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Flash Report

Economic and Humanitarian Impacts of Higher Global Oil Prices on Lebanon

March 2026



Source: MEE

The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.

This study/report is made possible by the support of the European Union Humanitarian Aid. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the LCAT and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Key Takeaways:

- Due the ongoing conflict and the resulting rise in crude oil prices, Lebanon is at risk of slowing growth, reduced consumer spending, and widening cash flow deficits. The country's dependence on imported fuel exposes all economic sectors and energy-intensive supply chains to cost-push inflation.

- Higher global oil prices, and by extension higher fuel and basic commodity prices, will have a marked effect on households, particularly the most vulnerable. LCAT estimates that if Brent crude reaches USD 150 per barrel, Lebanese household spending on fuel, transportation, and utilities would rise by more than a quarter.

- Fuel shipments to Lebanon have continued since conflict began on March 2. Unless a naval blockade is imposed, supply shortages are unlikely in the near term.

- Humanitarian actors should plan for near-term higher fuel prices, and should prioritize coordinated transport and warehousing solutions to sustain programs given cost and access constraints.

Introduction

This report examines how higher global oil prices – stemming from the United States (US)-Israel conflict with Iran and disrupted Strait of Hormuz shipping – have impacted Lebanese fuel costs and key commodity/service prices. After briefly outlining how the 66-Day War (September 23 to November 27, 2024) affected Lebanon's consumer economy, it analyzes pass-through effects from regional petroleum prices to domestic fuel and staple commodity costs, showing that higher oil prices significantly increase costs for commonly purchased household commodities. The report then assesses potential fuel supply constraints and their broader economic and humanitarian implications, finding that supply remains largely unconstrained across most of the country. It concludes with observations for humanitarian actors, arguing they should prepare contingencies for sustained higher fuel costs.

LCAT compiled this report following a desk review of available literature, government publications, and media reports. The team ran regressions to determine the pass-through effect on fuel, supplementing its findings with key informant and in-depth interviews across Lebanon's fuel sector value chain.

Context

In the wake of the US-Israeli military campaign beginning on February 28, Iran has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz – a crucial chokepoint for global oil shipments[1] – and attacked petroleum facilities in neighboring Gulf States.[2] The escalation triggered the largest oil supply disruption in decades,[3] driving market volatility and inflationary concerns.[4] Lebanon, already economically vulnerable to oil market shocks, was drawn into the regional conflict on March 2 when Hezbollah launched an attack on Israel. Since then, Israel and Hezbollah have continued to escalate militarily, with Tel Aviv conducting widespread bombardment and a limited ground invasion. The unfolding conflict poses devastating socio-economic consequences for Lebanon.

Lebanon relies entirely on fuel imports for electricity generation. In 2025, state utility Electricité du Liban (EdL) only covered an estimated 16.9% of national demand,[5,6] forcing households, businesses, and critical infrastructure to depend on costly private generators. The conflict has worsened this dynamic as localized outages occur when bombing damages EdL transmission lines. Nationally, 95-octane gasoline prices have risen 27.5%,[7] and diesel 56.9% since the start of the regional conflict.[8] Fuel importers do not anticipate immediate supply disruptions[9] as Lebanon sources 93.8% of its gasoline and 63.25% of its diesel from the eastern Mediterranean.[10] However, further price increases are likely if the conflict continues.

[1] Roughly one-fifth of the world's oil and about one-quarter to one-third of the global seaborne oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Reuters, Maps and charts of the Iran War March 20, 2026
[2] ibid.
[3] CNBC, The U.S.-Iran war is the biggest oil supply disruption in history March 9, 2026
[4] Financial Times, Iran war reawakens global inflation fears March 16, 2026
[5] Human Rights Watch, "Cut Off From Life Itself" Lebanon's Failure on the Right to Electricity March 9, 2023
[6] Electricité du Liban estimates that it generated 5,694,000,000 kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity in 2025, whereas it estimated demand at 33,569,771,210 kWH (accounting for technical losses in supply). Electricité du Liban, Cost Recovery Plan (Addendum) December 2025
[7] On February 27, 2026, the price of 20 liters of 95-octane gasoline was LBP 1,815,000. On March 24, 2026, the price was LBP 2,314,000. IPT Group, Fuel Prices March 26, 2026
[8] On February 27, 2026, the price of 20 liters of diesel was LBP 1,398,000. On March 13, 2026 the price was LBP 2,194,000. IPT Group, Fuel Prices March 26, 2026
[9] Lebanon Debate, ارتفاع كبير في أسعار المحروقات غداً... وصفيحة البنزين تلامس رقماً قياسياً March 12, 2026; Al-Sifr, ماذا لو فُرض الحصار على لبنان March 10, 2026; L'Orient Today, Impact of oil surge to ripple through Lebanon's economy, prices March 9, 2026;
[10] Lebanon imported 2,197,724,372 kilograms of Octane-95 gasoline in 2025, with 2,060,455,390 of it sourced from Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Romania and Turkey. Lebanon imported 3,285,359,255 kilograms of diesel in 2025, with 2,077,879,850 kilograms of it sourced from Egypt, Greece, Italy, Malta and Turkey. Lebanon imported 1,293,478,543 kilograms of diesel from Saudi Arabia.

