



Lebanon Crisis Update

April 2026 ■ ■



Source: AFP

- 03 ● Key Takeaways
- 04 ● Conflict Updates
- 16 ● Political Updates
- 19 ● Economic Updates
- 24 ● Access to Services Updates



The Monthly Lebanon Crisis Update provides an overview of economic and political developments to alert the international aid response to new and emerging challenges that could impact the humanitarian situation in Lebanon. In the context of the multiple crises affecting Lebanon, the update tracks the impact of political developments on the economy, relevant international developments, updates on service delivery and governance issues, and analysis of the drivers of humanitarian need as they develop. The report also aims to provide nuanced forecasting on contextual shifts relevant to shifting needs and the implementation of humanitarian programming. The report draws upon a desk review of currently available literature, analysis of relevant quantitative data, and key informant interviews with a range of experts and individuals with knowledge of Lebanon's economy.


The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.

This study/report is made possible by the support of the European Union Humanitarian Aid. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the LCAT and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.



Key Takeaways:

- A Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) between the Lebanese state and Israel came into effect on April 17, though Hezbollah and Israeli military actions have persisted in southern Lebanon. Ongoing hostilities and Israeli occupation have prevented hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from returning home, as Israeli forces continue their systematic destruction of housing and infrastructure south of the Litani River.
- Following widespread bombing on April 8, including extensive strikes in municipal Beirut, the Lebanese and Israeli governments announced bilateral negotiations aimed at reaching a permanent ceasefire and disarming Hezbollah. For its part, Hezbollah has rejected these talks, insisting first on a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, to be followed by a national dialogue on a national defense policy.
- Returns of displaced populations remain constrained by widespread destruction of housing and the breakdown of essential services in conflict-affected areas. These include some 40,000 housing units that were damaged between March 2 and April 7, which caused a second wave of displacement.
- The education sector is gradually transitioning back toward normal operations that incorporate hybrid learning solutions. Progress in this area is hampered by the fact that hundreds of schools are still in use as shelters and by the closure of schools in southern Lebanon.
- On April 9, the Council of Ministers tasked the Lebanon Armed Forces (LAF) and security forces with reinforcing state control in Beirut and restricting the possession of weapons to official forces, a move contested by ministers affiliated with Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.
- Lebanon's finance minister estimates that direct damages from both recent conflicts could reach as high as 18 billion US dollars (USD), triggering sharply negative gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts. Many sectors, including agriculture, tourism, and commerce, are suffering. The current account deficit is widening, and remittances are slowing, deepening dollar shortages, inflation, and unemployment.
- Concurrently, global crude oil prices are causing energy-intensive commodity prices to spike. In particular, private generator rates, which account for as much as 80% of electricity consumption, surged by 34%, doubling household bills. Transport and logistics costs also rose by up to 50%.



Source: Adri Salido

Conflict Updates :

The US-facilitated CoH should not be viewed as a structured framework for halting the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Rather, it primarily serves as a basis for diplomacy between Beirut and Tel Aviv.

- The April 17, 2026 CoH is formally between the Lebanese state and Israel, with Hezbollah excluded as a party.¹ Unlike its response to the November 27, 2024 CoH, Hezbollah has explicitly rejected the current agreement, primarily because its vaguely worded stipulations effectively enable further military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.²
- Unlike the 2024 CoH,³ the current agreement does not provide a framework for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon or the disarming of Hezbollah. Israel insists on maintaining troops in southern Lebanon until it considers northern Israeli communities no longer threatened by Hezbollah and the group is disarmed.⁴ Meanwhile, Hezbollah is demanding that Israel withdraw and cease its attacks on Lebanese territory before it will engage in a national dialogue over disarmament.⁵
- In the days following the 2026 CoH announcement, Israel stated that it was establishing a de-populated “security strip” in Lebanon extending to what it calls a “Yellow Line” several kilometers into Lebanese territory.⁶ Israel has since undertaken a policy of systematic demolitions of villages within this area.⁷

¹ US Department of State, [Ten Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon](#) April 16, 2026

² National News Agency, [حزب الله: استمرار العدو في خرقه وقف إطلاق النار وفي اعتدائه سيقابل بالرد والمقاومة الحاضرة والجاهزة للدفاع عن أرضها وشعبها](#) April 26, 2026;

National News Agency, [النائب فياض: كل وقف لإطلاق النار دون انسحاب إسرائيل يؤكد حق اللبنانيين في مقاومة الاحتلال واستعادة السيادة](#) April 24, 2026;

National News Agency, [رعد: على السلطة أن تدخل من شعبها وتنسحب مما سمي مفاوضات مباشرة مع العدو الصهيوني](#) April 24, 2026

³ The National, [Revealed: Full text of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement](#) November 27, 2024

⁴ Times of Israel, [Katz: Ceasefire with Hezbollah is temporary, IDF not withdrawing from positions in Lebanon](#) April 17, 2026


⁵ National News Agency, [نعيم قاسم: لم تهزمت إسرائيل ومنفتحون لأقصى تعاون مع السلطة في لبنان بصيغة جديدة مبنية على تحقيق سيادة وطننا](#) April 18, 2026

⁶ Times of Israel, [Katz: Ceasefire with Hezbollah is temporary, IDF not withdrawing from positions in Lebanon](#) April 17, 2026;

Israeli military via Telegram, [@IDFOfficial](#) April 18, 2026;

Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee, [@AvichayAdraee](#) April 19, 2026

⁷ Associated Press, [Lebanon decries Israeli demolition of homes in areas occupied after ceasefire](#) April 23, 2026



- The 2026 CoH stipulates that Israel can “take all necessary measures in self-defense, at any time, against planned, imminent, or ongoing attacks.”⁸ This language mirrors a reported US-Israeli understanding accompanying the 2024 CoH, which Israel used to continue its strikes against Hezbollah military infrastructure.⁹
- While Hezbollah did not retaliate for Israeli strikes during the November 27, 2024–March 1, 2026 CoH period, it has rejected a return to this approach under the current CoH.¹⁰ Instead, Hezbollah has pursued a policy of responding to Israeli strikes and attempting to degrade Tel Aviv’s efforts to establish a “security strip,”¹¹ claiming a series of attacks against Israeli troops in Lebanon.¹²
- While the 2026 CoH has not ended fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, fighting has almost entirely been confined to southern Lebanon amid US pressure to limit operations geographically while diplomacy with Iran continues.¹³ Hezbollah, for its part, has mostly limited its attacks to Israeli-occupied territory in southern Lebanon.
- The 2026 CoH calls on Lebanon and Israel to “work to create conditions conducive to lasting peace between the two countries.”¹⁴ On April 23, Lebanese and Israeli envoys met at the White House to announce an extension of the CoH and prepare for direct bilateral talks.¹⁵ The US is pushing for a meeting between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,¹⁶ though Aoun has conditioned direct engagement on full implementation of the CoH.¹⁷
- Further direct diplomacy with Israel, which Hezbollah opposes, runs the risk of worsening domestic political strife. However, not engaging with Tel Aviv could frustrate Washington and lead Israel to widen its military campaign.

