


# Lebanon Crisis Update

October 2025



Source: AP

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


The Monthly Lebanon Crisis Update provides an overview of economic and political developments to alert the international aid response to new and emerging challenges that could impact the humanitarian situation in Lebanon. In the context of the multiple crises affecting Lebanon, the update tracks the impact of political developments on the economy, relevant international developments, updates on service delivery and governance issues, and analysis of the drivers of humanitarian need as they develop. The report also aims to provide nuanced forecasting on contextual shifts relevant to shifting needs and the implementation of humanitarian programming. The report draws upon a desk review of currently available literature, analysis of relevant quantitative data, and key informant interviews with a range of experts and individuals with knowledge of Lebanon's economy.

The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.

*This study/report is made possible by the support of the European Union Humanitarian Aid. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the LCAT and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.*






## Key Takeaways:

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- Israel escalated its military campaign in Lebanon in October, carrying out a total of 95 airstrikes. Israeli forces targeted public infrastructure and equipment needed for reconstruction across southern Lebanon and launched a deadly cross-border ground raid. In addition to hindering reconstruction and recovery efforts, these actions hamper the return of displaced persons, particularly in villages along the border. Lebanon's government is under increasing pressure to disarm Hezbollah and engage in direct negotiations with Israel, which has signaled that it may launch a wider campaign.
- In mid-October, Lebanese officials met with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in Washington. Talks with the IMF focused on Lebanon's progress in implementing tax reforms and restructuring the commercial banking sector, during which the Fund reportedly relayed its concerns over the pace and quality of reform measures. Discussions with the World Bank centered on a 250 million US dollar (USD) loan to support the energy and water sectors.
- The Council of Ministers approved the expansion of the Jdeideh landfill on October 9 and extended its operational mandate through the end of 2026, despite a previous decision to close the site when it reached capacity. Environmental groups and civil society criticized the decision as prolonging Lebanon's chronic waste crisis, while experts warn the landfill will increase pollution, threaten public health, and harm the environment.
- The parliamentary session on October 28 was adjourned indefinitely due to lack of quorum, when 63 MPs refused to attend a session that did not address amendments to the Electoral Law. Amendments to the Law are necessary to hold elections and the delay in voting on the draft legislation is impeding other legislative work. A ministerial committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri has been tasked with drafting amendments to the Law, which will subsequently be presented to parliament.
- In late October, a young man was killed by Palestinian security forces and a young woman was found dead outside a reported drug den in Beirut's Shatila refugee camp. The incidents have rekindled a national debate over security and the presence of weapons in Palestinian camps amid ongoing implementation of the Lebanese government's camp disarmament plan.



# 2025

## OCTOBER

The Constitutional Council suspends the Bank Restructuring Law

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Lebanese officials approve World Bank-supported renewable energy projects

The Council of Ministers expands the Jdeideh landfill and authorizes it to operate through 2026

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Israeli airstrikes target construction and engineering equipment in southern Lebanon

A delegation headed by Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shibani arrives in Lebanon to renew diplomatic ties

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
26

Soldiers with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon down an Israeli drone

Israeli ground forces enter Blida and kill a municipal worker

30





Source: UNIFIL

## Conflict Updates :

In October, the US ratcheted up diplomatic pressure on Lebanon to expedite the disarmament of Hezbollah, while Israel escalated its airstrikes<sup>1</sup> amid growing threats that it might launch a widescale offensive. For months, Washington has promoted a roadmap that calls for Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025 in exchange for Israel ending its military operations and withdrawing from five hilltops near the border with Israel.<sup>2</sup> In response, on September 5, Lebanon's cabinet approved a confidential Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) disarmament plan, which reportedly sets out a five-stage process – without timetables – that starts south of the Litani River.<sup>3</sup> The plan reportedly does not stipulate the use of force against Hezbollah,<sup>4</sup> and builds on the November 27, 2024 Cessation of Hostilities (CoH) between Israel and Lebanon that calls for a disarmament process starting south of the Litani.<sup>5</sup>




Figure 1: A heatmap of at least 574 Israeli strikes north of the Litani since the start of the CoH on November 27, 2024 through October 2025.

<sup>1</sup> LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*. LCAT logged 95 airstrikes in October, 76 airstrikes in September, 71 in August, 105 in July, 101 in June, 101 in May, 71 in April, 117 in March, 61 in February, 29 in January, 75 in December, and 11 from November 27 through 30. LCAT logged 76 strikes north of the Litani in July, 74 in June, 53 in May, 20 in April, 79 in March, 44 in February, 16 in January, 32 in December, and 7 from November 27 through 30.

