



Lebanon Crisis Update

November 2025 ■ ■



Source: Reuters

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


The Monthly Lebanon Crisis Update provides an overview of economic and political developments to alert the international aid response to new and emerging challenges that could impact the humanitarian situation in Lebanon. In the context of the multiple crises affecting Lebanon, the update tracks the impact of political developments on the economy, relevant international developments, updates on service delivery and governance issues, and analysis of the drivers of humanitarian need as they develop. The report also aims to provide nuanced forecasting on contextual shifts relevant to shifting needs and the implementation of humanitarian programming. The report draws upon a desk review of currently available literature, analysis of relevant quantitative data, and key informant interviews with a range of experts and individuals with knowledge of Lebanon's economy.

The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.


This study/report is made possible by the support of the European Union Humanitarian Aid. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the LCAT and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.





Key Takeaways:

- Israel significantly escalated its military campaign against Hezbollah with the November 23 killing of Hezbollah official Haitham al-Tabatabai in Beirut's southern suburbs, its most high-profile assassination since the start of the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) last year. Tel Aviv conducted 84 strikes across Lebanon during the month, including 21 targeted assassinations, several in crowded areas. A November 19 airstrike in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp killed 13 people, Israel's deadliest strike since the CoH came into effect. Israeli forces also erected a wall southeast of Yaroun, cutting off access to roughly four square kilometers of Lebanese territory, and continued to impose a de facto five-kilometer buffer zone along the border, further obstructing the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and reconstruction efforts.
- Rising United States pressure on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah and curb its financing has brought with it heightened political and security risks. The United States (US) canceled meetings scheduled in Washington with the head of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), signaling its discontent with the perceived slow pace of Beirut's disarmament of Hezbollah. A US delegation visited Lebanon in mid-November to demand authorities take concrete action to seize Hezbollah's weapons and curb its financing. Meanwhile, Tel Aviv has accused Hezbollah of rearming, amid reports that Washington has greenlighted further Israeli military escalation in Lebanon.
- The Central Bank issued a "Know Your Customer" circular applicable to all transactions over 1,000 US dollars (USD), including domestic ones. Senders must now provide information on the source and purpose of transferred funds, as well as personal details for both themselves and the recipient. Nonbanking institutions must comply by December 1 or face penalties.
- The Lebanese Court of Audit held four former telecommunications ministers accountable for mismanagement of public funds and fined them USD 36.5 million. The unprecedented ruling established a critical legal precedent for future anti-corruption efforts.
- The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ended hospitalization coverage for displaced Syrian nationals, the culmination of a phased reduction that began in June 2024. This measure is expected to create an immediate, severe gap in access to essential and chronic medical care. In the absence of a governmental response, and given public hospitals' limited resources, NGOs will likely be forced to absorb the additional burden, as displaced Syrians remain unable to afford treatment.
- Over 7,000 wildfires – most of them attributable to human causes – broke out between January 2025 and November 10, 2025, burning nearly 600 hectares of land across Lebanon. The end of the fire season was delayed due to delayed rainfall, with major fires in Akkar, Iqlim al-Kharoub, and Jezzine, while Israeli airstrikes ignited fires in Nabatieh and surrounding areas.



2025

NOVEMBER

The Banking Control Commission issues a directive to curb excessive banking fees



14

The Central Bank issues a new "Know Your Client" circular

Lebanese Armed Forces arrest prominent narcotics trafficker Nuh Zaiter



23

Hezbollah official Haitham al-Tabatabai and four others are killed in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut

The Lebanese Court of Audit rules against four former telecommunications ministers



26

Lebanon and Cyprus sign a maritime border delineation agreement

Central Bank increases withdrawal limits on Circulars 158 and 166



30

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees ends hospitalization coverage for displaced Syrian nationals in Lebanon



Source: AFP

Conflict Updates :

On November 23, Israel significantly escalated its military campaign against Hezbollah with an airstrike in Beirut's southern suburbs that killed top Hezbollah military official Haytham al-Tabatabai and at least four others.¹ The targeted assassination was Israel's most high-profile action against Hezbollah since the Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) began on November 27, 2024, and its first strike in the greater Beirut area since June 5. Throughout November, Israel conducted 84 airstrikes² – several of them in densely populated areas – killing 43 people, the highest monthly death toll since the start of the CoH.³ These escalations, combined with rising US diplomatic pressure on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah and curb its financing, are contributing to an increasingly risky political and security landscape. On November 25, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said that Lebanon was in an escalating “one-sided war of attrition.”⁴




Figure 1: A heatmap of 621 Israeli strikes north of the Litani since the start of the CoH on November 27, 2024 through November 2025.


¹ L'Orient Today, [Israel strikes Beirut's southern suburbs, Hezbollah confirms death of al-Radwan commander](#) November 23, 2025

² LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. LCAT logged 84 airstrikes in November 2025, 95 in October 2025, 76 in September 2025, 71 in August 2025, 105 in July 2025, 101 in June 2025, 101 in May 2025, 71 in April 2025, 117 in March 2025, 61 in February 2025, 29 in January 2025, 75 in December 2024, and 11 from November 27 through 30 2024.

³ LCAT logs all reports by the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen* of casualties caused by Israeli military actions. When reports differ between sources, LCAT uses figures reported by the Ministry of Public Health.

LCAT logged 43 deaths in November 2025, 29 in October 2025, 27 in September 2025, 22 in August 2025, 40 in July 2025, 22 in June 2025, 22 in May 2025, 30 in April 2025, 32 in March 2025, 22 in February 2025, 39 in January 2025, 34 in December 2024, and 26 between November 27 and November 30, 2024.

⁴ Asharq Alawsat, [رئيس الحكومة اللبنانية: نواجه حرب استنزاف من طرف واحد](#), November 25, 2025



Since the summer, Washington has promoted a roadmap that calls for Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025 in exchange for Israel ending its military operations in Lebanon and withdrawing from five hilltops near the border with Israel.⁵ In response, on September 5, Lebanon's cabinet approved a confidential Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) disarmament plan, which reportedly sets out a five-stage process – without timetables – that starts south of the Litani River.⁶ The plan reportedly does not stipulate the use of force against Hezbollah,⁷ and builds on the CoH between Israel and Lebanon that calls for a disarmament process starting south of the Litani.⁸ Although the CoH prohibits offensive Israeli military actions, Tel Aviv has continued its campaign of airstrikes – reportedly backed by confidential US assurances⁹ – in a bid to dismantle Hezbollah's military capacities and compel the group to disarm.¹⁰

The LAF is only expected to secure Hezbollah's weapons south of the Litani by year's end.¹¹ In his November 6 progress report to the Lebanese cabinet, LAF chief Haykal reportedly suggested suspending disarmament efforts in protest of Israeli military actions in Lebanon.¹² On November 16, the LAF issued a statement that Israeli strikes were an obstacle to its deployment along the border,¹³ a key element of the first stage of its disarmament plan. For its part, Israel has reportedly demanded that the LAF conduct inspections on private property – including residences – as part of its disarmament efforts, which Lebanon has rejected.¹⁴ On November 19, the Israeli military issued a statement alleging that Hezbollah was storing weapons inside and adjacent to dozens of homes in the border town of Blida,¹⁵ likely a warning from Tel Aviv over the issue of inspections of private property. Israel did not follow up its statements with strikes on Blida, where the LAF deployed but did not inspect the homes. On November 28, the LAF's southern Litani sector commander said the army had not found weapons in residences bombed by Israel and had not been provided with evidence of weapons being moved into the area.¹⁶