⁸ US Department of State, [Ten Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon](#) April 16, 2026

⁹ Axios, [Israel and Lebanon agree on a ceasefire](#) November 26, 2024

¹⁰ National News Agency, [النائب فضل الله: يرفض المفاوضات المباشرة لأنها مسار سياسي تنازلي فيه استسلام لشروط العدو](#) April 18, 2026

¹¹ AFP, [Hezbollah MP says group will break Israel's 'yellow line' in south Lebanon](#) April 21, 2026

¹² LCAT logs all Hezbollah claims of responsibility for attacks against Israel.

¹³ Israeli Channel 12, [הקבינט המצומצם התכנס: אלו דרכי הפעולה של ישראל בלבנון ואיראן](#) April 24, 2026;

On April 23, 2026, US President Donald Trump stated that Israel would conduct its military operations in Lebanon “carefully” and that they needed to be “surgical.”

The White House, [President Trump Delivers Remarks](#) April 23, 2026

¹⁴ US Department of State, [Ten Day Cessation of Hostilities to Enable Peace Negotiations Between Israel and Lebanon](#) April 16, 2026

¹⁵ Reuters, [Lebanon-Israel ceasefire extended by three weeks after Oval Office meeting](#) April 23, 2026

¹⁶ US Embassy in Beirut via X, [@usembassybeirut](#) April 30, 2026;

L’Orient Today, [Trump says direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel 'within two weeks'](#) April 30, 2026

¹⁷ National News Agency, [رئيس الجمهورية أمام وفد الهيئات الاقتصادية](#) April 29, 2026





Figure 1. Heatmap of 460 Israeli airstrikes since the start of the 2026 CoH.
Source: LCAT analysis

Since the start of the current CoH, Israel’s bombardment of southern Lebanon has continued at levels similar to the March-April 2026 War.

- In the first week under the 2026 CoH, Israel conducted an average of 1.85 strikes a day, in line with its tempo after the 2024 CoH.¹⁸ Israel’s rate of fire escalated significantly starting on April 25, when Netanyahu ordered the country’s military to “strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon with force.”¹⁹ From then through May 2, Israel conducted an average of 52.3 strikes per day.²⁰





Figure 2. Daily rate of Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon (March 2–May 3, 2026). Source: LCAT analysis

¹⁸ LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. Between April 17 and 24, 2026, Israel conducted a total of 13 strikes. From November 27, 2024 through March 1, 2026, Israel conducted an average of 2.75 airstrikes a day.

¹⁹ Times of Israel, [Netanyahu's office says PM instructed IDF to strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon 'with force'](#) April 25, 2026

²⁰ LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. Between April 25 and May 2, 2026, Israel conducted 460 airstrikes.



- Between April 25 and May 3, Israel conducted an average of 47 strikes per day between the Yellow Line and the Zahrani River. During the March-April 2026 War, this figure was 54.6 strikes per day.²¹




Figure 3. Daily rate of Israeli airstrikes between the Yellow Line and the Zahrani River (March 2–May 3, 2026).
Source: LCAT analysis

- Starting on April 25, Israel’s stepped-up bombing campaign has killed an average of 16 people per day, compared with 50 per day during the March-April 2026 War. Other wartime dynamics have persisted, including widespread property damage and the targeting of paramedics.
- Hezbollah’s attacks have been largely limited to targeting Israeli troops in southern Lebanon. The organization has claimed an average of four attacks a day against Israeli forces, with its rate of fire steadily increasing under the 2026 CoH, but falling far short of its 44 attacks a day in the March-April 2026 War.²²
- Hezbollah has claimed two military operations against targets in Israel since the 2026 CoH came into effect: a drone attack in Kfar Giladi on April 21 and a rocket barrage targeting Metula on April 23, both of which were acknowledged by Israel.²³ According to the Israeli military, Hezbollah has fired projectiles and drones across the Israeli border on at least seven other occasions.²⁴

²¹ LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire across Lebanon reported by the National News Agency, *L’Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*.

²² LCAT logs all Hezbollah claims of responsibility for military attacks against Israel. Hezbollah claimed 70 attacks from the start of the CoH on April 17, 2026 through May 3, 2026. Hezbollah claimed 2,035 attacks from the start of the war on March 2, 2026 through April 16, 2026.

²³ Times of Israel, [Hezbollah fires rocket salvo at northern Israel shortly before ceasefire extended](#) April 24, 2026;

Times of Israel, [IDF says Hezbollah breached truce by launching rockets at troops, drone at Israel](#) April 21, 2026

²⁴ LCAT logs Israeli military statements on Hezbollah cross-border attacks since the start of the April 17, 2026 CoH.





Figure 4. Daily rate of Hezbollah attacks (March 2–May 3, 2026).
Source: LCAT analysis

- Tel Aviv has announced new security restrictions in northern Israel, as local municipalities are adopting enhanced security measures over fears of future attacks.²⁵ The Israeli military has discussed expanding its strikes in Lebanon to counter the threat of Hezbollah drones.²⁶ So far, Israel has conducted one strike outside southern Lebanon, in a remote area near Janta along the Syrian border.

According to LCAT’s analysis, Israel’s ongoing bombardment and evacuation orders in southern Lebanon are likely displacing at least 300,000 people.

- Unlike after the 2024 CoH, escalating hostilities and the uncertain nature of the current CoH are preventing the return of residents. At least 114,534 people were in collective shelters as of April 27, while the Lebanese state has not released statistics on the total number of IDPs.²⁷ This stands in stark contrast to the situation after the 2024 CoH, when a total of 178,817 people were still displaced Lebanon’s Beqaa weeks after the end of the conflict – 6,065 of them in shelters.²⁸
- Israel occupies approximately 570 square kilometers of Lebanese territory along the border, preventing the return of residents. According to WorldPop Global Demographic Data, the population of this zone is approximately 122,758. LCAT estimates that nearly all these residents, with the exception of those of Christian-populated villages, are unable to return, with a conservative estimate of 108,800 displaced.²⁹

²⁵ Walla News, [הסלמה בצפון: חיזבאללה שיגר רקטות וכטב"מים צה"ל תקף בדרום לבנון](#), April 25, 2026; Maariv, [לתקוף בעוצמה: עם צאת השבת - נתניהו בהצהרה דרמטית על לבנון](#), April 25, 2026; Times of Israel, [IDF strikes Lebanon's Beqaa Valley for first time in 3 weeks as some towns in north cancel school](#), April 27, 2026; Israeli military via Telegram, [@idfficial](#), May 1, 2026

²⁶ YNet, [הרמטכ"ל הורה: לתקוף את שרשרת ייצור ואספקת רחפני הנפץ - גם בעומק לבנון](#), May 1, 2026

²⁷ National News Agency, [التقرير اليومي للوضع الراهن: الشهداء والجرحى](#), April 27, 2026

²⁸ IOM, [Mobility Snapshot - Round 67](#), December 12, 2026

²⁹ LCAT cross-referenced geographic data on Israel’s evacuation notices, airstrikes, and artillery shelling with WorldPop’s global demographic data, which uses satellite imagery and geospatial analysis to estimate population distribution. WorldPop, [Population Data](#)