<sup>2</sup> Nida al-Watan, «*بناء الوطن*» تنشي النص الأصلي والحرفي لـ «ورقة براك» August 7, 2025

<sup>3</sup> Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *مقررات جلسة 5 أيلول 2025* September 5, 2025;

*L'Orient Today*, *L'Orient-Le Jour reveals the main elements of the Army's plan to monopolize weapons* September 5, 2025;

Al-Akhbar, *ربط نزاع بين الثنائي ورئيسي الجمهورية والحكومة: الجيش ينقذ الحكومة من الانفجار بطرح أفكار عامة* September 6, 2025

National News Agency, *مصري: الجيش لا يريد استعمال القوة ضد أي فئة وسيقدم تقريرا شهريا عن تنفيذ الخطة* September 18, 2025;

Al-Modon, *الجيش اللبناني على خطي النار الأمني... والسياسي* October 9, 2025

<sup>5</sup> The National, *Revealed: Full text of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement* November 27, 2024



Hezbollah interprets the CoH's provisions as applying only to arms south of the Litani.<sup>6</sup> Although the CoH prohibits offensive Israeli military actions, Tel Aviv has continued its campaign of airstrikes – reportedly backed by confidential US assurances<sup>7</sup> – in a bid to dismantle Hezbollah's military capacities and compel the group to disarm.<sup>8</sup>

In the past month, Lebanon has faced mounting diplomatic pressure to expedite the disarmament of Hezbollah, which Israel claims is rapidly reconstituting its military capabilities. At the end of October, US Deputy Special Presidential Envoy to the Middle East Morgan Ortagus visited Beirut to urge Lebanon to speed up the dismantling of Hezbollah's arsenal.<sup>9</sup> She also reportedly relayed Israeli intelligence on Hezbollah's alleged rearmament.<sup>10</sup> On October 20, US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack warned that Hezbollah will face a major confrontation with Israel if the Lebanese government fails to act quickly.<sup>11</sup> Also during the month, Egyptian General Intelligence Service Director Hassan Rashad visited Beirut, in coordination with Washington, to reportedly warn Lebanese leaders of potential Israeli escalation.<sup>12</sup> Rachad – who played a key role in brokering the latest Israel-Hamas ceasefire – reiterated Cairo's support for Lebanon and offered assistance in both stabilizing the security situation in the south and mediating between the government and Hezbollah over prospective disarmament.<sup>13</sup> Finally, on November 2, Defense Minister Israel Katz warned that Israel would intensify its strikes if the disarmament process is prolonged.<sup>14</sup> This flurry of diplomatic activity comes amid leaked warnings via Israeli,<sup>15</sup> Lebanese,<sup>16</sup> and regional<sup>17</sup> media that Israel is considering a widescale military campaign in Lebanon.

<sup>6</sup> Al Modon, [نعيم قاسم: نلتزم بالإبواء والإعمار... وسنكون إلى جانب سوريا](#), December 5, 2024

<sup>7</sup> Axios, [Israel and Lebanon agree on a ceasefire](#) November 26, 2024

<sup>8</sup> On July 29, 2025, the Times of Israel reported that the Israeli military assessed that its military actions could potentially enable the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Times of Israel, [IDF assesses successes against Hezbollah since ceasefire could lead to it disarming](#) July 28, 2025

<sup>8</sup> On July 29, 2025, the Times of Israel reported that the Israeli military assessed that its military actions could potentially enable the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Times of Israel, [IDF assesses successes against Hezbollah since ceasefire could lead to it disarming](#) July 28, 2025

<sup>9</sup> US Embassy in Lebanon, [Pentalateral members convene for 12th meeting: LAF operations ongoing in Lebanon](#) October 29, 2025

L'Orient Today, [Israel beats to the drums of war, Ortagus remains silent](#) October 29, 2025

Al-Joumhouria, [فرصة متاحة... أورتاغوس نقلت عدم اطمئنان لا تهديدا](#), October 29, 2025;

The New York Times, [U.S. Middle East Envoy Presses Lebanon to Disarm Hezbollah](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>10</sup> An-Nahar, [أورتاغوس تنقل إطاراً لتوسيع سياسي لـ"الميكانيزم"... الأكثرية أسقطت الجلسة واختار جديد لمجلس الوزراء](#), October 28, 2025;

Al-Akhar, [القاهرة تعرض الوساطة وواشنطن تشدد على التفاوض مع إسرائيل | أورتاغوس: حزب الله بعيد بناء قوته](#), October 29, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [أورتاغوس: لا تضيقوا الفرصة](#), October 29, 2025

<sup>11</sup> US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack via X, [@USAMBTurkiye](#) October 20, 2025

<sup>12</sup> Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, [خاص | ما حمله رئيس المخابرات المصرية من رسائل في زيارته إلى لبنان](#), October 28, 2025;

National News Agency, [الأنباء: إسرائيل قررت توسيع الضربات على لبنان... التحقيق الدولي يسجل روايات عن انتهاكات مروعة في السويداء](#), October 31;