⁵ Nida al-Watan, «نداء الوطن» تنشر النص الأصلي والحرفي لـ «ورقة براك» August 7, 2025

⁶ Presidency of the Council of Ministers, مقاررات جلسة 5 أيلول 2025 September 5, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [L'Orient-Le Jour reveals the main elements of the Army's plan to monopolize weapons](#) September 5, 2025;

Al-Akhabar, [ربط نزاع بين الثنائي ورئيسي الجمهورية والحكومة: الجيش ينفذ الحكومة من الانفجار بطرح أفكار عامة](#) September 6, 2025

⁷ National News Agency, [مترى: الجيش لا يريد استعمال القوة ضد أي فئة وسيقدم تقريرا شهريا عن تنفيذ الخطة](#) September 18, 2025;

Al-Modon, [الجيش اللبناني على خطي النار الأمني... والسياسي](#) October 9, 2025

⁸ The National, [Revealed: Full text of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement](#) November 27, 2024

⁹ Axios, [Israel and Lebanon agree on a ceasefire](#) November 26, 2024

¹⁰ On July 29, 2025, the Times of Israel reported that the Israeli military assessed that its military actions could potentially enable the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Times of Israel, [IDF assesses successes against Hezbollah since ceasefire could lead to it disarming](#) July 28, 2025

¹¹ مجلس الوزراء اطلع في جلسته في قصر بعبدا على التقرير الاول لقائد الجيش حول الخطة الموضوعية لحصر السلاح بيد الدولة October 6, 2025;

Reuters, [Lebanese army walks political tightrope to disarm Hezbollah](#) October 28, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [تنسيق عون - سلام سحب الفتيل وأنصف الدولة](#) October 7, 2025;

Al-Modon, [الجيش «يحقّق إنجازات» جنوب الليطاني و«يحتوي السلاح» في شماله](#) November 19, 2025

¹² L'Orient Today, [Disarming Hezbollah: Why Haykal raised the specter of 'suspending the army's plan'](#) November 7, 2025;

Al-Modon, [قائد الجيش محذرا: إذا استمر الاحتلال فسيستوقف تنفيذ الخطة](#) November 6, 2025;

An-Nahar, [ما حقيقة ما قاله قائد الجيش عن خطة نزع السلاح جنوب الليطاني؟](#) November 10, 2025


¹³ Lebanese Armed Forces, [قيادة الجيش تعمل بالتنسيق مع الدول الصديقة لوضع حد لانتهاكات العدو الإسرائيلي، بعد تصعيده الأخير من خلال الاعتداء على البونيفيل](#) November 16, 2025

¹⁴ Reuters, [Israel pushes Lebanon army to search more intrusively for Hezbollah arms, sources say](#) November 10, 2025;

Al-Akhabar, [الجيش أبلغ «الميكانيزم» رفضه تفتيش بيوت الجنوبيين | الحاكم ينفذ طلب واشنطن: رقابة على كل ألف دولار](#) November 13, 2025

¹⁵ Israeli military via Telegram, [@idfofficial](#) November 19, 2025

¹⁶ Al-Manar, [قائد قطاع جنوب الليطاني بالجيش اللبناني: نحن من هذا الشعب ومعه.. واحتلال العدو يعيق استكمال مهمتنا](#) November 28, 2025



In November, the US signaled its growing dissatisfaction with the pace of efforts to disarm Hezbollah, which Israel claims is rapidly reconstituting its military capabilities. On November 9, a US delegation met with top Lebanese leaders¹⁷ and reportedly gave them 60 days to seize Hezbollah's weapons and start blocking the organization's funding channels.¹⁸ On November 18, the US canceled a series of official meetings in Washington that had been scheduled around a visit by LAF Commander in Chief Rodolph Haykal.¹⁹ The move was reportedly prompted by Washington's frustration with an LAF statement that referred to Israel as an "enemy", as well as perceived foot-dragging by the Lebanese state on Hezbollah's disarmament.²⁰ Meanwhile, on November 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to prevent the organization from rebuilding its capacities.²¹ Following the airstrike in Beirut's southern suburbs on that same day, reports emerged that Washington had indeed greenlighted Israeli military escalations.²²

A growing wave of reports in Israeli,²³ Lebanese,²⁴ and regional²⁵ media suggest that Tel Aviv is considering a widescale military campaign in Lebanon. Amid growing US and Israeli dissatisfaction with Beirut, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said on November 20 that Tel Aviv is not yet responded to Lebanon's offers for negotiations.²⁶ In October, Lebanese and US officials discussed the possibility of opening talks with Israel,²⁷ with Beirut insisting on indirect negotiations while Washington and Tel Aviv favor direct engagement.²⁸ Nevertheless, on December 3, the Lebanese government assigned a civilian representative to participate in the CoH monitoring mechanism meeting that day. Other participants included US Special Envoy to Lebanon Morgan Ortogus and a representative of the Israeli government. These were first such talks involving civilian representatives from both countries since 1983.²⁹ The government's decision was praised by diplomatic sources and the US Embassy in Lebanon,³⁰ as several countries rushed to diffuse tensions between Lebanon and Israel.

¹⁷ US Department of the Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley via X, [@UnderSecTFI](#) November 9, 2025; France24, [Lebanon vows crackdown on illicit finance after US sanctions Hezbollah members](#) November 10, 2025

¹⁸ L'Orient Today, [Washington lays out its \(10\) conditions: The end of Hezbollah and a new political order](#) November 11, 2025;

Al-Hadath via X, [@AlHadath](#) November 12, 2025; Al-Modon, [لبنان يدخل كمشاة طاحنة: تسلط إسرائيل ولائحة واشنطن السوداء](#) November 19, 2025;

Al-Akhbar, [المقاومة تتمسك ب«استراتيجية الغموض» وتعلن استعدادها للحرب: قاسم أطلق «الإنذار الأول» للأصدقاء والأعداء](#) November 13, 2025

¹⁹ Reuters, [US cancels Washington meetings with Lebanese army chief over remarks on Israel, sources say](#) November 18, 2025

²⁰ Nida al-Watan, [«صفحة واشنطن» على وجه السلطة: أطلقوا يد الجيش أو ادفعوا الثمن](#) November 19, 2025;

Al-Modon, [لبنان يدخل كمشاة طاحنة: تسلط إسرائيل ولائحة واشنطن السوداء](#) November 19, 2025;

Al-Akhbar, [تسريبات حول «امتصاص أميركي» من مهاجمة الجيش للاعتداءات الإسرائيلية | أميركا تهاجم عون عبر هيكال: لا مجال للحياض](#) November 19, 2025

²¹ Office of Israel's Prime Minister, [Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu](#) November 23, 2025;

Times of Israel, [Netanyahu says Israel will keep striking Hezbollah and Hamas as necessary](#) November 23, 2025;

YNet News, [Israel zeroes in on Hezbollah's next generation: «The IDF is peeling them away layer by layer»](#) November 24, 2025

²² Al-Arabiya, [Washington relaxes stance on renewed Israeli escalation in Lebanon](#) November 25, 2025;

Israel Channel 12 chief political analyst Amit Segal via X, [@AmitSegal](#) November 24, 2025; Al-Jadeed, [@Aljadednews](#) November 26, 2025