Figure 5. The Israeli military's Yellow Line laid over a population density map of southern Lebanon (darker shades of red indicate higher population levels). Sources: LCAT analysis, [WorldPop](#)

- Since the start of the 2026 CoH, Israel has issued evacuation notices for 46 municipalities whose populations total 155,972, according to WorldPop Global Demographic Data.³⁰ Lebanese media has reported renewed waves of displacement following many of these evacuation notices and heavy Israeli bombardment.³¹ Assuming that 70% of these municipalities' residents have been displaced, **LCAT estimates at least 109,180 have been displaced due in part to Israel's evacuation notices and shelling.**





Figure 6. Southern Lebanon municipalities issued forced evacuation notices by Israel (excluding within the Yellow Line) since the start of the 2026 CoH. Sources: LCAT analysis, [WorldPop](#)

³⁰ Israel issued evacuation notices for 43 municipalities shelled by its forces. Israel also issued evacuation notices for two municipalities within the Yellow Line (not tabulated for LCAT's population estimates) and three municipalities where no shelling was logged. WorldPop, [Population Data](#)

³¹ National News Agency, [غارة على برج الشمالي واستهداف دراجة نارية في البازورية وحركة نزوح متواصلة تشهد لها بلدات جنوب اللباني](#) April 30, 2026; National News Agency, [حركة نزوح كثيفة للسيارات من منطقة النبطية](#) April 27, 2026



- Since the start of the 2026 CoH, Israel has conducted airstrikes and artillery shelling of a further 44 municipalities where Israel has not issued evacuation notices. The total population of these shelled municipalities is 255,646. Assuming that 50% of residents have been displaced, **LCAT estimates an additional 110,721 have been displaced due in part to Israeli shelling (LCAT assumes 25% displacement from Sour municipality, population 68,407, which was hit by a single UAV strike).**




Figure 7. Municipalities shelled by Israel in southern Lebanon (excluding within the Yellow Line) since the start of the 2026 CoH.
Sources: LCAT analysis, WorldPop

- **During the March-April 2026 War, Israel's shelling across southern Lebanon had a wider impact.** Since the 2026 CoH came into effect, Israeli strikes have hit 87 municipalities³² with a combined population of at least 400,000. By contrast, Israel shelled all of these municipalities in the March-April 2026 War, together with 82 additional towns with a total population of 204,715.

Lebanon's direct talks with Israel – amid Israel's ongoing occupation in the south and escalating strikes – are heightening political tensions, but a dramatic escalation remains unlikely in the near term.


- Hezbollah has repeatedly criticized the Lebanese government for engaging in direct talks with Israel and for accepting the 2026 CoH, which does not explicitly require that Israel halt airstrikes in Lebanon.³³ On April 27, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem suggested that the government's backing of talks with Tel Aviv and the US-facilitated CoH was tantamount to collaboration with Israel, and called on it to retract its decisions.³⁴

³² LCAT logged shelling within 87 municipal boundaries in southern Lebanon since the start of the April 17, 2026 CoH. Israel issued evacuation notices for 43 of these municipalities. Israel also issued evacuation notices for two municipalities within the Yellow Line (not tabulated for LCAT's population estimates) and three municipalities where no shelling was logged.

³³ National News Agency, [رعد: على السلطة أن تخجل من شعبها وتنسحب مما سمي مفاوضات مباشرة مع العدو الصهيوني](#), April 24, 2026;

National News Agency, [نعيم قاسم: لم تهزمتنا إسرائيل ومنفتحون لأقصى تعاون مع السلطة في لبنان بصيغة جديدة مبنية على تحقيق سيادة وطننا](#), April 18, 2026

³⁴ National News Agency, [قاسم: المفاوضات المباشرة ومخارجاتها لا تعيننا وسند على العدوان الإسرائيلي ونواجهه](#), April 27, 2026



- Rejecting these criticisms, President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have reaffirmed their support for talks with Israel and the US-led ceasefire process.³⁵ Neither Aoun nor the Lebanese government are likely to reverse course, given heavy international pressure to engage in diplomacy.
- Hezbollah political figures have given interviews in which they hinted at mass protests or the forceful overthrow of the Lebanese government.³⁶ On April 10 and 11, Hezbollah supporters staged limited-scale protests against the start of Lebanon-Israel talks.³⁷ Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement called off the protests to “protect civil peace.”³⁸ Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, the leader of the Amal Movement, has repeatedly affirmed his support for avoiding civil strife in Lebanon³⁹ and is unlikely to back a Hezbollah move that could lead to internal conflict.
- Hezbollah reportedly favors keeping the government in place, in a bid to avoid being drawn into political or civil strife while fighting a military campaign.⁴⁰ The party has not yet escalated matters politically, for example through prolonged boycotts of cabinet sessions or ordering affiliated ministers to resign.

The issue of Hezbollah’s disarmament might lead to significant security challenges in the medium to long term.

- On March 2, following Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel, Lebanon’s government announced a ban on all of the party’s security and military activities, and tasked the LAF and security agencies with preventing Hezbollah from conducting military operations against Israel. Shortly after, LAF Commander in Chief Rodolphe Haykal implicitly rejected direct action against Hezbollah.⁴¹
- With Lebanon and Israel now engaged in direct talks and the implementation of the US-mediated CoH, Washington is once again pressing the LAF – which it funds heavily – to take action on disarmament.
- The LAF is likely to continue to avoid potential civil strife that would be triggered by directly confronting Hezbollah, favoring containment measures instead, such as establishing checkpoints to restrict Hezbollah’s access to and movement of arms.⁴² However, the US and Israel will likely push for direct action.

³⁵ National News Agency, [سلام: لبنان يريد انسحابا كاملا للقوات الإسرائيلية ونشدد على الالتزام ببنود وقف الأعمال العدائية الصادر في 2026](#), April 21, 2026; National News Agency, [الرئيس عون امام وفد من حاصبيا ومرجعيون والعرقوب: أبلغنا الجانب الأميركي ان وقف إطلاق النار خطوة أولى لأي مفاوضات لاحقة وأي كلام آخر غير](#), April 27, 2026

³⁶ Al-Jadeed via X, [@ALJADEEDNEWS](#) April 18, 2026; BBC, [حزب الله يثير جدلا](#), March 17, 2026; [محمود قماطي: «قادرون على قلب البلد والحكومة».. تصريح القيادي في حزب الله يثير جدلا](#), March 22, 2026

³⁷ L’Orient Today, [Hezbollah supporters protest in Beirut against negotiations with Israel](#) April 10, 2026; Al-Jadeed, [العلم الأزرق الى جانب الأصفر.. والمستقبل يستنكر](#), April 11, 2026


³⁸ National News Agency, [قيادة «أمل» و«حزب الله» في بيروت: ندعو أهلنا الشرفاء إلى عدم التظاهر في هذه المرحلة الدقيقة](#), April 11, 2026

³⁹ L’Orient Today, [Berri: National unity and civil peace are a red line that must not be crossed](#) April 17, 2026

⁴⁰ L’Orient Today, [Why Hezbollah doesn't want the government to fall](#) March 28, 2026

⁴¹ Lebanese Armed Forces, [اجتماع قائد الجيش مع أركان القيادة وقادة الوحدات والأفواج العملائية](#), March 7, 2026

⁴² Lebanese Armed Forces, [بيان من قيادة الجيش – مديرية التوجيه](#), March 4, 2026



- On April 27, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington was working on a plan to train and equip select LAF units “to go after elements of Hezbollah and dismantle them so Israel doesn’t have to do it.”⁴³ While disarming Hezbollah is a stated public objective of the government, opponents of a confrontational approach caution that pursuing this goal without a broader political settlement could create internal divisions within the LAF and risk destabilizing an already fragile context.
- Moreover, the US reportedly has stopped delivering aid to the LAF since the start of the latest war between Israel and Hezbollah on March 2.⁴⁴ The US might make future aid contingent on the LAF taking action against Hezbollah.⁴⁵ Degrading the LAF’s capacities would deprive the state of its primary security institution, compounding political and social tensions while likely accelerating existing localized security initiatives.