The National, [Egypt shifts focus to Lebanon after Gaza ceasefire efforts](#) October 30, 2025

<sup>13</sup> The National, [Egypt shifts focus to Lebanon after Gaza ceasefire efforts](#) October 30, 2025;

Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, [خاص | ما حمله رئيس المخابرات المصرية من رسائل في زيارته إلى لبنان](#), October 28, 2025

<sup>14</sup> Israeli Foreign Minister Gidon Sa'ar via X, [@gidonsaar](#) October 30, 2025;

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz via X, [@Israel\\_katz](#) November 2, 2025;

Times of Israel, [Netanyahu says there are two pockets of Hamas forces behind Israeli lines in Gaza, vows to eliminate them](#) November 2, 2025

<sup>15</sup> I24 reporter Inon Yttach via X, [@inon\\_yttach](#) October 26, 2025

Walla News, [הללאביזח לארשי יוב תידיעה המחלמה הארית רכ: סלועם סירכדייה אל לואק](#), October 27, 2025;

Kann News reporter Suleiman Maswadeh via X, [@SuleimanMas1](#) October 27, 2025;


Israel Hayom, [המלסהל יוכיסהו - הללאביזח ידיב הרנוש תוטקרה תומכ: הכרעה](#), October 28, 2025

<sup>16</sup> Al-Jadeed, [والا أورتاغوس تعطي لبنان مهلة «غير بعيدة أبدا»](#), October 26, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [لجنة الميكانيزم توتخ لبنان: الحرب على الأبواب](#), October 27, 2025

<sup>17</sup> Al-Arabiya via X, [@AlArabiya\\_Brk](#) October 27, 2025;

SkyNews Arabia, [مصادر: إسرائيل تجهز لضربة موسعة على لبنان](#), October 24, 2025



On October 6, Lebanon’s cabinet reviewed the LAF’s progress in confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons.<sup>18</sup> While the US wants Lebanon to disarm the group nationwide by year’s end, the LAF is only expected to secure Hezbollah’s weapons south of the Litani by then.<sup>19</sup> LAF Commander in Chief Rodolph Haykal told ministers that his troops had more than doubled the number of disarmament missions compared to previous months.<sup>20</sup> Days after this review, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said that the LAF’s efforts were hindered by Israel’s ongoing violations of the CoH.<sup>21</sup> On October 29, Israeli troops opened fired at an LAF vehicle along the border, causing no injuries.<sup>22</sup> At least three times during the month, Israeli quadcopters dropped munitions near United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) troops,<sup>23</sup> which assist the LAF in disarmament.<sup>24</sup>




Figure 2: Heatmap of 95 Israel airstrikes in Lebanon in October 2025.

The US also upped its efforts to press Lebanon and Israel into talks to demarcate their land border and resolve security issues. In her meetings with Lebanese leaders, Ortagus reportedly discussed possible compromises to bridge Tel Aviv and Beirut’s stances on potential negotiations.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Presidency of the Council of Ministers, [مجلس الوزراء اطلع في جلسته في قصر بعبدا على التقرير الاول لقائد الجيش حول الخطة الموضوعة لحصر السلاح بيد الدولة](#), October 6, 2025;

Reuters, [Lebanese army walks political tightrope to disarm Hezbollah](#) October 28, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [تنسيق عون - سلام سحب القتييل وأنصف الدولة](#), October 7, 2025

<sup>19</sup> Presidency of the Council of Ministers, [مجلس الوزراء اطلع في جلسته في قصر بعبدا على التقرير الاول لقائد الجيش حول الخطة الموضوعة لحصر السلاح بيد الدولة](#), October 6, 2025;

Reuters, [Lebanese army walks political tightrope to disarm Hezbollah](#) October 28, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [تنسيق عون - سلام سحب القتييل وأنصف الدولة](#), October 7, 2025

<sup>20</sup> National News Agency, [شجادة: خطة الجيش مشجعة والقرار السبائي ماض في التنفيذ](#), October 8, 2025

Nida al-Watan, [تنسيق عون - سلام سحب القتييل وأنصف الدولة](#), October 7, 2025

<sup>21</sup> Lebanese Presidency via X, [@LBpresidency](#), October 8, 2025

<sup>22</sup> L’Orient Today, [Israeli army attacks Lebanese Army twice as cease-fire monitoring committee meets](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>23</sup> LCAT logs all Israeli quadcopter attacks reported by Lebanon’s National News Agency, L’Orient Today, and Al-Mayadeen, noting when they target UNIFIL peacekeeping troops.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, [UNIFIL Mandate](#) May 28, 2025

<sup>25</sup> L’Orient Today, [Morgan Ortagus’s proposal makes a breakthrough?](#) October 20, 2025