Lessons from the 66-Day War

Lebanon faces acute inflationary pressures driven by Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah and the broader regional conflict. While the 2024 war stoked similar concerns over inflation[11] and its impact on vulnerable groups,[12] consumer price trends largely held steady before, during, and after that conflict (Figures 1 and 2).



Figure 1. *Consumer Price Index of food and non-alcoholic beverages from August 2023 to February 2026. The 66-Day War falls between the dotted lines.*
Source: Consumer Price Index - Central Administration of Statistics

[11] During the 66-Day War (September 23 to November 27 2024), risk premiums on shipments to Lebanon increased by as much as threefold. L'Orient Today, Insurance premiums drive up flight and shipping costs in Lebanon amid rising tension August 4, 2024
[12] UNDP, The socioeconomic impacts of the 2024 war on Lebanon July, 24, 2025
The National, Lebanon's economy may shrink by up to 25% in 2024 as war intensifies September 24, 2025



Figure 2. *Consumer Price Index from August 2023 to February 2026. The 66-Day War falls between the dotted lines.*
Source: Consumer Price Index - Central Administration of Statistics

The relative stability in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) stemmed from:

1. **Uninterrupted supply of imported goods**:[13] A steady influx of goods, particularly foodstuffs, eased public concerns over supply capacity despite logistical hurdles and deteriorating security.[14]

2. **Steady national supply-demand equilibrium**: Reduced household spending on non-essentials and humanitarian assistance likely mitigated demand pressures. Most displaced households remained in Lebanon, contributing to relatively stable nationwide demand.

3. **Mostly intact national infrastructure north of the Litani River**: Unlike the widespread destruction of vital infrastructure in southern Lebanon during the 66-Day War, the absence of wider national infrastructure damage prevented the supply-side shocks that drive inflation.

4. **Limited external economic and commodity shocks**: The 2024 conflict occurred without spillover from significant external economic shocks, such as current oil market disruptions caused by the partial closing of the Strait of Hormuz.[15]

If the current regional and Lebanon-based conflicts persist or escalate, the absence of the stabilizing factors outlined above will likely trigger negative economic effects: a slowdown in growth, reduced consumer spending, and a widening cash flow deficit.

The most pressing impact of the regional conflict is rising oil prices. Lebanon's dependence on imported fuel affects every economic sector and energy-intensive supply chains, driving cost-push inflation. Displaced and non-displaced households alike will face greater vulnerability as oil prices rise, with already vulnerable households at risk of falling into extreme poverty.

[13] Including the Beirut port, Rafik Hariri International Airport, and several sea ports and border crossings on the Lebanese-Syrian borders
[14] This is Beirut, Trade Under Fire: How Are Imports Faring in Times of War? November 14, 2024
[15] Lebanon's import-to-GDP ratio reached 91.4% in 2023.
Mercy Corps Lebanon, Lebanon import bill signals no pivot toward essential commodities September 23, 2024

Credit: AFP

LCAT Fuel Pricing Estimates and Projections

To estimate the effects of global oil price increases on fuel prices in Lebanon, LCAT modeled diesel and gasoline price projections based on two pass-through effects: 1) Brent crude price changes transmitted to Mediterranean diesel and gasoline prices, and 2) Mediterranean price changes transmitted to Lebanese prices. Using price data from August 2019 to February 2026, the regressions measured price lags, and both direct and one-month lagged pass-through effects for Brent crude and Eastern Mediterranean gasoline and diesel price prices. The model controlled for Lebanese pound (LBP) depreciation against the US dollar (USD) across two periods: post subsidy removal (August 2021 onward) and the lead-up to and during the 66-Day War (August to November 2024).

