also forced the South Lebanon Water Establishment to reduce supply – the backup generators it uses to run water pumps do not provide sufficient electricity to meet demand.¹³⁶

These shortages highlight how the country's public water system is leaving households nationwide dependent on private water sourcing, a vulnerability likely to deepen amid peak summertime demand and ongoing electricity shortages. Many households compensate by purchasing water from private suppliers, forcing some to take on debt. Researchers at the American University of Beirut have reported that privately sourced water is susceptible to microbial contamination, and may contain nitrates, heavy metals, and elevated saline levels. Legal experts note that Lebanon's private water tanker sector remains largely unregulated – lacking standardized licensing, source disclosure requirements, or systematic testing – as national regulations are rarely enforced.¹³⁷

¹³² ibid.

¹³³ National News Agency, [لقاء طارئ للصيادين البحريين في ميناء الضبية اعتراضاً على إقرار "قانون الصيد المائي وتربية الأحياء المائية": نحن حراس البحر ولن نكون يوماً ضيوفاً فيه](#) July 21, 2026;

Elnashra, [صياغة لبنان: مجمعون على رفض قانون الصيد المائي وتربية الأحياء المائية](#) July 27, 2026;

Lebanon 24, [صياغة لبنان يرفضون قانون الصيد المائي: يضر بحقوقنا ولقمة عيشنا](#) July 27, 2026

¹³⁴ Lebanon 24, [مؤسسة مياه بيروت: تقنين قاس في المتن وبيروت بدءاً من الجمعة](#) July 15, 2026;

Lebanon Debate, [إنجاز جديد لوزارة الطاقة... بعد تقنين الكهرباء جاء دور المياه](#) July 15, 2026

¹³⁵ [مياه لبنان الشمالي: قطع المياه يومي الإثنين والخميس عن أجزاء من طرابلس والميناء](#) July 23, 2026

¹³⁶ Sawt Beirut International, [مؤسسة مياه لبنان الجنوبي تحذر من انخفاض التغذية بالمياه بسبب أزمة الكهرباء](#) July 21, 2026

¹³⁷ Silat Wassel, [عندما يصبح الماء سلعة](#) July 6, 2026



Lebanon Advances Bilateral Electricity Supply Agreements

Lebanon is exploring two projects to diversify the country's electricity supply. On July 16, Lebanese Minister of Energy and Water Joe Al-Sadi and Cypriot Energy Minister Michael Damianos announced a World Bank-supported feasibility study on linking the Lebanese and Cypriot electrical grids via an undersea cable. Officials claim the arrangement would eventually give Lebanon access to the European electricity grid, lowering the price of imported power. The project would take at least a half-decade to complete, after which Lebanon would have access to 500 megawatts daily for between four and six hours.¹³⁸

Al-Sadi also announced that the ministry is working to source electricity from Turkey via Syria, either through an electricity swap mechanism¹³⁹ or an underwater cable running along the Syrian coast to Tripoli. A swap agreement may prove unfeasible due to the technical limitations in Syria's grid, although trilateral talks on the subject are planned between Lebanon, Turkey, and Syria. Laying an underwater cable would be costly and time-consuming. Although Turkey has yet to specify export quantities or costs ahead of a planned technical meeting, the Council for Development and Reconstruction has begun reaching out to potential donors about upgrading the Lebanon energy grid to accommodate potential increased supply.¹⁴⁰ Both initiatives are contingent on third-party cooperation and external financing, and neither offers near-term relief from ongoing energy rationing.

Electricity Rationing and the Fuel Crisis

State electricity production and transmission declined in July, with most subscribers receiving three to four hours per day. According to Électricité du Liban (EdL) and the Ministry of Energy and Water, these shortages are due to high summer demand and fuel prices.¹⁴¹ EdL has warned that stabilizing the grid requires daily production of roughly 1,000 megawatts (MW), while it is only able to produce about 500 MW, a gap that raises the risk of a wider blackout.¹⁴²

Authorities assert that production shortfalls stem primarily from two factors: uncollected bills and constrained fuel financing. The Ministry of Energy has cited an estimated USD 67.5 million in distribution-sector losses, a roughly USD 12.85 million monthly revenue shortfall linked to suspended bill collection and war-damaged infrastructure, and a widening gap between the cost of producing electricity (over USD 0.31 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) once transmission, distribution, and losses are factored in) and the maximum applicable tariff (approximately USD 0.27 per kWh).¹⁴³

¹³⁸ Al-Modon, "إنقاذ أم مستنقع جديد؟" July 16, 2026;

Al-Araby al-Jadeed, "لبنان يشهد تقنياً قاسياً بالكهرباء ومحاولات لتفادي العتمة الشاملة" July 21, 2026

¹³⁹ Under the proposed swap, Turkey would not supply Lebanon directly — its grid is not connected to Lebanon's. Instead, Turkey would supply Syria's grid, and Syria would supply Lebanon an equivalent amount from its own network.