²³ Kan News, [שרים בקבינט: אם חמאס ימשיך להתעצם - לא יהיה מנוס ממחקר צבאי בעזה](#) November 21, 2025;

Israel Hayom, [Israeli officials say only a major operation can dismantle Hezbollah](#) November 20, 2025;

Haaretz, [A Year After the Cease-fire, Israel and Hezbollah Are on the Brink of War Again](#) November 9, 2025;

I24 reporter Inon Yttach via X, [@inon_yttach](#) October 26, 2025;

Walla News, [כאילו לא היו דברים מעולם: כך תיראה המלחמה העתידית בין ישראל לחיזבאללה](#) October 27, 2025;

²⁴ Al-Modon, [العدوان على الضاحية: إسرائيل أسقطت المحرمات](#) November 24, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [ساعة حاسمة لإعادة جدولة زيارة هيكال، 48](#) November 21, 2025; Al-Jadeed, [أورناغوس تعطي لبنان مهلة «غير بعيدة أبدا».. والا](#) October 26, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [لجنة الميكانيزم توثق لبنان: الحرب على الأبواب](#) October 27, 2025

²⁵ Al-Arabiya, [مسؤول إسرائيلي: لا ن تسعى لحرب في لبنان لكن لن نتردد إذا لزم الأمر](#) November 5, 2025; Al-Arabiya via X, [@AlArabiya_Brk](#) October 27, 2025;

SkyNews Arabia, [مصادر: إسرائيل تجهز لضربة موسعة على لبنان](#) October 24, 2025

²⁶ Bloomberg, [Lebanon's Premier to Seek US Help to Draw Israel Into Talks](#) November 20, 2025

²⁷ L'Orient Today, [Morgan Ortogus's proposal makes a breakthrough?](#) October 20, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [واشنطن تلمّح بأن إسرائيل تقترب من نزع سلاح حزب الله](#) October 31, 2025;

An-Nahar, [عملية بليدا التصعيدية تواكب توسيع «الميكانيزم»؟ عون يطلب من الجيش التصدي للتوغل الإسرائيلي](#) October 30, 2025

²⁸ L'Orient Today, [Direct negotiations with Tel Aviv: The noose tightens around Beirut](#) October 21, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [Morgan Ortogus's proposal makes a breakthrough?](#) October 20, 2025;

Al-Akhbar, [إسرائيل دقرت آليات مخصصة لإعمار 38 قرية: غارة المصليح توقف السلطة من سياستها](#) October 13, 2025;

Al-Anbaa, [واشنطن تلمّح بأن إسرائيل تقترب من نزع سلاح حزب الله](#) October 31, 2025; Nida al-Watan, [لبنان: سياق الحرب أو التفاوض... مع زيارة البايا](#) October 29, 2025;

Al-Akhbar, [بيراك إلى بيروت مع "تحذير أخير": نزع السلاح الآن أو تترككم لمصيركم](#) October 28, 2025;

Ashtar Alawsat, [عون أطلق مبادرته لحض واشنطن على التدخل لإنقاذ مفاوضات الناقورة](#) October 19, 2025

²⁹ L'Orient Today, [Lebanon and Israel hold their first direct talks in over 40 years](#) December 3, 2025

³⁰ US Embassy in Lebanon, [Pentalateral Members Convene for 14th Meeting; Civilian Participants Added to Enhance Stability and Success](#) December 3, 2025



In November, Israel carried out increasingly lethal airstrikes in Lebanon as part of its campaign targeting Hezbollah operatives and the group's alleged military sites. Israel conducted 21 targeted assassinations this past month, its highest tally since the start of the CoH.³¹ While most of Israel's targeted assassinations since November 27, 2024 have hit vehicles on relatively empty roads, several Israeli strikes struck crowded public areas in the past month. These include a November 23 strike in the southern Beirut suburbs,³² a November 19 strike in Al-Tiri that injured 12 students riding a nearby bus,³³ and a November 3 strike that damaged more than a dozen shops in central Doueir.³⁴ Israel killed 13 people in a November 19 strike on the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp,³⁵ its deadliest bombing since the start of the CoH. Tel Aviv claimed it had struck a Hamas training compound,³⁶ an allegation denied by the Palestinian organization.³⁷




Figure 2: Heatmap of 84 Israel airstrikes in Lebanon in November 2025.

The Israeli military issued more advanced strike notices in November than in previous months. Israel's tactic of issuing such notices has sparked panic among residents of targeted areas and was criticized by Amnesty International, which stated that its potential misuse could cause mass displacement.³⁸ On November 6 and 19, the Israeli military issued notices for several towns across southern Lebanon.³⁹ Unattributed calls were also made on November 19 to evacuate buildings in Beirut, Sour, and Majdal Zoun, none of which were later targeted.⁴⁰

³¹ LCAT logged 21 assassinations in November 2025, 19 in October 2025, 13 in September, 10 in August, 19 in July, 12 in June, 18 in May, 11 in April, 8 in March and 4 in February.

LCAT logs Israeli military statements regarding its targeted assassinations. LCAT defines a targeted assassination as an Israeli strike aimed at a specific individual(s) and does not count Israel's statements of strikes against alleged Hezbollah infrastructure that kill members of Hezbollah. Israel's statements before February 2025 were ambiguous on whether it was conducting targeted assassinations, so LCAT does not log these as such.

³² L'Orient Today, [Israel strikes Beirut's southern suburbs, Hezbollah confirms death of al-Radwan commander](#) November 23, 2025

³³ National News Agency, [استهداف سيارة في الطيري وإصابة طلاب في حافلة مدرسة خلفها](#) November 19, 2025

³⁴ National News Agency, [العدوان على الدوير يستهدف منطقة مكتظة: استشهاد مواطن وإصابة 7 بحروح وأضرار مادية كبيرة](#) November 3, 2025

³⁵ National News Agency, [طوارئ الصحة: 13 شهيدا وإصابة 9 في حصيلة نهائية للغارة المعادية على عين الحلوة](#) November 19, 2025

³⁶ Israeli military via Telegram, [@idfofficial](#) November 21, 2025

³⁷ Anadolu Agency, [حماس: مجزرة إسرائيلية بعين الحلوة ولا منشآت عسكرية بمخيمات لبنان](#), November 19, 2025

³⁸ Amnesty International, [Lebanon: Israel's evacuation 'warnings' for civilians misleading and inadequate](#) October 10, 2025

³⁹ L'Orient Today, [Israel unleashes on the South: «You don't want peace... message received.»](#) says Aoun November 6, 2025;

⁴⁰ L'Orient Today, [Israel accuses Hezbollah of restoring its military presence in Beit Lif, residents call on authorities to act](#) November 19, 2025

⁴¹ National News Agency, [إخلاء مبنى في صور بعد ورود اتصالات مشبوهة](#) November 19, 2025;

National News Agency, [بلدية مجدل زون تحذر من تهديد لمنزل بعد ورود اتصال مجهول](#) November 19, 2025;

L'Orient Today via X, [@lorienttoday](#) November 19, 2025





Figure 3: Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon since the CoH came into effect on November 27, 2024.