These pass-through estimates were extrapolated to project local Lebanese diesel and gasoline prices under three Brent crude scenarios selected by the research team: USD 120, USD 150, and USD 200 per barrel.[16,17] Projections are based on the March 2026 running average for Brent crude (approximately USD 103 per barrel) and 20-litre volumes of diesel (USD 24.5) and gasoline (USD 26). The model does not include supply shocks (e.g., sea blockade), which will be explored in future LCAT research; therefore, these projections are a lower bound for future diesel and gasoline prices in Lebanon. Lastly, these projections do not account for any price interventions by the state that would mitigate the local price rises resulting from higher Brent crude oil prices.

[16] Regressions assume that the Lebanese lira remains constant at 89,500 LBP/USD.
[17] Al-Jazeera, Could oil hit $200 a barrel? Analysts no longer think it is far-fetched March 19, 2026



Figure 3. *Diesel and gasoline fuel price projections based on Brent crude price scenarios.*
Source: OPEC Monthly Oil Market reports, IPT Lebanon fuel prices, US Energy Information Administration European Brent Spot Price.


Credit: Human Rights Watch

Impact on Household Consumption

According to the 2025 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA),[18] median household income was USD 550.[19] Median regular and irregular household expenditures were USD 435 and USD 400, respectively. Roughly 74% of household income goes to regular expenses, and when irregular purchases are included (e.g., health services, medicine, furniture, education), this figure rises to 141%, exceeding what the typical Lebanese household can afford. Additionally, nearly 8% of respondents were actively servicing debt, with a median monthly repayment of USD 300, while some 19% had debt but were unable to service it (median burden of USD 600).

LCAT's analysis shows that higher Brent crude prices directly affect household spending on fuel, transportation, and utilities. According to the 2025 MSNA, **the typical Lebanese household allocated 17.9% of monthly expenditures to fuel, 8.5% to transportation, and 9.8% to utilities; approximately 4.7% reported transportation as a primary reason for borrowing**.[20] Applying diesel and gasoline projections[21] to these spending categories (Figure 4), **Lebanese households would spend roughly 34% more on fuel and 27% more overall across all three categories if Brent crude reaches USD 150 per barrel**. These projections assume constant demand, which is unlikely – financially stressed households will likely reduce consumption and shift to substitutes such as carpooling and reduced electricity use as prices rise.

[18] REACH Lebanon, REACH Lebanon Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment 2025 Cleaned Dataset
[19] Among Lebanese households earning more than USD 50 per month
[20] REACH, Multi-Sector Needs Assessment Dataset 2025
[21] The projections assume the following: 1) 75% of the gasoline price rise is passed onto fuel spending to avoid conflating cooking fuel in the total spending; 2) 50% of the diesel price rise is passed onto utilities to account for electricity generators and remove other utility costs; and 3) 50% of the gasoline price rise is passed onto transportation under the assumption that taxi drivers absorb some additional costs to preserve demand.



Figure 4. *Projected change in average Lebanese household monthly spending on fuel, transportation, and electricity under each Brent price increase scenario. The red dotted lines indicate the average monthly expenditure, per category, observed in the 2025 MSNA. Source: REACH Lebanon, MSNA 2025*

Of the food items in World Food Programme (WFP) price records, only two show a statistically significant relationship to local fuel price dynamics. About 24% of diesel price increases pass through to bread prices (Figure 5).[22] **The gasoline-to-bread pass-through effect was notably large (1.33), even controlling for seasonality**. Bread carries symbolic weight for vulnerable consumers: it is locally produced, subsidized, and monitored by the government, and households use its price as a signal for future spending – meaning **price increases drive broader contractionary spending in the short and medium term**.

The limited number of significant fuel-to-food pass-through effects suggests that higher fuel prices only partially explain higher food prices, which likely depend on a wider range of variables, such as input costs (e.g., fertilizer, pesticide) and import dynamics. Throughout the conflict, LCAT will continue monitoring price changes for food and non-food items in the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket.

[22] The pass-through effect was observed for one-month-lagged diesel price growth rates, indicating that bread price shocks are experienced slightly after the fuel shock impact. The pass-through effect of gasoline prices was also statistically significant with approximately the same magnitude, likely because fuel shocks impact bread prices through multiple channels, such as transportation and operating costs (i.e., generators).