Looking Forward / Analysis:

The conflict in Lebanon remains volatile and could escalate rapidly. The following dynamics will be most decisive in shaping its trajectory, serving either as barriers to escalation or trigger factors.

Iran-US talks

According to Israeli media, the US has pushed Israel to limit its military activities in Lebanon as it pursues negotiations with Iran.⁴⁶ Iran’s stance on Hezbollah’s military activities is unclear, but Tehran likely wants the organization to curb its attacks on Israel as diplomacy with the US and calls for a ceasefire in Lebanon continue.

The trajectory of US-Iran diplomacy will largely determine how the conflict in Lebanon evolves. Continued negotiations would help maintain the status quo, while a diplomatic breakdown would likely see it deteriorate. A renewed US-Iran military confrontation would significantly raise the risk of wide-scale conflict in Lebanon.

Lebanon-Israel diplomatic track

The US is seeking to broker a diplomatic track between Lebanon and Israel, with a second round of direct talks held at the White House on April 23. Following this meeting, US President Donald Trump said that Israel would restrain its military activities in Lebanon.⁴⁷ Should the Lebanon–Israel talks fail to make meaningful progress or fall short of satisfying Tel Aviv and Washington, the risk that large-scale bombing will resume beyond southern Lebanon will increase.⁴⁸

⁴³ US Department of State, [Secretary of State Marco Rubio With Trey Yingst of Fox News Channel](#) April 27, 2026

⁴⁴ The National, [US tightens grip on Lebanese army aid as delays bite in Beirut](#) April 24, 2026

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ Israeli Channel 12, [טראמפ לנתניהו: ישראל צריכה להבליג ולא לסכן את הפסקת האש בלבנון](#) April 28, 2026;

YNet, [טראמפ על השאלטר: הקיפאון המדמם בלבנון ייגמר כשיהיו הכרעות באיראן](#) April 28, 2026

Israel Hayom, [ההימור של טראמפ בלבנון עלול לפגוע גם במאמץ מול איראן](#) April 27, 2026

⁴⁷ The White House, [President Trump Delivers Remarks](#) April 23, 2026

⁴⁸ L’Orient Today, [Israel’s ultimatum to Lebanon: Two weeks to reach a deal](#) May 1, 2026;

L’Orient Today, [US embassy says Lebanon could secure ‘guarantees’ should Aoun-Netanyahu meeting occur](#) May 4, 2026;

Nida al-Watan, [هذا ما ينتظر لبنان إذا أخذ بطلب «الحزب» وأوقف المفاوضات](#) April 29, 2026




Even if the regional conflict were to restart, the US would likely seek to continue the Lebanese-Israeli diplomatic track and potentially constrain Tel Aviv's military activities in Lebanon. Iran and Hezbollah, however, do not support this diplomatic track. If regional conflict reignites, Hezbollah is highly likely to escalate its military activities against Israel, leading either to a deterioration of the status quo in Lebanon or potentially to widescale conflict.

Israel-Hezbollah military exchanges


Both Israel and Hezbollah have geographically limited their military activity since the 2026 CoH came into effect. Israel has largely confined its strikes to southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah has mostly limited its attacks to Israeli troops within the Yellow Line. However, either side could unintentionally trigger escalation. For example:

- Israeli bombings causing mass casualties in southern Lebanon could prompt Hezbollah rocket barrages on northern Israel, which in turn would likely lead Israel to geographically extend its bombardment in Lebanon.
- Since October 8, 2023, targeted assassinations have become Israel's preferred tactic against Hezbollah. Israel has not assassinated a high-ranking Hezbollah figure outside the current conflict zone since the 2026 CoH came into effect. Targeted assassinations, particularly in Beirut, would risk escalating the conflict.
- Hezbollah attacks on Israeli troops in southern Lebanon have triggered Red Alerts in northern Israeli communities, raising security concerns among residents. While Hezbollah has so far launched one rocket barrage targeting northern Israel since the 2026 CoH came into effect, any further such attacks would pressure Israel to take escalatory action in Lebanon.



	Status Quo	Deteriorating Status Quo	Widescale Conflict
Iran-US diplomatic efforts	Ongoing or stalled	Ongoing or stalled	Resumption of conflict
Lebanon-Israel talks	Ongoing	Ongoing or stalled	Ongoing or stalled
Scope of Israeli military actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Almost all airstrikes target southern Lebanon, concentrated south of the Litani River and between the Litani and Nabatieh • No strikes in the Greater Beirut area • Limited number of mass casualty bombings • No targeted assassinations outside southern Lebanon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Most airstrikes target southern Lebanon, with intermittent strikes in the Sidon district, Bekaa valley, and Greater Beirut area • Frequent mass casualty bombings • Intermittent targeted assassinations outside southern Lebanon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict dynamics similar to March-April 2026 War or 66-Day War of 2024
Scope of Hezbollah military actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Almost all military operations directed against Israeli troops within the Yellow Line • Intermittent UAV and rocket attacks against northern Israeli municipalities border communities (Kiryat Shmona, Metula, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing military operations directed against Israeli troops within Yellow Line • Intermittent UAV and rocket attacks against northern Israeli municipalities border communities (Kiryat Shmona, Metula, etc.) • Possibility of UAV and rocket attacks deeper into northern Israel (Safed, Nahariya, Haifa, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict dynamics similar to March-April 2026 War or 66-Day War of 2024


Table 1. Potential diplomatic and military developments in Lebanon.



Internal Tensions

The following indicators would signal the conflict may be worsening or is on the verge of doing so:

- Increased Israeli evacuation notices, particularly for specific buildings or broader areas outside southern Lebanon.
- Israeli targeted assassinations outside southern Lebanon, particularly in the Greater Beirut Area. *Israel has not yet carried out such an operation under the 2026 CoH, likely due to US pressure.*
- Intermittent or frequent Israeli strikes against alleged Hezbollah infrastructure outside southern Lebanon, including in the Bekaa. *To date, Israel has conducted a single strike outside southern Lebanon, on the outskirts of Janta in a remote area near the Syrian border. More such strikes, including in populous areas of the Bekaa, would likely indicate an escalation of the conflict.*
- Intermittent to frequent Hezbollah rocket volleys and UAV attacks directed at northern Israeli towns.
- Israeli announcements of stricter security measures in central Israel. Media reports of municipalities in central Israel preparing bomb shelters, cancellation of in-person schooling, etc. *So far, however, Israel has tightened security only in the north, consistent with the current threat level and not indicative of fears of significant escalation.*
- Any long-range Hezbollah launch toward Haifa or the center of Israel will likely prompt a sharp Israeli response and could raise the risk of a widescale conflict in Lebanon.
- Any resumption of conflict between the US and Israel against Iran would significantly increase the risks of widescale conflict in Lebanon.