Nida al-Watan, [واشنطن تلمح بأن إسرائيل تقترب من نزع سلاح «حزب الله»](#), October 31, 2025;

An-Nahar, [عملية بليدا التصعيدية تواكب توسيع «الميكانيزم»؟ عون يطلب من الجيش التصدي للتوغل الإسرائيلي](#), October 30, 2025



Israel is reportedly seeking direct talks with Lebanese political representatives, akin to its negotiations with Syria,<sup>26</sup> a position favored by Washington.<sup>27</sup> In mid-October, however, President Aoun proposed indirect talks contingent on a halt to Israel's strikes on Lebanon.<sup>28</sup> On October 20, Speaker Nabih Berri said that Israel rejected the proposal, though reports on the circumstances of this failed initiative vary.<sup>29</sup>

Israel escalated its military actions in Lebanon during the month, conducting highly destructive bombing raids against reconstruction-related infrastructure while also staging a deadly cross border ground raid. In October, Israel increased the number of its airstrikes to 95, compared to 76 in September.<sup>30</sup> These included a series of strikes on October 10 against engineering equipment showrooms in Msayleh – 10 kilometers south of Saida – destroying approximately 300 vehicles, including bulldozers and excavators.<sup>31</sup> Six days later, Israel conducted a wave of strikes outside Ansar in Nabatieh, destroying asphalt and cement production facilities, fuel depots, and storage facilities for industrial machinery – the largest set of strikes against commercial facilities since the start of the CoH.<sup>32</sup> Among the fuel depots destroyed by Israel was a strategic reserve of 500,000 liters of diesel for the South Lebanon Water Establishment, which was intended for distribution to villages for pumping water.<sup>33</sup> Israel claims these strikes were aimed at disrupting Hezbollah's military infrastructure,<sup>34</sup> while Lebanese leaders consider them to be part of Tel Aviv's efforts to prevent reconstruction in southern Lebanon.<sup>35</sup>

Israel's targeted assassination campaign against Hezbollah has also shifted to encompass reconstruction-related activities, with the Israeli military saying on October 16 that it was targeting Hezbollah-affiliated engineers, contractors, and businessmen.<sup>36</sup> In one instance, on October 2 an Israeli unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike outside Kfar Roummane killed two engineers working for Meamar Construction,<sup>37</sup> a firm sanctioned by the US for allegedly being controlled by Hezbollah.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>26</sup> L'Orient Today, [Direct negotiations with Tel Aviv: The noose tightens around Beirut](#) October 21, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [Morgan Ortogus's proposal makes a breakthrough?](#) October 20, 2025;

Al-Akhbar, [إسرائيل دعت البات مخصصة لإعمار 38 قرية: غارة المصليح توقف السلطة من سياستها](#), October 13, 2025;

Al-Anbaa, [لبنان: سياق الحرب أو التفاوض... مع زيارة البيا](#), October 29, 2025

<sup>27</sup> Nida al-Watan, [واشنطن تلجأ بأن إسرائيل تقترب من نزع سلاح «حزب الله»](#), October 31, 2025;

Al-Akhbar, [يرك إلى بيروت مع "تحذير أخير": نزع السلاح الآن أو تترككم لمصيركم](#), October 28, 2025

Asharq Alawsat, [عون أطلق مبادرته لحضّ واشنطن على التدخل لإنقاذ مفاوضات الناقورة](#), October 19, 2025

<sup>28</sup> Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, [خاص | شروط لبنانية للتفاوض مع إسرائيل](#), October 20, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [التفاوض مبادرة رئاسية بحجم التحولات: واشنطن تؤيد وتدعم بضغط على نتنياهو](#), October 15, 2025;

Asharq Alawsat, [ترحيب لبناني وارتياح دولي لمبادرة عون التفاوضية مع إسرائيل](#), October 18, 2025

<sup>29</sup> Reports vary on the nature of Lebanon's proposal and Israel's rejection. Berri said in an October 20 interview with Asharq Alawsat that the US presented a proposal to Israel for indirect talks in return for a two-month halt to strikes, which was rejected. L'Orient Today reported on October 21 that the US mediated a proposal for Lebanon to hold direct talks, albeit just on technical matters, with Israel, which was rejected by Israel. Nida al-Watan on October 28 cited US sources as saying that it was untrue that Israel had rejected a Lebanese offer for indirect talks.