Figure 5. *Bread price projections based on the Brent crude price scenarios.*
The red dotted line indicates the latest reported average bread price in Lebanon by WFP (February 2026).
Source: OCHA Humanitarian Data Exchange

Potential Supply and Distribution Disruptions

Lebanon has no domestic fuel production or refining capacity, relying entirely on private importers grouped under the Association for Petroleum Importing Companies (APIC)[23] to supply both the government and the private sector. Local prices are updated four times per two-week period to reflect changes in global prices, taxes, and costs. Despite the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Lebanese ports and sea lanes remain open, meaning fuel can continue to arrive from European countries and Egypt, albeit in smaller cargoes than before the conflict. **The principal threat to this system is soaring war-risk premiums and insurance costs, which sharply boost the landed cost of fuel**. Domestic gasoline prices have already risen about 45% since the start of the regional conflict – approximately USD 4 per tank.[24]



Figure 6. *A map of Lebanon's fuel import terminals, mostly located north of Beirut, overlaid with a heat map of Israel's airstrikes in Lebanon from March 2 through March 25, 2026.*

[25] APIC, Snapshot of the Refined Petroleum Market in LEBANON September 2015
[24] LCAT interview with the Head of Fuel Distributors Syndicate in Lebanon, Mr. Fadi Abou Chakra

A prolonged or escalating conflict in Lebanon raises the risk of localized fuel supply disruptions that would limit mobility – particularly amid mass displacement – degrade living standards, and reduce economic activity in conflict-stricken areas.

- While Israeli officials and media reports have raised the possibility of wider strikes on Lebanese state infrastructure, this would be unlikely to affect fuel import and storage capacity. Most facilities are operated by private firms and situated along the coast north of Beirut,[25] areas rarely attacked in previous Israeli-Hezbollah conflicts.

- On March 18, Israel bombed five gas stations operated by Amana, a Hezbollah-linked firm.[26] Though the campaign is likely to expand, Amana operates just 52 gas stations – a small share of Lebanon's estimated 3,000 nationwide.[27] Given Lebanon's exceptionally high geographic density of fuel stations,[28] even a broader bombardment of such targets is unlikely to cause a significant supply disruption.

- A far more disruptive scenario involves a naval blockade. In the 2006 War, Israel's blockade prevented fuel tankers from docking,[29] precipitating shortages by the end of the 33-day conflict.[30] Lebanon's private importers currently hold only about two weeks' worth of gasoline and diesel in storage.[31] This scenario cannot be entirely ruled out given the rapidly deteriorating regional conflict. Barring it, humanitarian actors should plan for localized fuel supply disruptions, as analyzed below.



Figure 7. *A map of the evacuation zone in southern Lebanon designated by Israel as well as the bridges spanning the Litani destroyed by Israeli airstrikes starting in mid-March 2026.*

[25] Lebanon has 13 private sector fuel import terminals, with all but two located north of Beirut. Lebanon also has two public sector fuel terminals. Republic of Lebanon, Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for Exploration and Production Activities Offshore Lebanon February 2020
[26] L'Orient Today staff, 5 al-Amana Gas Stations Affiliated with Hezbollah Targeted by Israeli Strikes in Southern Lebanon March 18, 2026
[27] Amana, Homepage March 19, 2026;
American University of Beirut - Issam Fares Institute, Fixing Fuel Flows: Petroleum and Finance Trajectories in Lebanon November 2024
[28] American University of Beirut - Issam Fares Institute, Fixing Fuel Flows: Petroleum and Finance Trajectories in Lebanon November 2024
[29] UNOCHA, Lebanon response OCHA situation report No. 16 August 8, 2026;
UNOCHA, OCHA Media Factsheet on Lebanon - 15 Aug 2006 August 15, 2006
[30] The New York Times, As Lebanon's Fuel Runs Out, Fears of a Doomsday Moment August 9, 2006
[31] An-Nahar, شماس: لا نقص في المحروقات حالياً... والخطر الوحيد حرب مفتوحة March 2, 2026

South of Litani

- In the near term, Lebanon's southern border area faces the prospect of widespread fuel shortages. The Israeli military has launched what it calls a limited ground offensive along the border,[32] which could extend to the Litani River depending on the severity and length of the conflict.[33] Israeli shelling has already disrupted local road networks,[34] and this disruption will likely expand with intensified airstrikes, artillery fire, and potential ground combat.