¹⁴⁰ Annahar, "تركيا تعرض الكهرباء على لبنان... والمفتاح بيد سوريا - وزير الطاقة لـ 'النهار': طرحت خيارين لمعالجة أزمة القطاع" July 22, 2026

¹⁴¹ Annahar, "مؤسسة 'كهرباء لبنان' تعرض واقع التغذية الكهربائية والتحديات التشغيلية" July 13, 2026;

Sawt Beirut International, "لبنان أمام شبح العتمة الشاملة... العد العكسي بدأ" July 19, 2026

¹⁴² An internal EdL audio recording circulating in mid-July put actual production even lower, at 350–360 MW, though EdL denied this and maintained output was closer to 450 MW, providing three to four hours of daily supply for nine days, and stated on July 20 that a shipment of approximately 33,000 metric tons was being loaded for delivery.

Annahar, "الكهرباء على حافة العتمة الشاملة... الوقود ينفد والإنتاج يتهاوى وتحذيرات من أيام أكثر صعوبة" July 19, 2026;

Annahar, "تركيا تعرض الكهرباء على لبنان... والمفتاح بيد سوريا - وزير الطاقة لـ 'النهار': طرحت خيارين لمعالجة أزمة القطاع" July 22, 2026;

Annahar, "كهرباء لبنان": مخزون الغاز أول، يكفي 9 أيام... وشحنة جديدة خلال أيام" July 20, 2026;

Al-Araby al-Jadeed, "لبنان يشهد تقنياً قاسياً بالكهرباء ومحاولات لتفادي العتمة الشاملة" July 21, 2026

¹⁴³ Al-Akhbar, "الكهرباء بين الاستدامة والإنقاذ: من يمول العتمة؟" July 6, 2026



Al-Sadi noted that EdL has financed fuel purchases from its own revenues for more than a year. He also reiterated the government's refusal to resume state advances or treasury borrowing, which he stated would shift additional costs onto citizens.¹⁴⁴ To address the shortfall, Al-Sadi presented the Council of Ministers with two financing options. The first, a variable electricity tariff indexed to global oil prices, was rejected on the grounds that prevailing social and economic conditions could not absorb the resulting cost increases. The second calls for phased repayment of public-sector arrears to EdL – estimated at USD 280–300 million through the end of 2025 – with an initial payment of roughly USD 48 million followed by continued installments of approximately USD 12–50 million per month, which Al-Sadi said would provide sufficient liquidity to sustain fuel purchases for four to six months.¹⁴⁵ Pending resolution of these arrears, he confirmed that a forthcoming fuel shipment would be followed by three others, though their continuity remains contingent on the pace of state repayment.¹⁴⁶

The Ministry has paired this financing push with a parallel restructuring effort that would separate EdL's generation, transmission, and distribution activities, as stipulated in Law No. 462/2002, with EdL's eventual corporatization to follow later. The Ministry said privatization remains a separate, later-stage question under the same law, and that the current measures will not affect either employees' rights or job security.¹⁴⁷ The Union of Workers and Employees of the Lebanese Electricity Corporation rejected this characterization, warning the restructuring is a first step toward dismantling EdL in favor of licensed private companies, and threatened a general strike if measures proceed without its input. The union pointed to its exclusion from consultations, as well as EdL's own unresolved arrears – roughly USD 300 million owed by public institutions and USD 60 million by municipalities – as evidence the state cannot be trusted to manage a restructuring of this scale, and called on the prime minister and the Council of Ministers to withhold approval absent negotiation.¹⁴⁸

Taken together, the stopgap financing measures may avert an immediate blackout, but they do not resolve the structural drivers, such as uncollected arrears and a tariff that does not cover production costs, which are prerequisites for recovery. The aforementioned cross-border projects, which would take five years or more and are contingent on foreign cooperation and financing, would do little to change this calculus in the interim.

¹⁴⁴ Al-Araby al-Jadeed, [لبنان يشهد تقنياً قاسياً بالكهرباء ومحاولات لتفادي العتمة الشاملة](#), July 21, 2026;

Annahar, [تركيا تعرض الكهرباء على لبنان... والمفتاح بيد سوريا - وزير الطاقة لـ "النهار": طرحت خيارين لمعالجة أزمة القطاع](#), July 22, 2026;

¹⁴⁵ Al-Akhbar, [الكهرباء بين الاستدامة والإنقاذ: من يمول العتمة؟](#), July 6, 2026;

Annahar, [تركيا تعرض الكهرباء على لبنان... والمفتاح بيد سوريا - وزير الطاقة لـ "النهار": طرحت خيارين لمعالجة أزمة القطاع](#), July 22, 2026;

¹⁴⁶ Al-Araby al-Jadeed, [لبنان يشهد تقنياً قاسياً بالكهرباء ومحاولات لتفادي العتمة الشاملة](#), July 21, 2026;


Annahar, [تركيا تعرض الكهرباء على لبنان... والمفتاح بيد سوريا - وزير الطاقة لـ "النهار": طرحت خيارين لمعالجة أزمة القطاع](#), July 22, 2026;

¹⁴⁷ Al-Modon, [وزارة الطاقة: تحسين القطاع لا يمس حقوق عمال كهرباء لبنان](#), July 18, 2026;



¹⁴⁸ Al-Modon, [نقابة عمال الكهرباء تلوح بالإضراب: لا مساس بحقوق العاملين](#), July 16, 2026;

Al-Markazia, ["كهرباء لبنان" تعلق على خطة وزارة الطاقة](#), July 22, 2026;


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