Asharq Alawsat, [يري يكشف لـ"الشرق الأوسط" تفاصيل سقوط مقترح التفاوض مع إسرائيل](#), October 20, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [Direct negotiations with Tel Aviv: The noose tightens around Beirut](#) October 21, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [«مئة الأميركيين يتكذب يري الغطاس»](#), October 28, 2025

<sup>30</sup> LCAT logs all Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, L'Orient Today, and Al-Mayadeen. LCAT logged 95 airstrikes in October, 76 airstrikes in September, 71 in August, 105 in July, 101 in June, 101 in May, 71 in April, 117 in March, 61 in February, 29 in January, 75 in December, and 11 from November 27 through 30. LCAT logged 76 strikes north of the Litani in July, 74 in June, 53 in May, 20 in April, 79 in March, 44 in February, 16 in January, 32 in December, and 7 from November 27 through 30.

<sup>31</sup> National News Agency, [عدوان المصليح أدى إلى تدمير أكثر من 300 البية بين حرافات وحفارات](#), October 11, 2025

<sup>32</sup> National News Agency, [الوكالة الوطنية: عابنت مخلفات العدوان الاسرائيلي على وادي بصفور سيناي - أنصار: دمار هائل في منشآت صناعية والخسائر بالملايين ومئات العائلات من دون عمل](#), October 17, 2025

<sup>33</sup> National News Agency, [مياه الجنوب: العدوان الاسرائيلي دمر مخزن المحروقات الاستراتيجي للمؤسسة](#), October 17, 2025

<sup>34</sup> Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee via X, [@AvichayAdraee](#) October 11, 2025;

Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee via X, [@AvichayAdraee](#) October 16, 2025


<sup>35</sup> Lebanese Presidency via X, [@LBpresidency](#) October 16, 2025;

Asharq Alawsat, [يري: الرسالة الإسرائيلية وصلت لكن أين صدقية الراعي الأميركي لاتفاق وقف النار؟](#), October 12, 2025

<sup>36</sup> Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee via X, [@AvichayAdraee](#) October 16, 2025

<sup>37</sup> National News Agency, [شهيدا غارة الحرمل مهندسان من كفرمان](#), October 2, 2025

<sup>38</sup> US Department of the Treasury, [Treasury Targets Hizballah Executive Council Companies and Official](#) September 17, 2025



Overall, Israel claimed 19 targeted assassinations in the past month, an uptick from previous months.<sup>39</sup> On October 30, Israeli troops entered Blida – where they stormed the town’s municipal building and killed an employee – an unprecedented raid since Tel Aviv withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon on February 18.<sup>40</sup> The following day, President Aoun ordered the LAF to confront further Israeli incursions, a rare instance of the Lebanese state tasking its armed forces with taking potential action against the Israeli military.<sup>41</sup>




Figure 3: Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon since the CoH came into effect on November 27, 2024.

Apart from a single attack – two mortar rounds fired on December 2 at the contested Shebaa Farms claimed by Lebanon, Israel, and Syria<sup>42</sup> – Hezbollah has not launched any attacks on Israeli military or civilian targets. In an August 5 speech, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem warned that his organization would retaliate against any widescale Israeli military offensive with rocket fire on Israel.<sup>43</sup>

Israeli military actions in Lebanon’s border regions continue to impede the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and hamper reconstruction efforts. Israel regularly conducts military actions in a vaguely delineated security strip on Lebanese territory along the border.

The Israeli military has continued to disrupt agricultural activity and demanded that UNIFIL

<sup>39</sup> LCAT logs Israeli military statements regarding its targeted assassinations. LCAT defines a targeted assassination as an Israeli strike aimed at a specific individual(s) and does not count Israel’s statements of strikes against alleged Hezbollah infrastructure that kill members of Hezbollah. Israel’s statements before February 2025 were ambiguous on whether it was conducting a targeted assassination, so LCAT does not log any numbers from this period. LCAT logged 19 targeted assassinations in October 2025, 13 in September, 10 in August, 19 in July, 12 in June, 18 in May, 11 in April, 8 in March and 4 in February.

<sup>40</sup> National News Agency, [قوة معادية دخلت مبنى البلدية في بليدا وقتلت موظفا خلال نومه](#) October 30, 2025

<sup>41</sup> Lebanese Presidency, [@LBpresidency](#) October 30, 2025


<sup>42</sup> L’Orient Today, [To whom do Shebaa Farms belong?](#) January 24, 2024;

National News Agency, [المقاومة الاسلامية «ردا على الخروقات الاسرائيلية»](#) December 2, 2024

<sup>43</sup> National News Agency, [قاسم: إذا شنت إسرائيل حربا جديدة على لبنان ستسقط الصواريخ عليها والعدوان هو المشكلة وليس السلاح ويجب الاسراع بانجاز التحقيقات في انفجار المرفأ بعيدا عن التسيس](#) August 5, 2025



coordinate with local municipalities to regulate the movement of farmers near the border.<sup>44</sup> While the municipality of Blida set October 16-20 as a designated period for olive harvesting, under the supervision of the LAF and UNIFIL,<sup>45</sup> Israeli troops opened fire in the vicinity of farmers on at least two occasions while quadcopters dropped stun grenades at least four times.<sup>46</sup> Israel conducted 49 quadcopter attacks in the past month, three of which targeted construction vehicles near the border.<sup>47</sup>



**Figure 4:** A heatmap of 276 Israeli quadcopter attacks since the start of the CoH on November 27, 2024 through October 2025.