Source: mLibanFrance

Political Updates:

2026

APRIL

The Constitutional Council rejects appeals against the law extending parliament's mandate by two years, leaving elections postponed to May 2028.⁴⁹



7

Following Israeli airstrikes on Beirut, the Council of Ministers restricts the possession of arms in the capital to "legitimate forces".



9

The LAF arrests three individuals involved in a deadly clash in Tripoli's Bab al-Tabbaneh area that killed one soldier and injured two others.⁵⁰



17/18

During a meeting in Paris with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, French President Emmanuel Macron supports Salam's call for a complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory.⁵¹




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⁴⁹ L'Orient Today, [Constitutional Council approves two-year extension of Parliament's mandate](#) April 8, 2026

⁵⁰ Annahar, [الجيش اللبناني يوقف 3 متورطين في إشكال باب التبانة - شمال لبنان](#) April 18, 2026;

National News Agency, [الجيش: استشهاد عسكري وإصابة آخرين خلال إشكال في منطقة باب التبانة](#) April 17, 2026

⁵¹ Le Monde, [Lebanon displays proximity to France ahead of talks with Israel](#) April 22, 2026



Beirut Disarmament

On April 9, the Council of Ministers called on the LAF and security forces to ensure that weapons remain exclusively in the hands of “legitimate” forces – in reference to the LAF and Internal Security Forces – in Beirut. The Cabinet issued its decision one day after Israeli airstrikes across the country, including in municipal Beirut, killed over 300 people.⁵² Although the decision does not name any group, it is widely understood as primarily directed at Hezbollah.⁵³

Ministers affiliated with Hezbollah roundly condemned the announcement while others questioned the plan’s efficacy.⁵⁴ Comprehensive disarmament in the capital would require the LAF to identify, confront, and dismantle networks embedded within powerful parties and communities in Beirut. Critics argue that the decision’s timing and framing risk reinforcing Israeli narratives that Beirut is heavily armed or inadequately secured, justifying its targeting. Supporters, however, viewed the decision as a necessary assertion of state sovereignty and to secure the capital.⁵⁵

Internal Tensions

Intra-Lebanese tensions have heightened during the ongoing conflict, characterized by political mobilization and sectarian discourse. Collectively, these developments underscore a pattern in which localized incidents within a fragile context rapidly escalate into wider political and sectarian tensions, increasing risks of civil unrest.

- Pro-Hezbollah protests in Beirut opposing the government’s decision to engage in direct negotiations with Israel and to ban Hezbollah’s military activities prompted the LAF to warn that such actions jeopardize civil peace.⁵⁶
- An airstrike targeting the predominantly Christian town of Ain Saade, which killed a member of the Lebanese Forces, among others, contributed to heightened tensions between IDPs and host communities.⁵⁷
- Reports of evictions and access restrictions targeting IDPs have increased. The municipalities of Daychounieh (Baabda), Mansouriyeh, and Mkalles (Metn) installed police checkpoints, and Jdeidet Marjayoun’s municipality called on non-residents to leave or avoid certain areas, reflecting growing host community pressure.⁵⁸
- In Beirut, an incident in Saqiyat al-Janzir escalated from a security dispute into citywide protests and road closures, quickly taking on sectarian overtones and triggering broader political reactions.⁵⁹

⁵² Asharq al-Awsat, [الوزراء اللبناني يقرر حصر السلاح بيد القوى الشرعية في بيروت](#) April 9, 2026;

Human Rights Watch, [Lebanon: Israeli Strikes Kill Hundreds, Damage Vital Bridge](#) April 10, 2026

⁵³ Presidency of the Council of Ministers, [مجلس الوزراء قرر التقدم بشكوى عاجلة الى مجلس الامن الدولي عن تصاعد الاعتداءات الإسرائيلية على لبنان](#) April 9, 2026

⁵⁴ L’Orient Today, [Lebanese govt bans non-state weapons in capital Beirut](#) April 9, 2026;

Presidency of the Council of Ministers, [مجلس الوزراء قرر التقدم بشكوى عاجلة الى مجلس الامن الدولي عن تصاعد الاعتداءات الإسرائيلية على لبنان](#) April 9, 2026

⁵⁵ Al Modon, [حصص السلاح في بيروت: اختبار الدولة في خضم المجزرة](#) April 9, 2026;

Al-Araby al-Jadeed, [الحكومة اللبنانية تقتر حصر السلاح في بيروت ودق باب مجلس الأمن](#) April 9, 2026;

Asharq al-Awsat, [Hezbollah Pressure on Military Court Undermines Lebanon’s Weapons Ban](#) March 10, 2026

⁵⁶ Asharq al-Awsat, [الجيش اللبناني ينته مناصري «حزب الله» الى «المس بالسلام الأهلي» بعد تحركات مناهضة للحكومة](#) April 11, 2026;

Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Weekly Pulse | 11 April - 17 April 2026](#) April 17, 2026

⁵⁷ Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Weekly Pulse | 4 April - 10 April 2026](#) April 10, 2026

⁵⁸ Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Weekly Pulse | 11 April - 17 April 2026](#) April 17, 2026;

Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Weekly Pulse | 25 April - 01 May 2026](#) May 1, 2026

⁵⁹ Asharq al-Awsat, [قطع طرق في بيروت على خلفية مداهمة أمنية](#) April 25, 2026;

Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Weekly Pulse | 25 April - 01 May 2026](#) May 1, 2026



General Amnesty Draft Law

On April 24, 2025, joint parliamentary committees began examining a new general amnesty draft law. Seven MPs from the Independent Moderation bloc submitted the draft, a revision of a proposal the bloc had filed on December 31, 2024.⁶⁰ The current version grants a full general amnesty for crimes committed before the law's adoption, with notable exceptions.⁶¹ In parallel, it introduces reduced sentences for crimes otherwise excluded from the amnesty: commuting death sentences to 25 years, life sentences to 20 years, and cutting other penalties by one-third. If enacted, the law would also release pre-trial detainees who have been held for nine years or more.⁶²

According to figures from the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities and Ministry of Justice, there are 8,576 prisoners and detainees across Lebanon, including 6,223 in prisons (2,820 convicted and 3,403 pre-trial detainees), plus 2,353 additional detainees held at police stations. If the law passes, an estimated 3,400–4,000 individuals could be released, significantly reducing prison overcrowding.⁶³ Political parties including the Amal Movement, Hezbollah, Progressive Socialist Party, and the Moderation bloc broadly back passing a general amnesty with exclusions. The Lebanese Forces and Free Patriotic Movement MPs have signalled their conditional support for the proposed legislation, though they have insisted on stricter exclusions – notably for killing LAF soldiers – and consideration of how the law would affect victims' rights, recidivism, and the role of the judiciary.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Legal Agenda, [اقتراح العفو العام أمام اللجان المشتركة اليوم: انهيار نظام العدالة تحت غطاء العدالة الانتقالية](#), April 23, 2026

⁶¹ Among the exceptions are nine categories of offenses, including the murder of civilians and military personnel, cases referred to the Judicial Council, repeated drug felonies, encroachment on public property, embezzlement and corruption offenses, and treason and espionage on behalf of Israel.