In the past month, Israeli strikes on alleged Hezbollah weapon facilities did not cause widespread damage to engineering and reconstruction-related sites, as they did in October. A November 6 Israeli strike in the Sour district town of Toura hit a sawmill,⁴¹ while a November 13 strike in neighboring Teir Felsay targeted a restaurant.⁴² Since November 27, 2024, Israel's strikes against Hezbollah's supposed arms caches and arms development facilities have focused on rural and mountainous areas outside of Nabatieh, south of Jezzine, and along the Lebanon-Syria border near Nabi Chit, according to LCAT's analysis (see figure 1 above). Overall, Israel carried out 71 strikes more than six kilometers from the border, outside the area it considers a buffer zone.⁴³ Of these, 47 were north of the Litani.⁴⁴

The Israeli military imposes a de facto buffer zone extending about five kilometers from the border, impeding the return of IDPs and hampering reconstruction efforts. In November, Israeli troops conducted 33 quadcopter attacks in the border area, including a November 18 attack in Blida that damaged construction equipment.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, a November 11 quadcopter attack in the border town of Dhayra damaged four residences. Quadcopters have also been used to drop incendiary munitions along the border, including on November 12 in Chihine.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Al-Mayadeen via X, [@mayadeenlebanon](#) November 6, 2025

⁴² L'Orient Today, [Israel strikes south Lebanon restaurant, claims <arms depot and underground facilities> targeted](#) November 13, 2025

⁴³ LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*, noting their distance from the border. Israel conducted 7 airstrikes deeper than 6 kilometers from the border from November 27-30, 2024, 73 in December 2024, 21 in January 2025, 50 in February 2025, 95 in March 2025, 19 in April 2025, 65 in May 2025, 82 in June 2025, 86 in July 2025, 59 in August 2025, 61 in September 2025, 87 in October 2025 and 71 in November 2025.

⁴⁴ LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*, noting if they were north of the Litani. LCAT logged 47 airstrikes north of the Litani in November 2025, 77 in October 2025, 52 in September 2025, 44 in August 2025, 76 in July 2025, 74 in June 2025, 53 in May 2025, 20 in April 2025, 79 in March 2025, 44 in February 2025, 16 in January 2025, 32 in December 2024, and 7 from November 27 through 30.

⁴⁵ LCAT logs all Israeli quadcopter attacks reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*, noting when they pose a barrier to return by targeting reconstruction activity.

⁴⁶ LCAT logs all Israeli quadcopter attacks reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*, noting when they start fires.




Figure 4: A heatmap of 309 Israeli quadcopter attacks since the start of the CoH on November 27, 2024 through November 2025.

In another barrier to return, Israeli troops erected a wall southeast of Yaroun along the demarcation line, rendering four square kilometers of Lebanese territory inaccessible, according to a November 14 UNIFIL statement.⁴⁷ Israeli troops have also conducted intermittent demolitions of structures along the border since the start of the CoH, with five such incidents this past month.⁴⁸ As of May 31 (the most recent date for which data is available), 82,632 people remained displaced across Lebanon due to Israeli military action.⁴⁹ This represents a 16.5% drop since Israel completed its withdrawal from southern towns and villages on February 1, when there were 98,994 IDPs.⁵⁰

Apart from a single attack – two mortar rounds fired on December 2 at the contested Shebaa Farms claimed by Lebanon, Israel, and Syria⁵¹ – Hezbollah has not launched any attacks on Israeli military or civilian targets. In an August 5 speech, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem warned that his organization would retaliate against any widescale Israeli military offensive with rocket fire on Israel.⁵² After Israel’s November 23 killing of a senior Hezbollah official, the party refrained from issuing any clearcut vow to retaliate, as was its practice in response to high-profile assassinations prior to the CoH.

⁴⁷ UNIFIL, [UNIFIL statement](#) November 14, 2025

⁴⁸ LCAT logs all demolitions reported by Lebanon reported by Lebanon’s National News Agency, *L’Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*.

⁴⁹ International Organization for Migration, [Mobility Snapshot - Round 87](#) June 5, 2025

⁵⁰ International Organization for Migration, [Mobility Snapshot - Round 77](#) February 20, 2025

⁵¹ L’Orient Today, [To whom do Shebaa Farms belong?](#) January 24, 2024;

National News Agency, [«ردا على الخروقات الاسرائيلية» المقاومة الاسلامية](#) December 2, 2024

⁵² National News Agency, [قاسم: إذا شنت إسرائيل حرباً جديدة على لبنان ستسقط الصواريخ عليها والعدوان هو المشكلة وليس السلاح ويجب الاسراع باتخاذ التحقيقات في انفجار المرفأ بعيداً عن التسيس](#) August 5, 2025



Source: NNA

Political Updates:

On November 13, Saudi Arabia announced that it plans to relaunch trade relations with Lebanon, citing recent “effectiveness” by Lebanese authorities in curbing drug trafficking into the Kingdom.⁵³ In 2021, Saudi Arabia banned Lebanese imports due to narcotics smuggling, thus restricting access to Gulf markets amid Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis.⁵⁴ On November 17, a Saudi delegation arrived in Beirut, where Prime Minister Nawaf Salam reaffirmed Lebanon’s commitment not to serve as a platform for drug trafficking or activities destabilizing Arab states, and discussed measures to resume bilateral trade.⁵⁵ As part of Lebanon’s current anti-smuggling measures, authorities installed state-of-the-art scanners at Beirut Port.⁵⁶

On November 18 and 19, as part of a wider effort to attract foreign investment, the Lebanese Government hosted the “BeirutOne” conference. The event drew participants from both the public and private spheres, and included delegations from Italy, Germany, Jordan, Egypt, the UAE, and, notably, Saudi Arabia.⁵⁷ Attendees discussed USD 7.5 billion in prospective capital investments across several sectors, including energy, trade, transportation, telecommunications, social services, industry, and agriculture. Participants emphasized that investment is predicated on restoring security and stability and on reforms, conditions closely tied to ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁵⁸

⁵³ National News Agency, [القاضي الدجاح يصدر قراره الطّبي بملف تهريب الكوكايين والكاتبانغون الى السعودية وأحال المتهمين على محكمة الجنابات](#), November 17, 2025

⁵⁴ Entrevue, [WORLD :Riyadh ready to revive trade with Lebanon after progress against drug trafficking](#), November 14, 2025

⁵⁵ L’Orient Today, [Lebanon committed to not serve as drug trafficking platform: Salam to Saudi advisor](#), November 17, 2025

⁵⁶ LBCI, [Lebanon steps up port security: High tech scanners aim to block smuggling, strengthen ports](#), November 20, 2025

⁵⁷ Beirut One, [Beirut One](#), November 2025;

National News Agency, [« من المجلس الاقتصادي بساط: لكن بداية مرحلة جديدة من التعاون والنهوض والثقة المستعادة عربي: سيؤكد ان الطريق Beirut One إطلاق مؤتمر »](#), November 21, 2025;

L’Orient Today, [للاستقرار الاقتصادي يمر عبر الثقة والاصلاح لا عبر التسويات](#), November 19, 2025

⁵⁸ L’Orient Today, [Beirut One closes its doors on an optimistic note, but with no concrete promises](#), November 20, 2025



On November 18, two Lebanese soldiers were killed and three injured during a counter-narcotics raid in Baalbeck. The LAF reported that a fugitive killed during the raid was linked to earlier deadly clashes with the military and was wanted on charges of kidnapping and armed robbery. A large quantity of weapons, ammunition, and narcotics were seized.⁵⁹ Similar raids over the last month are part of a heightened campaign by Lebanese authorities to target traffickers along the Lebanese-Syrian border following the fall of the Assad regime. During Assad's tenure, prominent members of the government worked as drug producers and traffickers, and provided cover for the cross-border narcotics trade. Stepped-up enforcement actions could also be linked to enhanced coordination with regional states such as Saudi Arabia, as well as to Hezbollah's waning influence – many traffickers benefitted from political cover provided by figures in the Bekaa Valley and elsewhere, including some aligned with Hezbollah.⁶⁰ These developments presented an opportunity to overcome previous political barriers to drug enforcement while also strengthening regional ties.