As of May 31 (the most recent date for which data is available), 82,632 people remained displaced across Lebanon due to Israeli military action.<sup>48</sup> This represents a 16.5% drop since Israel completed its withdrawal from southern towns and villages on February 1, when there were 98,994 IDPs.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>44</sup> L'Orient Today, [Southern Lebanon municipalities announce measures to regulate olive harvest October 8, 2025](#) October 8, 2025; Al-Modon, [الاحتلال يطلب معلومات مسبقة عن مزارعي الزيتون](#) October 8, 2025


<sup>45</sup> L'Orient Today, [Trump says allies ready to send troops to Gaza to "straighten out" Hamas](#) October 21, 2025

<sup>46</sup> As part of LCAT's logging of Israeli military actions in Lebanon, LCAT notes when the actions disrupt agricultural related activity.

<sup>47</sup> LCAT logs all Israeli quadcopter attacks reported by Lebanon's National News Agency, *L'Orient Today*, and *Al-Mayadeen*, noting when they pose a barrier to return by targeting reconstruction activity.

<sup>48</sup> International Organization for Migration, [Mobility Snapshot - Round 87](#) June 5, 2025

<sup>49</sup> International Organization for Migration, [Mobility Snapshot - Round 77](#) February 20, 2025



Source: Lebanese Ministry of Finance

## Economic Updates:

In mid-October, a Lebanese delegation led by Finance Minister Yassine Jaber met with representatives of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington. Jaber presented a medium-term fiscal plan to the IMF, and talks focused on bank restructuring and tax reforms. Although the IMF did not release a statement following these discussions, its priorities for Lebanon are well established. The Fund is seeking a solid framework to combat tax evasion<sup>50</sup> and a transparent banking restructuring process free of influence by commercial banks or other private sector institutions, in line with international standards.<sup>51</sup> A major point of contention between the IMF and Lebanon's Central Bank involves how responsibilities should be divided when it comes to regulating the banking sector.<sup>52</sup>

Divergences persist between the IMF, the Lebanese government, and Central Bank Governor Karim Souhaid regarding the interpretation of key aspects of the financial recovery framework. These differences are particularly pronounced around issues such as the hierarchy of claims in the Financial Gap Law and the potential use of gold reserves to offset part of the financial losses.<sup>53</sup> Additionally, Lebanon has issued two consecutive annual budgets on time and introduced new tax policies, the IMF believes that these steps fall short, and that Lebanon has yet to implement a truly solid and sustainable tax system. Moreover, the IMF reportedly assesses proposed legislation on restructuring the financial sector and recovering lost assets as failing to meet international standards.

<sup>50</sup> The IMF expected more aggressive tax reforms in Lebanon's 2026 budget law (currently awaiting approval), including expanding the tax base and introducing tougher tax compliance.

International Monetary Fund, [IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Lebanon](#) September 26, 2025

<sup>51</sup> The IMF does not approve the presence of representatives of commercial banks and economic bodies in the High Banking Authority, fearing it would create conflict of interest and affect decision making in restructuring banks.

LBCI, [Lebanon under pressure: IMF sets reform conditions before aid](#) October 10, 2025

<sup>52</sup> L'Orient Today, [Souhaid and Jaber report on Washington talks with IMF, World Bank](#) October 16, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [Lebanon's unified front for the IMF falls apart in Washington](#) October 20, 2025

LBCI, [Lebanon under pressure: IMF sets reform conditions before aid](#) October 10, 2025

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.



**On October 3, Justice Minister Adel Nassar issued a circular requiring public notaries to adopt enhanced measures to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.<sup>54</sup>**

Notaries must check that all parties to a power of attorney agreement are not on national or international sanctions lists, and must refuse to process transactions and legal documents if they are. Nassar explained that these new procedures are meant to “keep Lebanon off financial blacklists”. He also clarified that notaries will be able to access the names of sanctioned individuals and entities on the Justice Ministry’s website.<sup>55</sup>

**On October 3, the Constitutional Council<sup>56</sup> partially annulled the Bank Restructuring Law following an appeal from the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).<sup>57</sup>** The FPM’s September appeal raised several constitutional concerns: unclear provisions in the law, unconstitutional linkages to other laws (namely banking secrecy and financial gap laws), encroachment of legislative power over judicial duties, and violations of depositor equality.