⁶² L'Orient Today, [Information and amnesty laws: Two key bills, zero progress](#) April 24, 2026

⁶³ Breaking News Lebanon, [الاكتظاظ يفصح الخلل القضائي: هل يمر قانون العفو العام؟](#), April 28, 2026;


L'Orient Today, [Information and amnesty laws: Two key bills, zero progress](#) April 24, 2026

⁶⁴ Annahar, [العفو العام في لبنان يبدأ مشواره أمام اللجان: هل اقتربت ساعة الجسم؟](#), April 27, 2026;

Breaking News Lebanon, [الاكتظاظ يفصح الخلل القضائي: هل يمرّ قانون العفو العام؟](#), April 28, 2026;

Sawt Beirut International, [نصار: العفو العام بيت في مجلس النواب أما الوزارة فتبدي ملاحظاتها](#), April 28, 2026;

Annahar, [لبنان: العفو عن السجناء سجين اللجان النيابية... انقسام في الآراء حول الاستثناءات](#), April 29, 2026



Source: MAAN

Economic Updates:

2026
APRIL

The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development transfers the fourth tranche of a USD 165 million loan to the Housing Bank. The latest tranche, which totals USD 16.123 million, brings the Fund's total disbursements to about USD 70 million.⁶⁵



13

As part of wider efforts to shore up social protection, Lebanon obtains a USD 200 million World Bank loan to finance targeted cash transfers for vulnerable households through the "Aman" social safety net program.⁶⁶

15

A Lebanese delegation meets with International Monetary Fund (IMF) officials in Washington, DC to discuss an agreement over potential lending and assistance projects in Lebanon.⁶⁷



16



The cabinet unanimously approves IMF-vetted amendments to the 2025 banking resolution law, despite objections from Central Bank Governor Karim Souhaid over Central Bank independence and institutional power balance.⁶⁸


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⁶⁵ L'Orient Today, [Arab Fund \(AFESD\) transfers \\$16.1 million from loan granted to Housing Bank in Lebanon](#) April 13, 2026

⁶⁶ Enmaeya, [Lebanon Secures \\$200 Million World Bank Loan: Here's Where the Funds Will Go](#) April 16, 2025

⁶⁷ Reuters, [Lebanese officials had 'good' meeting with IMF, finance minister says](#) April 17, 2026

⁶⁸ L'Orient Today, [Banking resolution: Government falls in line with IMF despite BDL reservations](#) May 2, 2026



Conflict-Induced Economic Damage

Finance Minister Yassin Jaber estimates direct war damage at USD 3–4 billion, over and above losses incurred during the 66-Day War in 2024.⁶⁹ Non-official sources put this figure at USD 5–7 billion, plus USD 1.6 billion in secondary losses.⁷⁰ This destruction – through infrastructure damage, trade disruption, and mass displacement – is the main driver of sharply negative GDP projections for 2026, which range from 7% (Lebanese officials) to 12-16% (Institute of International Finance).⁷¹ These projections are made bleaker by the Central Administration of Statistics, which recently issued a downward revision of GDP figures for 2023-2024, revealing that growth during that period was significantly overestimated.⁷² The conflict continues to affect tourism, agriculture, and remittances – sectors that have long anchored the economy – while deterring foreign investment.⁷³

These pressures are making themselves felt externally as well: the current account deficit is expected to widen by 3 percentage points,⁷⁴ stemming from soaring import costs for essentials like fuel and medicine, plummeting export revenues, and slowing remittances, particularly from the Gulf Cooperation Council, which accounts for 34%–48% of total remittances.⁷⁵ The result is a deepening cycle of dollar shortages, inflation, and rising unemployment.




Figure 8. Lebanon Purchasing Managers' Index (Manufacturing PMI)

Source: BLOMINVEST - [PMI Reports](#)

⁶⁹ Jaber stated that state revenues have fallen 30-40% below budgetary projections.

L'Orient Today, [Lebanon suffers at least \\$3 billion in war-related losses, Jaber says](#) April 21, 2026

⁷⁰ Al-Modon, [بالأرقام... تقديرات خسائر الحرب بمليارات الدولارات](#) April 17, 2026

⁷¹ L'Orient Today, [IIF sees Lebanese GDP collapsing dramatically in 2026](#) April 1, 2026


⁷² Central Administration of Statistics, [Lebanese National Accounts—Comment and Tables](#)

⁷³ Al-Modon, [خاص «المدن»: هذا ما قدمه لبنان في اجتماعات الربيع](#) April 16, 2026

⁷⁴ Al-Modon, [بالأرقام... تقديرات خسائر الحرب بمليارات الدولارات](#) April 17, 2026

⁷⁵ Mercy Corps Lebanon, [Lebanese Remittances: A Household Analysis](#) July 20, 2023

UNDP, [The Increasing Role and Importance of Remittances in Lebanon](#) May 2023



Economic sectors have suffered unevenly. Agriculture, a lifeline for rural livelihoods, has seen 22% of its productive capacity damaged, with bombing and supply chain disruptions affecting crops, irrigation systems, and livestock.⁷⁶ Tourism, which contributed up to 20% of GDP before the conflict, has effectively collapsed: flight cancellations, hotel closures, and travel advisories have cut tourism agencies’ activity by over 80%, putting thousands of seasonal and daily workers out of work.⁷⁷ Commerce and retail have been hit by cross-border trade interruptions, with a reported 50% decline in import-dependent activity,⁷⁸ while digital startups have to contend with power blackouts, internet cuts, and investor pullbacks. Lebanon’s Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) has fallen into contractionary territory (below 50), reflecting eroded business confidence, delayed orders, and workforce reductions across the private sector.⁷⁹

Inflationary Trends

The Consumer Price Index increased by 4.91% from February to March as per the Central Administration of Statistics’ monthly CPI report.⁸⁰ This inflation has disproportionately inflated key commodities, especially fuel and energy-intensive goods, where global crude surges passed through rapidly to local pumps and derivatives.⁸¹




Figure 9. Monthly CPI Change (August 2025 - March 2026)
Source: Central Administration of Statistics, [Consumer Price Index - CPI](#)

⁷⁶ Ministry of Agriculture, [Lebanon’s Agricultural Sector at the Heart of the Crisis: 22% of Land Damaged and a Direct Threat to Food Security](#) March 27, 2026
⁷⁷ Enmaeya, [War’s Cost on Lebanon’s Tourism: What Numbers Reveal](#) March 13, 2026
⁷⁸ Annahar, [The Impact of the 2026 War on the Lebanese Economy](#) April 10, 2026
⁷⁹ BlomInvest, [War in the Middle East Weighs Sharply on Lebanon’s Economy in March](#) April 7, 2026
⁸⁰ Central Administration of Statistics, [Consumer Price Index - CPI](#)
⁸¹ Mercy Corps Lebanon, [March Crisis Update](#) April 2, 2026



As diesel prices skyrocketed in March, private generator tariffs jumped 34%, from LBP 30,244 (USD 0.34) per kWh in February to LBP 40,580 (USD 0.45) per kWh, forcing households to ration power or face daunting monthly bills.⁸² Transportation costs followed suit, with fuel hikes rippling into bus and taxi fares that increased by up to 50%,⁸³ and logistic costs inflating food imports and delivery.