Two days later, during a raid near Kneiseh, the LAF arrested Nouh Zaiter, a prominent narcotics trafficker sanctioned by the US Treasury.⁶¹ The arrest sparked speculation that it was intended as a political signal to Gulf States – particularly Saudi Arabia – as Zaiter played a role in manufacturing and smuggling narcotics abroad.⁶² The arrest was also framed as potentially part of a broader arrangement involving the release of Syrian or Islamist detainees,⁶³ leading some to speculate that it was timed for Zaiter to benefit from a general amnesty, a point hinted at by Zaiter's lawyer.⁶⁴ Notably, the government has made no official announcement about an amnesty.⁶⁵

On November 20, the cabinet reviewed a draft law to abolish the death penalty.⁶⁶ The bill, which had been submitted on October 7 and signed by seven MPs, still requires parliamentary debate and approval. Lebanon continues to issue death sentences but has not carried out an execution since 2004. There are currently 87 people on death row. Supporters of the bill frame it as part of a wider effort to align national legislation with Lebanon's recent votes at the UN and to address the legal and human rights implications of maintaining capital punishment without enforcement. The government's review was reportedly unrelated to the potential extradition from Bulgaria of Igor Grechouchkin, owner of the Rhosus, the ship that transported the ammonium nitrate that exploded at Beirut Port in 2020. Bulgarian authorities have requested guarantees that Lebanon would not impose the death penalty were Grechouchkin to be convicted.⁶⁷

⁵⁹ Annahar, [شهيدين للجيش اللبناني جراء اشتباكات في الشراونة - بعلبك... ومقتل مطلوب خطير](#) November 18, 2025

⁶⁰ Asharq al-Awsat, [Lebanon's Drug Empire Faces Beginning of Its End](#) October 30, 2025

⁶¹ L'Orient Today, [Drug kingpin Nouh Zaiter arrested by Lebanese Army](#) November 20, 2025

⁶² Ynet News, [Lebanon captures notorious drug kingpin tied to Hezbollah and Assad regime](#) November 20, 2025


⁶³ L'Orient Today, [Syrian detainees in Lebanon: Will Mitri's trip to Syria bring a long-awaited breakthrough?](#) November 19, 2025

⁶⁴ APT (YouTube), [Lebanon's Most Wanted Drug Lord Arrested! 1,500 Cases Against Him | Lawyer Calls for Amnesty](#) November 21, 2025

⁶⁵ Nidaa al-Watan, [توقيف نوح زعيتير وطبحة العفو العام في الكواليس - لوسي بارسخيان](#) November 25, 2025

⁶⁶ L'Orient Today, [Government reviews law to abolish death penalty and permit for National Cement Company](#) November 20, 2025

⁶⁷ L'Orient Today, [Cabinet to discuss draft law for the abolition of the death penalty](#) November 19, 2025



On November 25, the Lebanese Court of Audit fined four former ministers over real estate deals involving the purchase and rental of two properties. The Court held successive telecommunication ministers personally liable for not properly scrutinizing the transactions in line with official ministry standards.⁶⁸ The former ministers must pay the state at least USD 36.5 million – Minister Nicolas Sehnaoui was fined USD 8.07 million, Jamal Jarrah and Mohammad Choucair USD 11.3 million, and Johnny Corm USD 4.92 million. Former Minister Boutros Harb was not fined because he terminated the lease of the “Kasabian” building – an action deemed to have saved the state USD 20 million – and the court suspended the fine for former Minister Talal Hawat due to lack of illicit intent. The ruling stands out because the Court of Audit, for the first time in 70 years, exercised direct judicial authority in fining ministers as opposed to reporting its findings to the parliament.⁶⁹ This ruling could set a legal precedent for future anti-corruption actions and institutional reform, enabling the Court of Audit and other judicial bodies to scrutinize and directly penalize individuals for ministerial-level financial decisions.

On November 26, Lebanon and Cyprus signed a maritime border delineation agreement, a milestone for both states as they continue offshore hydrocarbon exploration.⁷⁰ The agreement is not without controversy.⁷¹ It is based on a preliminary demarcation negotiated in 2007 that, despite not being ratified by the Lebanese Parliament, served as a basis for demarcating the Cyprus-Israel border in 2010 and, indirectly, subsequent Lebanese-Israeli negotiations.⁷² The Lebanon-Cyprus agreement, which reportedly includes provisions to support the LAF and advances potential discussions over joint exploitation efforts, was strong opposed by Türkiye.⁷³ The deal poses a setback for Türkiye’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine,⁷⁴ and is expected to contribute to escalating diplomatic tensions, despite President Aoun stressing in a speech marking the agreement that the accord was struck to foster regional cooperation and was not intended to “exclude anyone”, in an apparent reference to Türkiye and Syria.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ The “Kasabian” and “Bashoura” buildings were determined to be unusable or overvalued. The “Kasabian” building was purchased for USD 10.8 million and was later declared to be “unsafe” by engineering firm Dar Al-Handasah. MIC2 leased and then purchased the unfinished Bashoura building at an inflated price, without a public procurement bid, while the ministry paid maintenance costs on the building that were 20% higher than market rate. Lebanon 24, [ديوان المحاسبة يطلب من وزراء اتصالات دفع ملايين الدولار للخزينة](#), November 26, 2025

⁶⁹ Annahar, [سابقة هي الأولى في تاريخ ديوان المحاسبة: تعريم وزراء اتصالات بملايين الدولارات لمصلحة الخزينة](#), November 25, 2025;

Al-Jadeed, [الأول مرة في لبنان... غرامات على وزراء](#), November 25, 2025

⁷⁰ L’Orient Today, [Lebanon and Cyprus sign agreement on delimiting their maritime border](#), November 26, 2025

⁷¹ Critics argue that reliance on the 2007 “median line” approach disadvantages Lebanon due to its longer coastline relative to Cyprus and could cost the country between 2,600 and 5,000 square kilometers. Officials and committee members reported that the government chose to proceed with the existing framework rather than renegotiate, citing concerns that international arbitration could delay offshore licensing by up to four years. Notably, Cyprus has also warned that arbitration might prompt its leaders to claim a larger area.