- As of March 26, Israel has damaged eight bridges spanning the Litani River, including a key one on the coastal highway from Saida to Sour.[35] Israel's policy of striking these bridges, which it claims Hezbollah is using to transport weapons, threatens to effectively isolate the southern border region from the rest of the country.

- Humanitarian actors should anticipate that Israel will effectively halt transportation into the border region, reminiscent of its actions in the 2006 War, when every bridge over the Litani River was destroyed.[36] At that time, limited humanitarian aid corridors were insufficient to supply the region, with acute shortages of essential items reported in Sour.[37]

Litani to Zahrani

- Israel's airstrikes in the area between the Litani and Zahrani Rivers – currently under Israeli evacuation orders[38] – could also disrupt fuel deliveries, though likely to a far lesser extent than along the border. Israel has concentrated 28.1% of its airstrikes in this zone, including against vehicles.[39] On March 14, the Israeli military warned that trucks on the coastal road in the area could be targeted, alleging Hezbollah has been moving weapons in civilian trucks.[40] LCAT has recorded no strikes on fuel tanker trucks since October 8, 2023, although two airstrikes targeted water tanker trucks in September 2025.[41] Widescale fuel delivery disruptions between the Litani and Zahrani are unlikely without a major Israeli escalation, such as ground combat or systematic destruction of key roadways. During the 2006 War, amid Israel's naval blockade, humanitarian convoys including fuel tankers reached Saida, north of the Zahrani, only after receiving clearance from Tel Aviv.[42]

[32] Israel Defense Forces via Telegram, @IDFOfficial March 16, 2026
[33] Lebanese and Israeli media reports have raised the prospect of Israel attempting a wider ground offensive that extends to the Litani, and possibly even further north.
Haaretz, IDF's Grandiose Plans for South Lebanon Ground Offensive Won't Topple Hezbollah March 17, 2026;
L'Orient Today, As Israel prepares to escalate, rift widens between Lebanese state and Hezbollah March 17, 2026
[34] National News Agency, اعادة فتح الطرق المؤدية إلى مرجعيون بعد غارات إسرائيلية قطعتها March 15, 2026
[35] The National, Israel hits eight Lebanese bridges as Smotrich calls for Litani River border March 23, 2026;
National News Agency, غارة على جسر صيدا - صور للمرة الثالثة منذ أمس March 23, 2026
Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee via X, @AvichayAdraee March 18, 2026
[36] UNOCHA, Lebanon response OCHA situation report No. 15 August 7, 2006
NBC News, With bridges gone, Lebanese struggle August 10, 2006
[37] UNOCHA, Lebanon response OCHA situation report No. 12 August 4, 2006;
UNOCHA, Lebanon response OCHA situation report No. 15 August 7, 2006;
UNOCHA, Lebanon response OCHA situation report No. 16 August 8, 2006
[38] Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee via X, @AvichayAdraee March 12, 2026
[39] LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency. Israel conducted 512 strikes in the area between the Litani and Zahrani Rivers designated as an evacuation zone by Israel from March 2, 2026 through March 25, 2026. Israel conducted a total of 1839 airstrikes across Lebanon in this time period.
[40] Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee via X, @AvichayAdraee March 14, 2026
[41] National News Agency, غارة معادية إستهدفت صهريج مياه على طريق بلدة النبطية الفوقا وإرتقاء شهيد September 29, 2025;
National News Agency, غارة معادية بين بلدتي كوثرية الرز وأنصار واستهداف صهريج مياه في حي هونين ومعلومات عن اصابات September 19, 2025
[42] UNOCHA, OCHA Media Factsheet on Lebanon - 9 Aug 2006 August 9, 2006

Bekaa, Beirut, and the rest of Lebanon

- Israel has concentrated 8% of its airstrikes in the Bekaa Valley, which also faces fuel delivery disruption risks.[43] Lebanon's fuel import facilities are located along the coast,[44] with tanker trucks traversing mountain roads to reach the region. In the event of a major escalation, Israel might attempt to sever these transport links, mirroring tactics used south of the Litani, though Israeli officials and media have not raised this scenario, suggesting low near-term likelihood.

- Beirut's southern suburbs have absorbed 6.8% of Israel's airstrikes,[45] but its distance from major fuel import terminals makes significant fuel delivery disruptions unlikely. Israeli airstrikes elsewhere in Lebanon are infrequent, making near-term disruptions unlikely.