Figure 10. CPI Monthly Change by Component (March 2026)
Source: Central Administration of Statistics, [Consumer Price Index - CPI](#)

The latest IPC update for Lebanon shows a sharp deterioration in food security amid renewed conflict, displacement, and worsening economic pressures. About 1.24 million people are projected to face food insecurity levels classified as Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse between April and August 2026, up from 874,000 in the November 2025 to March 2026 period.⁸⁴

Displacement has further eroded affordability, driving rents to unprecedented levels, as IDPs work to secure housing, with many resorting to living in roadside tents, public shelters, or cars.⁸⁵ Amid unchecked “greedflation”, the government has announced a crackdown on manipulators, monopolies, and hoarders, though enforcement remains spotty.⁸⁶


⁸² Arab Reform Initiative, [Navigating the Energy Shock: Electricity and Social Equity in Lebanon](#) April 22, 2026

⁸³ Mercy Corps Lebanon, [March Crisis Update](#) April 2, 2026

⁸⁴ World Food Programme, [Lebanon: New IPC analysis shows conflict escalation pushing nearly a quarter of population into acute food insecurity](#) April 29, 2026

⁸⁵ Asharq al-Awsat, [Lebanon’s Displaced Face Housing Crunch, Surging Rents, Municipal Curbs](#) March 5, 2026

⁸⁶ L’Orient Today, [Wartime price gouging under scrutiny as authorities step in](#) April 9, 2026



Developments that Could Lead to LBP Depreciation

The exchange rate – roughly LBP 89,500 to USD 1 – has remained stable for several years, thanks to interventions by the Central Bank to control LBP supply and steady USD cash inflows. Concerns are growing, however, that the ongoing conflict and longstanding financial fallout could spark fluctuations last seen in 2020-2023. Despite the dollarization of Lebanon’s economy, any major change in the exchange rate could undermine fiscal planning and LBP-denominated consumption. LCAT has identified the following three scenarios under which the LBP could depreciate:

1	2	3
The government decides to spend its LBP reserves deposited in the Central Bank ⁸⁷	The Central Bank refrains from defending the LBP against the USD	Cash inflows and remittances decline amid global uncertainty and falling export revenues
↓	↓	↓
LBP supply increases, while USD supply holds steady, depressing the LBP/USD exchange rate	Rising financial sector USD demand drives up USD cash prices in LBP and weakens the LBP/USD exchange rate	USD supply in Lebanon decreases, disrupting current monetary balances ⁸⁷ and driving a drop in the LBP/USD exchange rate



Any single one or a combination of these scenarios would likely lead to a drop in the LBP/USD exchange rate



Anticipated Short-Term Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited impact compared to 2019-2023 currency fluctuations due to dollarization • LBP-based transactions – typically in exchange for cheaper commodities and services, such as food, public transportation, and small tax fees – increase in price • LBP full and partial salaries, income, and benefits depreciate, resulting in a swift drop in affordability



Anticipated Medium- to Long-term Impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rising inflation affects affordable goods and commodities priced in LBP, which disproportionately impacts vulnerable households • Wider dollarization of the prices of affordable commodities and services • A further decline in demand for LBP, which would mainly consist of LBP for government taxes and fees • A drop in government LBP revenues, prompting authorities to re-index taxes and fees to depreciated LBP/USD exchange rates

⁸⁷ Under this scenario, the government collects revenues in LBP and deposits them in the Central Bank in exchange for USD. The Central Bank re-sells LBP for USD on the parallel market. Demand for LBP is driven by the need for the national currency as a smaller “change” currency and the official currency to conduct official transactions (taxes and commitments to the government).

⁸⁸ Fewer dollars in circulation affects demand for USD from key monetary and financial players, primarily Lebanese importers, traders, and the Central Bank, which is regularly seeking to expand its FX reserves.



Source: AFP

Access to Services Updates:

2026

APRIL

Following reports of alleged aid distribution bias, unknown individuals set fire to multiple municipal vehicles, including an ambulance, outside a primary healthcare center in Al-Muhammara, Akkar.⁸⁹



7

The Ministry of Public Health reports cases of suspected food poisoning across several schools and displacement shelters, without causing severe health complications. Authorities launch an investigation into potential contamination sources, including food providers.⁹⁰



8

The Ministry of Public Works and Transport announce the start of intensified field operations under the “Reconnect Lebanon” campaign to restore damaged road infrastructure and reopen key routes across southern Lebanon.⁹¹



17

State-owned telecommunications company Touch announces that it had restored over 85% of its network coverage across southern Lebanon, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the Western Bekaa. Technical teams repair 115 of 135 affected stations, with remaining disruptions linked to inaccessible sites due to security conditions.⁹²



21

⁸⁹ Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Pulse](#) April 7, 2026;

Annahar, [إحراق سيارات إسعاف وآليات لشرطة بلدية المحمرة العكارية ليلاً](#) April 7, 2026

⁹⁰ Annahar, [تسجيل حالات تسمم في مدارس ومراكز إيواء... تحقيق وكشف على الوجبات الغذائية](#), April 8, 2026

⁹¹ Annahar, [وزارة الأشغال تُوسّع تدخلاتها جنوباً وتفتح مجاور حيوية رغم التحديات](#), April 18, 2026;

National News Agency, [وزارة الأشغال: تقدم مستمر في الأعمال جنوباً وتثبيت استمرارية الحركة على المجاور الحيوية](#), April 22, 2026

⁹² National News Agency, [تاتش استعادت أكثر من 85% من تغطية شبكتها في الجنوب والضاحية والبقاع الغربي](#), April 21, 2026



Barriers to Return

Structural barriers continue to limit the viability of IDP returns across conflict-affected areas of Lebanon. Approximately 40,000 housing units were partially or fully damaged between March 2 and April 7, in addition to severe disruptions to electricity, water, and telecommunications services.⁹³ Conditions in return areas pose direct safety and public health risks, with unexploded ordnance, degraded WASH systems, and limited healthcare access.⁹⁴ The lack of basic services and viable housing has forced some returnees to relocate multiple times,⁹⁵ placing a greater strain on shelters and host communities. Since many schools serve as public shelters, the gradual return of students to in-person learning places additional pressure on shelter capacity.⁹⁶

Public Sector Salaries

Delays in implementing the sixfold public sector salary increase ordered by the Council of Ministers on February 16 prompted public sector unions to call for a warning strike on April 27. The Association of Public Administration Employees called for a separate strike on April 29 and 30, in line with longstanding demands to restore wages to their pre-2019 value.⁹⁷ The two funding mechanisms earmarked to finance these adjustments have stalled: the ongoing conflict has suppressed fuel consumption, undermining a USD 4 fuel tax, while the parliament has yet to pass a 1-point VAT hike.⁹⁸