Al Araby Al Jadeed, [ترسيم الحدود بين لبنان وقبرص: تنازل جديد عن الحقوق](#), November 24, 2025;

Parliamentary Observatory, [ترسيم الحدود البحرية مع قبرص: من خطأ 7002 إلى خطئنا](#), November 24, 2025

⁷² Al Jazeera, [ترسيم الحدود البحرية بين لبنان وقبرص يعيد سؤال المصالح الإقليمية](#), November 2, 2025

⁷³ Greek Reporter, [Turkey Condemns Cyprus – Lebanon EEZ Deal as Regional Energy Landscape Shifts](#), November 27, 2025

⁷⁴ The Turkish Navy adopted the term “Blue Homeland” in 2006 to refer to Turkey’s claim to a wide exclusive economic zone (EEZ), a move that challenges Greek and Cypriot sovereign rights in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Kathimerini English Edition, [Behind Turkey’s ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine](#), March 19, 2023

⁷⁵ Greek Reporter, [Turkey Condemns Cyprus – Lebanon EEZ Deal as Regional Energy Landscape Shifts](#), November 27, 2025;

National News Agency, [الرئيس عون في مؤتمر مشترك مع نظيره القبرصي: نوجه دعوة واضحة صريحة لاستكمال هذا التفاهم البحري مع كل من يريد التعاون معنا والخير](#), November 26, 2025



Source: AFP

Economic Updates:

On November 4, the Banking Control Commission issued a directive aimed at curbing excessive banking fees and ensuring that financial institutions operate more transparently.⁷⁶ Banks are now prohibited from introducing new fees, and from increasing existing ones on “non-cash funds deposit accounts” (long-term savings accounts that cannot be immediately liquidated) beyond their pre-October 2019 levels, when unofficial capital controls were first implemented. Moreover, each bank must publish a regularly updated, accessible breakdown of all fees and commissions for individual and corporate accounts. The directive also requires banks to automatically reactivate all non-cash accounts classified as dormant after October 2019 within one month of the decision date, without requiring account holders to take any action.⁷⁷ The directive does not require refunds for any fees imposed since October 2019.⁷⁸

A US Treasury delegation led by Deputy Assistant to the US President for Counterterrorism Affairs Sebastian Gorka visited Lebanon in early November. The US officials called on Lebanese leaders to take steps to counter Hezbollah financing and diminish the group’s military influence.⁷⁹ Undersecretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John Hurley urged the government to prosecute individuals dealing with Hezbollah-affiliated entities, particularly Qard al-Hassan.⁸⁰ The delegation also demanded that Lebanon start direct peace negotiations with Israel, impose greater control over Lebanon’s borders, and implement concrete fiscal and financial reforms.⁸¹ Although the US set a deadline for these measures, reports differ as to the exact date. Some stated that they must be implemented by May 2026 – when Lebanon is slated to hold parliamentary elections – and others by the end of the year, similar to the reported US-Israeli deadline for tangible progress on Hezbollah’s disarmament.⁸²

⁷⁶ Banking Control Commission of Lebanon, [إجراءات متعلقة بحسابات الودائع والعمولات/الرسوم مقابلها](#), November 4, 2025

⁷⁷ An account can be labeled dormant only after the bank has exhausted all means of communication with the account holder (SMS, email, phone calls, statements). Given the lack of oversight on commercial banking operations since the onset of the 2019 crisis, commercial banks may have adopted dubious or even illicit standards to classify accounts as dormant, giving themselves the opportunity to financially benefit from these accounts through excessive retention, subscription, or other recurrent fees.

⁷⁸ L’Orient Today, [Banking Control Commission moves to curb excessive bank fees](#) November 10, 2025


⁷⁹ This Is Beirut, [US Treasury Delegation Warns Lebanon: Two-Month Deadline for Key Reforms](#) November 10, 2025;

Iran Wire, [Iran Paid Hezbollah \\$1 Billion in 10 Months Despite Economic Crisis](#) November 14, 2025

⁸⁰ Asharq al-Awsat, [Treasury Official Says US Pushes Lebanon to Crack Down on Hezbollah Funding Ahead of Elections](#) November 10, 2025

⁸¹ Nidaa al-Watan, [وفد الخزانة الأميركية: تعالوا إلينا بـ “OFFER” نزع السلاح شمال اللباني](#), November 11, 2025

⁸² PBS News, [U.S. pushes Lebanon to crack down on Hezbollah funding ahead of elections](#) November 10, 2025



On November 6, a World Bank (WB) delegation met with Finance Minister Yassine Jaber in Beirut, where it warned that further delays in approving outstanding loans issued by the international body could undermine economic recovery.⁸³ Loans to fund postwar reconstruction and repair the water sector are currently awaiting approval by the parliament, which has not reached quorum since September 29, 2025, due to disagreements over proposed amendments to the electoral law.⁸⁴ Jaber also reportedly told some MPs that assistance from international institutions, including additional WB loans, is predicated on finalizing an agreement with the IMF. If Lebanon completes its agreement with the IMF, the WB may expand its assistance to Lebanon in the form of direct budgetary support, rather than sector-specific interventions.⁸⁵

On November 14, a new Central Bank “Know Your Client” circular came into force.⁸⁶ Basic Circular 3 stipulates that anyone making a domestic transfer of over USD 1,000 must denote the source of the funds, the purpose of the transfer, and provide personal information about themselves and the funds’ recipient. Previously, these measures only applied to transactions over USD 10,000.⁸⁷ Nonbanking institutions must implement the new measures by December 1 and companies that fail to comply will be subject to penalties under Lebanese Law. The circular was issued only days after the US Treasury delegation departed Lebanon, and amid increased scrutiny of Lebanon’s nonbanking financial institutions and Hezbollah’s alleged use of them over the past year.⁸⁸

In the second half of November, some commercial bank deposits that had been transferred abroad in late 2019 were reportedly returned to Lebanon. In compliance with an earlier directive by Financial Public Prosecutor Judge Maher Shoueito,⁸⁹ banks were required to begin transferring sums equivalent to those previously sent abroad around the time of the October 2019 economic crisis. The returned funds are being deposited into accounts supervised by the Financial Public Prosecutor’s office.⁹⁰

On November 27, the Central Bank increased withdrawal limits on USD deposits trapped in the commercial banking system. These increases apply only to electronic payments; physical USD cash withdrawals remain the same. The new limits are USD 1,000 for Circular 158 beneficiaries (up from USD 800) and USD 500 for Circular 166 beneficiaries (up from USD 400). The Central Bank will also allow “sole proprietorships and officially licensed associations, including charitable and religious organizations,” to benefit from both circulars simultaneously.⁹¹ By limiting additional withdrawals to digital platforms, the Central Bank aims to maintain greater control over the exchange rate. The new policy also enables the Central Bank to better comply with international standards, including those of the Financial Action Task Force and the US Treasury.⁹²

⁸³ L’Orient Today, [When the risk of a deadlock with IMF also hangs over World Bank loans](#) November 5, 2025;

Enmaeya, [Lebanon Risks Losing World Bank Funds Amid Political Deadlock](#) November 7, 2025

⁸⁴ Mercy Corps Lebanon, [September Crisis Update](#) October 6, 2025;

LBCI, [Lebanese parliament session loses quorum after opposition walkout over expatriate voting](#) September 29, 2025

⁸⁵ LBCI, [Lebanon running out of time: World Bank funds hang in the balance](#) November 6, 2025

⁸⁶ Banque du Liban, [Basic Circular 3](#) November 14, 2025

⁸⁷ LBCI, [Beirut crackdown: Lebanon to tighten cash transfer controls after US delegation visit](#) November 13, 2025

⁸⁸ L’Orient Today, [Sanctioned Hezbollah-affiliated charities shift to digital payments for fundraising](#) November 3, 2025;

L’Orient Today, [Hezbollah financing: Exchange offices are a ‘big part of the problem,’ says US Treasury representative](#) November 11, 2025;