In an extreme scenario, Israel could target ports and private fuel storage facilities of APIC importers. **Lebanon's maximum fuel storage capacity covers roughly three to four weeks of demand under normal conditions**; destroying half of it would force Lebanon to double its imports within any given time window. Severing major roads and bridges would also restrict access to energy. A full naval blockade remains the only scenario that directly disrupts physical fuel supply. All other escalation scenarios translate **into higher costs – war-risk premiums, logistical complications, and supply constraints – passed on to consumers on top of domestic taxes and fees**.[46]

[43] LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency. Israel conducted 189 strikes in the Baalbek-Hermel and Bekaa governorates from March 2, 2026 through March 25, 2026. Israel conducted a total of 1,839 airstrikes across Lebanon in this time period.
[44] Lebanon has 13 private sector fuel import terminals, with all but two located north of Beirut. Lebanon also has two public sector fuel terminals. Republic of Lebanon, Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for Exploration and Production Activities Offshore Lebanon February 2020
[45] LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency. Israel conducted 125 strikes in the Baalbek-Hermel and Bekaa governorates from March 2, 2026 through March 25, 2026. Israel conducted a total of 1,839 airstrikes across Lebanon in this time period.
[46] LCAT interview with the Head of Fuel Distributors Syndicate in Lebanon, Mr. Fadi Abou Chakra


Credit: AP

Livelihoods and Humanitarian Implications

The humanitarian sector's most pressing challenge is mass displacement and housing destruction in areas of return. To assess the scope, LCAT analyzed International Organization for Migration (IOM) data on the change in IDP proportions per district during the 66-Day War.[47] When the conflict first escalated, IDP proportions fell sharply in affected districts (mainly in southern Lebanon) and rose in those farther away, particularly in Chouf and to a lesser extent in Beirut, Baalbek, and Akkar. Given current escalation and evacuation orders, displaced populations from southern Lebanon are likely to follow a similar pattern.

To track where economic activity has risen or fallen at the governorate and district levels, LCAT used night lights reflectance (NLR) data; changes during the first week of the current conflict are shown in Figure 8. Sharp NLR declines (orange and red) were observed in conflict areas, as well as in Tripoli and Batroun. The decline in the latter two groups is likely due to unexplored economic factors, while lower NLR in conflict areas can be attributed to displacement and damage.



Figure 8. *Change in night lights per cadaster (February 15–20 to March 1–6, 2026). Night lights are calculated by calculating the median cloud-free NLR in the VIIRS nightly NLR images within the specified date range. Source: Earth Engine Data Catalogue*

[47] International Organization for Migration via Humanitarian Data Exchange, Global IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) from API Modified March 23, 2026

Areas where NLR significantly increased (darker greens) can be assumed to be IDP destinations. The districts with the highest proportion of cadasters with significantly higher NLR (>25% increase) were Tripoli (13 of 17), Beirut (5 of 13), and Bcharre (7 of 19), suggesting that these districts received a large number of IDPs during the conflict's first week.

Programming considerations

Given the sharp rise in displacement, spiraling transport and import costs, fragmented caseloads, and growing access constraints, **humanitarian and development actors should consider adapting their programming** to ensure responses remain viable, adequately resourced, and focused on the dignity and basic needs of affected people. Programming should:

- **Factor higher logistics and fuel costs into budgets**, pre-position critical stocks closer to communities, and coordinate transport and warehousing solutions to keep programs running despite cost and access pressures.
- **Diversify delivery channels** – community hubs, local partners, digital, and mobile outreach – and invest in area-based approaches serving host communities and IDPs, to reach increasingly dispersed and mobility-constrained populations.
- **Prioritize expanded food and NFI assistance** with flexible and scalable modalities (including cash and voucher assistance where markets function) to keep pace with rising prices and demand.
- **Expand support for energy-efficient and alternative energy solutions** for cooking, heating, and communications, coupled with targeted subsidies or top-ups for the most vulnerable households, in anticipation of further fuel price shocks.
- **Monitor and assess the capacity of host community economies and rental markets** to absorb growing IDP populations. Deteriorating economic conditions may lead to secondary migrations to districts with more affordable housing or better employment opportunities.

Latest Monthly Reports







Latest Thematic Reports





Latest Flash Reports





Contact

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MERCY CORPS

ABOUT MERCY CORPS

Mercy Corps is a leading global organization powered by the belief that a better world is possible. In disaster, in hardship, in more than 40 countries around the world, we partner to put bold solutions into action — helping people triumph over adversity and build stronger communities from within. Now, and for the future.