The Council rejected most elements of the FPM’s appeal but rescinded specific provisions. It removed a requirement that would have forced the government to wait for parliamentary action before enforcing the Law, arguing that this undermined the independence of the executive branch. The Council also safeguarded judiciary authority by allowing court appeals to suspend the Law’s enforcement and by annulling the provisions that would have forced all lawsuits into special courts. Finally, the Council established October 17, 2019 as the date separating older, pre-crisis deposits from new, post-crisis ones, and ensured equality among depositors under the law.<sup>58</sup>

**On October 7, government officials signed two decrees for renewable energy projects funded by a parliamentary-approved USD 250 million loan from the World Bank.<sup>59</sup>**

The funds will be used to repair three hydroelectric plants, develop solar production, and rehabilitate and improve the efficiency of the national grid, parts of which were damaged or destroyed during the 2024 Israel-Hezbollah war. According to Jaber’s statement, Électricité du Liban and the Litani River Authority will implement the projects. The loan will be disbursed over 30 years and comes with an eight-year grace period.<sup>60</sup>

**On October 7, the World Bank released its Macro Poverty Outlook,<sup>61</sup> adjusting Lebanon’s 2025 growth forecast to 3.5%, down from the 4.7% it had projected in April.**

The downgrade stems primarily from the escalation of regional conflict during the peak tourism season in June 2025, which disrupted air traffic and reduced arrivals, as well as from difficulties in securing needed capital for postwar recovery and reconstruction. The report nevertheless highlights a return to political normalcy following the election of a president and the formation of a government, as well as progress on reforms related to judicial independence, banking secrecy, and banking sector restructuring. The Bank emphasized, however, that adopting a third law on distribution of financial losses remains essential for banking sector recovery and restoring confidence in the financial system.

<sup>54</sup> Al-Modon, [نصار يشرح تعميمه لكتاب العدل: هدفنا حماية لبنان من العقوبات](#) October 6, 2025

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> The Constitutional Council (CC) scrutinizes laws and regulations passed by the parliament, among other duties.


<sup>57</sup> National News Agency, [المجلس الدستوري يبطل جزئياً قانون «إصلاح وضع المصارف» الرقم 23/2025](#) October 3, 2025

<sup>58</sup> Some provisions in the law were adopting October 30, 2019 as a cut-off date.

<sup>59</sup> National News Agency, [جابر التقى الخازن وأرماس ووقع اتفاقتي قرض البنك الدولي للطاقة المتجددة: بعد إقرار قانون الكهرباء جان وقت التنفيذ](#) October 7, 2025

<sup>60</sup> L’Orient Today, [Signing of decrees implementing two World Bank-funded projects](#) October 2027

<sup>61</sup> World Bank, [LEBANON: Macro Poverty Outlook \(MPO\)](#) October 7, 2025



Growth is expected to reach 4% in 2026, reflecting a slower-than-anticipated recovery. The Bank forecasts modest growth across the agriculture, industry, and services sectors, and expects Lebanon's annual inflation to reach 15.2% in 2025, falling to 8.7% in 2026, though levels remain considerably above global averages. The Bank attributes this to limited market competition and oligopolistic structures, which continue to affect household purchasing power and food security. Nearly 20% of the population experienced acute food insecurity between April and June 2025, while 54% lived on less than USD 8.30 per day and 17.4% on less than USD 4.20.<sup>62</sup>


**On October 20, the Central Administration of Statistics (CAS) reported<sup>63</sup> that Lebanon's consumer price index rose by 0.6% in September – the second such increase under 1% this year.** Despite this overall price stabilization, all expenditure categories, apart from telecommunications, recorded year-on-year increases. The sharpest rises were observed in education (30.57%), miscellaneous goods and services (27.64%), and food and non-alcoholic beverages (23.9%), underscoring continued pressure on household consumption.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> L'Orient Today, [World Bank lowers its 2025 growth forecast for Lebanon](#) October 17, 2025

<sup>63</sup> Central Administration of Statistics, [Consumer Price Index in Lebanon for September 2025](#) October 20, 2025

<sup>64</sup> L'Orient Today, [Lebanon rate of inflation remains below 1% for second consecutive month in September](#) October 22, 2025



Source: Reuters

## Access to Services:

**On October 9, the Cabinet approved the expansion of the Jdeideh landfill and extended its mandate to operate through the end of 2026.**<sup>65</sup> Just two days earlier, the landfill had been shuttered because it was at capacity. This prompted waste management company Ramco to suspend trash collection in the Metn, Kesrouan, and Beirut districts, triggering a public outcry.<sup>66</sup>

Established in 2016 following Lebanon's most severe waste crisis and the closure of another site, the Jdeideh landfill now stands 37 meters high. Greenpeace Middle East and North Africa criticized the Cabinet's decision as "yet another temporary fix." It urged the government to replace ad hoc waste management with a comprehensive national plan, and emphasized that Lebanon's waste crisis stems from governance failures rather than technical limitations.<sup>67</sup> Similarly, environmental and civil society groups condemned the state's "patchwork approach," calling the move short-sighted and unsustainable.<sup>68</sup>