Asharq al-Awsat, [Lebanon Starts Technical Response Process to US Treasury Demands](#) November 14, 2025

⁸⁹ Mercy Corps Lebanon, [August Crisis Update](#) September 8, 2025

⁹⁰ National News Agency, [بدء تنفيذ قرار النيابة العامة المالية بإعادة التحويلات الخارجية](#) November 19, 2025

⁹¹ Kataeb, [Central Bank Raises Monthly Dollar Withdrawal Limits](#) November 27, 2025

⁹² L’Orient Today, [BDL raises withdrawal limits on blocked deposits, adds safeguard](#) November 28, 2025



Source: UNHCR

Access to Services:


On November 30, UNHCR ended hospitalization coverage for displaced Syrian nationals in Lebanon, citing insufficient funding. This follows a phased reduction that began in June 2024, when support for non-urgent care was cut by 60-70%. Limited coverage continued for deliveries, neonatal and pediatric services, and emergency interventions. The Ministry of Public Health has not publicly outlined a plan to offset the loss, and public hospitals report limited capacity to absorb additional costs. Healthcare sector actors indicate that NGOs are expected to face increased pressure to fill resulting gaps in access to care.⁹³ The end of coverage is expected to severely restrict treatment for chronic illnesses and essential procedures, as most Syrian households are unable to meet hospitalization costs and public emergency facilities already operate with limited resources.⁹⁴

Since late September, following the August directive requiring private generator owners to install meters and comply with official pricing guidelines, State Security has issued more than 600 citations. Inspections are conducted in coordination with the Ministry of Economy and municipalities are responsible for documenting complaints. Feedback from residents indicates that electricity bills have decreased overall after meters were installed. However, there is still widespread noncompliance, with some owners demanding additional payments for meter installation or adjusting per-kilowatt-hour rates, undermining the intended cost-saving effects of the government directive.⁹⁵

⁹³ L'Orient Today, [UNHCR to end Syrian refugees' medical coverage in Lebanon by late November](#) November 4, 2025

⁹⁴ Annahar, [توقف استشفاء السوريين من غدا إرتدادات صحية واقتصادية على لبنان](#) October 31, 2025


⁹⁵ L'Orient Today, [Generator owners push back on meter law](#) November 16, 2025



On November 17, a report estimated that the Lebanese state owes nearly USD 150 million to 254 non-profit institutions under contracts signed between 2014 and 2023.

These institutions include schools, hospitals, orphanages, and care centers for the elderly and persons with disabilities. The report, prepared by L'Œuvre d'Orient, a French Catholic organization, indicates that the Education Ministry owes the largest amount (some USD 64 million, or 44% of the total), followed by the Health Ministry (USD 60 million, or 38%) and the Social Affairs Ministry (USD 27 million, or 18%). Amounts were adjusted for inflation and include a standard annual penalty of 2%. The report highlights the financial instability of non-profit institutions that provide services in place of public institutions, noting that delayed payments affect nearly 150,000 vulnerable beneficiaries annually.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ L'Orient Today, [State owes hefty bill to nonprofit institutions for education, health, social services](#) November 18, 2025



Source: The National

Environmental Updates:

Between January and November 10, 2025, the National Council for Scientific Research logged over 7,000 fires across Lebanon, including 6,900 grassland fires and 637 affecting orchards and forests.⁹⁷ The overwhelming majority were attributable to human causes. Drought⁹⁸ and the late arrival of the rainy season have prolonged this year's fire season beyond its annual September-October peak, and windy conditions have accelerated the fires' spread. Nearly 600 hectares of forests and fertile land have burned, including about 150 hectares in Akkar.⁹⁹ From November 10 to 12, large fires burned through parts of Akkar, Iqlim al-Kharoub, and Jezzine – where Israeli airstrikes ignited blazes that extended to the Iqlim al-Tuffah forests in Nabatieh, consuming pine forests and olive groves.¹⁰⁰

On November 25, flooding from heavy rainfall led to roadway closings in greater Beirut and several other coastal regions. The Ministry of Labor building in the capital's southern suburbs flooded, trapping employees and citizens inside.¹⁰¹ Similar floods were also reported across Tripoli.¹⁰² According to the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, rainfall reached 25.4 millimeters in 30 minutes; triple the rate typically associated with roadway flooding.¹⁰³ The Ministry highlighted work over the last year to improve drainage infrastructure and asserted that waste accumulation and debris were the primary drivers of localized flooding.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁷ Annahar, [حريقاً في لبنان منذ بداية 2025... وزيرة البيئة تعلق وخبير يرد: شعبنا كلاماً 7147](#), November 11, 2025

⁹⁸ Mercy Corps Lebanon, [Household Water Access in Baalbek-Hermel and Bekaa: Constraints and Coping Mechanisms](#), October 3, 2025

⁹⁹ Al-Akhar, [يفعل الجفاف والعدو الإسرائيلي... موسم الحرائق يتمدد](#), November 12, 2025


¹⁰⁰ Kataeb, [الحرائق تلتهم أحراج لبنان... إبادة بيئية وإهمال وقدرات محدودة](#), November 12, 2025

¹⁰¹ Al-Modon, [أول موجة أمطار تغرق لبنان: فيضانات وسيول... وازدحام صوري](#), November 25, 2025

¹⁰² Janoubia, [بالفيديو: الأمطار الغزيرة تتسبب بتجمعات مياه وفوضى سير في عدد من المناطق](#), November 25, 2025

¹⁰³ National News Agency, [رسماني: ما حصل يؤكد أن وزارة الأشغال جاهزة وفعالة وقادرة على مواجهة أي منخفض مقليل](#), November 26, 2025

¹⁰⁴ Nidaa al-Watan, [رسماني يُوضح ما جرى ويفند خطط المستقبل - رماح هاشم](#), November 27, 2025



Looking Forward:

Conflict Escalation Scenarios

Leaked reports suggest that Washington and Tel Aviv have set a deadline for Lebanon to make satisfactory progress on Hezbollah's disarmament in the coming weeks or face the threat of significant military escalation.¹⁰⁵ While these disclosures may be intended to pressure the Lebanese state and Hezbollah into making concessions, humanitarian organizations and other stakeholders should take these apparent threats seriously. The LAF has announced its intention to complete disarmament operations south of the Litani by the end of 2025. However, given Israel's misgivings about the LAF's capabilities and Hezbollah's opposition to extending disarmament efforts, this may not be sufficient to de-escalate tensions or prevent a resumption of large-scale hostilities.

Against this backdrop, LCAT assesses that Lebanon faces the following broad, non-mutually exclusive scenarios:

1. The high probability of a deteriorating status-quo with limited-scale Israeli military escalations,
2. A growing risk that Tel Aviv could launch a large-scale, highly destructive military campaign, and,
3. The possibility that the US could impose punitive measures on Lebanon that negatively affect the country's security, political stability, and economy.

As part of these scenarios, covered in depth in a forthcoming report, Israel and the US could employ several tactics – each of which could be escalated gradually or sharply – that would entail serious humanitarian consequences. These escalatory pathways include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Increasingly frequent, lethal, and widespread targeted assassinations

Israel has averaged less than one targeted assassination a day since the start of the CoH, mostly involving strikes on vehicles on uncrowded roadways. This trend has shifted in recent weeks, with Tel Aviv bombing Hezbollah operatives in busy streets in southern Lebanon towns and urban areas. Israel could escalate even further by targeting alleged Hezbollah figures in homes in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa – as it often did prior to the CoH – as well as apartments in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Saida, Sour, Nabatieh, and other urban areas. Israel could also strike financial and business figures with alleged ties to Hezbollah, similar to its June 24, 2025 strike on a money exchange owner.¹⁰⁶ Such actions would lead to a sharp rise in casualties and displacement in affected areas and increase the risk of social and political tensions whenever strikes hit communities politically opposed to Hezbollah.