Old Rent Law

Fears of a housing crisis surged following the expiration of a nine-year extension to Lebanon's Old Rent Law. Recent court rulings have accelerated eviction proceedings, interpreting the extension period as running continuously since 2017 and leaving tenants no time to challenge removals.⁹⁹ Several legal experts contest this, arguing that key provisions of the Old Rent Law were never enacted – including establishing a tenant support fund and oversight committees – and that evictions lack a sound legal basis. They maintain that the state should first fulfill its obligations before tenants can be removed.¹⁰⁰ Property owners, meanwhile, argue that enforcement is long overdue after decades of rent freezes. Many affected tenants are elderly or on limited incomes, and face heightened risks of losing their homes as rents rise. Without a comprehensive housing policy and effective state¹⁰¹ support, the situation is likely to drive vulnerabilities among low-income households.¹⁰²

⁹³ Annahar, [١٠٨١ وحدة سكنية دمرتها إسرائيل يومياً في لبنان خلال ٥ أسابيع: أرقام تكشف حجم الدمار في القطاع السكني](#), April 16, 2026;

Annahar, [من الجسور إلى الكهرباء: استراتيجية خنق جنوب لبنان تتوسع](#), April 16, 2026

⁹⁴ Six hospitals and forty-six primary health care centers remain non-operational, while seven are only partially functioning, restricted to chronic disease management and emergency care.

ReliefWeb, [Lebanon Health Sector Emergency Situation Report Issue #8](#) April 28, 2026

⁹⁵ Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Weekly Pulse | 18 April - 24 April 2026](#) April 25, 2026

⁹⁶ Tensions Monitoring System, [TMS Tensions Weekly Pulse | 25 April - 01 May 2026](#) May 1, 2026

⁹⁷ Annahar, [إضراب الإئتمين: غالبية القطاع العام ملتزمة... وهبتان تمثيلتان للموظفين تتعارضان](#), April 26, 2026;

El Nashra, [رابطة موظفي الإدارة العامة أعلنت الإضراب في ٢٩ و٣٠ نيسان ولوّحت بخطوات تصعيدية](#), April 27, 2026

⁹⁸ LBCI via Facebook, [انخفاض واردات الدولة وتعذر دفع زيادات الرواتب... تأثيرات الحرب](#), April 27, 2026;

Al Modon, [جابر لموظفي القطاع العام: حقوقكم التي أقرت لم ولن تلغى](#), April 26, 2026

⁹⁹ Annahar, [إشكالية قانون الإيجارات بعد شباط ٢٠٢٦: أزمة تنفيذ أم بداية حل](#), April 4, 2026;


Lebanon Debate, [إحکم قضائي يفتح باب تحرير العقارات... ورفض قاطع للتمديد تحت أي ذريعة](#), March 25, 2026

¹⁰⁰ National News Agency, [تجمع الحقوقيين للطعن وتعديل قانون الإيجارات: تتخوف من قرارات مخالفة للقانون تعرض مئات آلاف العائلات للتهجير](#), April 9, 2026

¹⁰¹ On February 25, 2026, several MPs introduced two draft laws aimed at securing the right to housing: one on the continuity of new lease agreements and another regulating old leases.

Legal Agenda, [إقتراحان توأمان لتعزيز الحق بالسكن](#), February 27, 2026

¹⁰² Al Modon, [قانون الإيجارات الجديد... العد التنازلي لتشريد العائلات بدأ](#), February 1, 2026



Education Sector Under Strain

The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) has pursued a phased reopening of schools, while maintaining hybrid and remote learning options. As of late April, over 700 public schools have resumed operations – with more than 600 offering in-person classes and approximately 100 in hybrid mode. Another 462 schools remain in use as collective shelters.¹⁰³ All schools south of Saida, however, remain closed.¹⁰⁴

The war has deepened pre-existing educational inequalities along geographic and sectoral lines. In areas considered more secure, in-person learning has been more consistently maintained throughout the war, with about half of public schools continuing in-person instruction, although others introduced remote learning. On the other hand, 15% of schools in directly affected areas suspended operations entirely.¹⁰⁵ Significantly, 77% of students have returned to classrooms in private schools since the 2026 CoH into effect,¹⁰⁶ whereas students who are internally displaced, residing in shelters, or whose public schools are still being used as shelters, have limited or no access to in-person learning.¹⁰⁷

Although some 180,000 internally displaced children have accessed online education, there are disparities in the quality and consistency of that access.¹⁰⁸ Availability of devices remains uneven – while 94% of high school students in shelters report having a personal device, the majority of younger students up to eighth grade do not. For displaced and low-income households, connectivity costs, inadequate supervision, shared spaces, and limited privacy in collective shelters further reduce the effectiveness of remote learning engagement.¹⁰⁹ These challenges are compounded for children with special learning and developmental needs – in-person therapeutic and assistive interventions cannot be replicated through digital platforms.¹¹⁰

An estimated half of students are currently performing below required levels, particularly in reading and mathematics, with rising risks of dropouts, child labor, and early marriage among the most vulnerable.¹¹¹ These figures should be viewed against the wider backdrop of financial strain on schools, teacher attrition, and declining institutional capacity, which are particularly acute in the south, where tuition collection has collapsed, salary disbursements are at risk, and the threat of permanent school closure is mounting.¹¹²

¹⁰³ UN OCHA, [Lebanon: Flash Update #21 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon \(as of 27 April 2026\) - Lebanon | ReliefWeb](#) April 29, 2026

¹⁰⁴ Annahar, [مدارس جنوب لبنان تواجه خطر الإغلاق والإفلاس](#) April 30, 2026

¹⁰⁵ Lebanon Debate, [معركة التعليم في لبنان... التربية تكشف الأرقام والخطة في ظل الحرب](#) April 12, 2026

¹⁰⁶ Annahar, [وزيرة التربية ربما كرامتي تكشف لـالنهار: مصير الامتحانات الرسمية في لبنان](#) April 24, 2026

¹⁰⁷ Asharq al-Awsat, [الحرب تحاصر التعليم في لبنان وتعمق عدم المساواة بين الطلاب](#) March 16, 2026

¹⁰⁸ UN OCHA, [Lebanon: Flash Update #21 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon \(as of 27 April 2026\) - Lebanon | ReliefWeb](#) April 29, 2026

¹⁰⁹ Daraj, [التعليم في زمن الحرب... أجيال تُدفع خارج الصفوف](#) March 24, 2026;


Annahar, [لبنان: الإرباك الجماعي في قطاع التعليم](#) April 24, 2026

¹¹⁰ Annahar, [ذوو الصعوبات والتعلم عن بعد: الشاشة مزجة وتفقد التركيز](#) April 24, 2026



¹¹¹ Annahar, [عندما يتحول حق التعليم إلى هم يومي... 147 ألف تلميذ يتعلمون عن بعد في لبنان](#) April 24, 2026

¹¹² Annahar, [مدارس جنوب لبنان تواجه خطر الإغلاق والإفلاس](#) April 30, 2026


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