¹⁰⁵ Nida al-Watan, [الحرب قبل الميلاد!](#) November 27, 2025;

Israel Hayom, [Trump sets disarmament deadline for Hezbollah](#) November 27, 2025;

Al-Modon, [إسرائيل تبتز لبنان بفائض القوة: نسف الترسيم وجنون الحرب!](#) November 27, 2025;

Al-Akhar, [وزير الخارجية المصري «بمهل» لبنان أسابيع: مفاوضات مباشرة في القاهرة... والتسليم أو الجحيم!](#) November 27, 2025;

MTV via X, [@MTVLebanon](#) November 27, 2025

¹⁰⁶ Israeli military via Telegram, [@idofficial](#) June 25, 2025






Figure 5: A heatmap of 336 airstrikes in the greater Beirut area from September 23 to November 27, 2024 (providing a reference for potential Israeli bombardment around Lebanon's capital).

- Increasingly destructive bombing of civilian and public infrastructure

Since the start of the CoH, Israel has intermittently struck civilian infrastructure. The most severe attacks occurred in southern Lebanon in October and included the bombing of a South Lebanon Water Establishment fuel depot. Although there were no widescale attacks on public or civilian infrastructure in November, these would likely resume in the event of any escalation, particularly since Israel could use them to pressure the Lebanese government concerning Hezbollah's disarmament. Tel Aviv would likely justify any strike by claiming it was foiling Hezbollah's attempts to rebuild its military infrastructure. Potential Israeli strikes on or near maritime facilities, fuel intake and storage centers, warehouses, and bridges and overpasses would severely disrupt humanitarian operations and logistics. If they were severe enough, strikes could increase shipping costs or disrupt the import of critical goods and restrict the supply of fuel for transportation and electricity generation. Humanitarian organizations should not expect Israel to refrain from targeting public infrastructure, as it did during the September 23-November 27, 2024 conflict.



- US financial sanctions and funding freeze for LAF

Alongside Israeli military escalations, the US could expand sanctions against Hezbollah to include political and business figures, as well as entities outside the organization. For example, US sanctions targeted Lebanese fuel importers in 2023¹⁰⁷ and top politician Gebran Bassil in 2020.¹⁰⁸ Washington could also impose sanctions on financial service providers suspected of facilitating the inflow of funds for Hezbollah, including banks and money transfer operators. These actions would likely prompt international financial institutions to tighten their compliance procedures, thus increasing both the cost and the processing time of financial transactions for a country that relies heavily on remittances. In a worst-case scenario, transfers to Lebanon could be suspended entirely. The US could also suspend or reduce aid for the LAF, significantly reducing the capacities of the Lebanese state's main guarantor of security. This would deprive the Lebanese government of the ability to enforce civil order and quell potential intercommunal clashes. It would also disrupt first-line emergency response and aid distribution, which is often dependent on LAF support and security.

Financial Sector Challenges Facing Humanitarian Orgs

Under sustained US pressure, the Central Bank and government are expected to step up compliance measures targeting Hezbollah financing. Several Central Bank measures in the works include shifting to digital payments and introducing additional precautionary procedures at commercial banks.¹⁰⁹ Under the new “Know Your Customer” rules – which apply to both banks and nonbanking institutions – aid actors, their partners/suppliers, and other stakeholders will likely contend with transfer delays, additional paperwork requiring in-person transactions, and potentially higher fees.¹¹⁰ These could negatively affect humanitarian actor-provided assistance – including cash, non-food, and services – and development programs, as local partners and suppliers face difficulties in sourcing and procurement due to increased red tape and greater scrutiny. Humanitarian organizations should also closely monitor actions by the US Treasury – particularly those aimed at severing Hezbollah's financial channels – and adapt by training staff on compliance, adjusting cash transfer methods, and supporting local partners to meet new regulatory requirements.

¹⁰⁷ US Department of the Treasury, [Treasury Targets Two Politically Connected Brothers in Lebanon for Profiting from Public Corruption](#) April 4, 2023

¹⁰⁸ US Department of the Treasury, [Treasury Targets Corruption in Lebanon](#) November 6, 2023

¹⁰⁹ Asharq Al-Awsat sources claimed that the Central Bank will promote the use of electronic payments connected to secure banking networks in all retail activities (cards, smartphones, digital wallets). The Bank will also allegedly impose additional precautionary measures on commercial banks to “establish multiple layers of controls and checkpoints to detect, contain, and prevent illicit funds from circulating through the banking system and the broader financial sector.” Asharq Al-Awsat, [Lebanon Starts Technical Response Process to US Treasury Demands](#) November 14, 2025;

The Beirut, [Lebanon's KYC crackdown: Will money transfers survive the deadline?](#)

¹¹⁰ Norwegian Refugee Council, [Humanitarian Organizations' Use of Money Service Providers](#) 2025



Stalled Reforms Threaten Financial Recovery Despite Disarmament Efforts

Although attention is centered on Hezbollah's disarmament as a condition for reconstruction assistance, failure to advance IMF-mandated reforms could nullify any progress made on disarmament. Lebanon's IMF process is stalled pending the passage of reform legislation, including revisions to protect small depositors, banking sector restructuring to address losses and public debt, and tax reforms to enable social spending.¹¹¹ While the legal framework is in place, passing and implementing such broad cross-sector measures is difficult at best, with the process currently deadlocked because the parliament has failed to reach quorum since late September due to disagreements over proposed amendments to the electoral law.

The financial restructuring plan is snagged on the most complex issue – how to distribute financial losses among commercial banks, the Central Bank, and the government. Many in the government favor depositors sharing at least part of the losses,¹¹² a solution that the IMF finds unacceptable.¹¹³ Other contentious issues could undermine progress toward approving an IMF plan. Several media reports have highlighted clashes between Finance Minister Yassine Jaber and Central Bank Governor Karim Souhaid concerning the distribution of losses and the outstanding audit of the government's claims in Central Bank ledgers.¹¹⁴ Another issue has to do with the poor performance of the Treasury over the last two decades. The government has failed to accumulate a surplus, while the monetary crisis has crippled its ability to allocate LBP-denominated funds for services.


Humanitarian and aid actors should therefore assume that state financial relief is not likely to materialize soon, if ever. They should carefully assess how this will affect whatever remaining relationships they have with state entities – most importantly partnerships in strategizing or delivering humanitarian and development assistance programs – and, more broadly, the Lebanese economy and household well-being, access to quality public services, and livelihoods.

¹¹¹ Reuters, [IMF urges Lebanon to improve reform laws, consider tax reforms](#) September 26, 2025


¹¹² L'Orient Today, [5 years on, debate over Lebanese banks' responsibility resurfaces](#) November 7, 2025

¹¹³ L'Orient Today, [Banking restructuring: Another revised version to satisfy the IMF](#) October 29, 2025



¹¹⁴ L'Orient Today, [Audit of banks and BDL fuels tensions between governor and government](#) November 14, 2025





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