**Throughout October, Lebanese authorities stepped up enforcement of the private generator sector.** Backed by State Security and the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Economy and Trade carried out nationwide inspections to determine whether generator owners were billing fair rates and had installed electricity meters. Enforcement focused primarily on North and South Lebanon: authorities confiscated two generators and issued citations to non-compliant operators.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>65</sup> National News Agency, [مجلس الوزراء وافق على توسيع مطمر الجديدة وإستمرار النفايات حتى نهاية ال 2026 وإنجاز الخلية الجديدة](#) October 9, 2025

<sup>67</sup> L'Orient Today, [Jdeideh landfill reopens temporarily, awaits Cabinet decision Thursday](#) October 7, 2025

<sup>66</sup> L'Orient Today, [Greenpeace: By expanding the Jdeideh landfill, Lebanon prolongs crisis](#) October 10, 2025

<sup>68</sup> National News Agency, [«مبتدى امناء بيروت» يرفض سياسة الإهمال ويطلب بخرطة طوارئ لرفع النفايات المتراكمة في بيروت](#) October 9, 2025;


National News Agency, [المنير البلدي: ندعو لرفع الصوت بسبب أزمة النفايات المستجدة](#) October 8, 2025;

National News Agency, [حزب «الخصي»: يرفض قرار توسعة مطمر الجديدة - سد البوشرية لما يترتب عليه من مخاطر بيئية وصحية لا يمكن تحملها](#) October 8, 2025

<sup>69</sup> National News Agency, [وزارة الاقتصاد والتجارة تتابع جولاتها الرقابية في الشمال وتصادر مولدين مخالفين](#) October 24, 2025;

National News Agency, [مداهمات لمراقبي مصلحة الاقتصاد في الجنوب في قضاء صور تظال أصحاب مولدات مخالفين ومحاضر ضبط واستدعاءات](#) October 7, 2025;

National News Agency, [إجراءات حازمة لأمن الدولة لمكافحة مخالفات المولدات في طرابلس](#) October 23, 2025




Meanwhile, in early October, the Association of Private Generator Owners proposed a “partnership” with the government to provide electricity through Electricity du Liban (EdL) and assist with collection, claiming that they collect 95% of their own bills, whereas EdL’s collection rate is about 40%.<sup>70</sup> Abdo Saade, the Association’s president, pointed out that it already operates in compliance with the law, supports regulation, and coordinates with the respective ministries.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>70</sup> L’Orient Today, [Association of Private Generator Owners proposes to help collect EDL bills](#) October 13, 2025;

National News Agency, [«تجمع المولدات الخاصة»: نشدد على أهمية التعاون والشراكة بين التجمع والدولة](#), October 12, 2025

<sup>71</sup> National News Agency, [«تجمع المولدات الخاصة»: نشدد على أهمية التعاون والشراكة بين التجمع والدولة](#), October 12, 2025



Source: NNA

## Political Updates:

On October 10, at the invitation of Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji, a delegation led by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani visited Lebanon in an effort to renew diplomatic relations.<sup>72</sup> During a meeting with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun,<sup>73</sup> attendees discussed border control, the status of Syrian detainees in Lebanon, the situation of displaced Syrians, and efforts to locate Lebanese nationals missing in Syria.<sup>74</sup>

Following the meeting, Rajji announced the suspension of the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council, established in 1991. The Council was long viewed as a symbol of Syrian dominance over Lebanon, particularly prior to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005. Its role was significantly diminished after the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the opening of the Syrian Embassy in Beirut in 2008.<sup>75</sup> Immediately following al-Shaibani's visit, the Lebanese government also announced that Henry Jean Coston would be named ambassador to Damascus – the first such appointment since 2013. Previously, the embassy had been headed by *chargés d'affaires*, reflecting the dormant state of diplomatic relations since 2011.<sup>76</sup> Syria has yet to name a replacement for Ali Abdel Karim Ali, who served as ambassador to Lebanon under the Assad regime.<sup>77,78</sup>

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that approximately 300,000 Syrians have returned to their home country since the beginning of 2025, though many Syrian nationals fled to Lebanon during the same period.<sup>79</sup> As of October 23, six voluntary repatriation convoys carrying 1,340 refugees had been organized by the Lebanese government in coordination with the Syrian transitional government and under UNHCR supervision.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>72</sup> National News Agency, [Syrian Foreign Minister Arrives in Beirut for First Official Visit Since Fall of Former Regime](#) October 10, 2025

<sup>73</sup> Separate meetings were also held at the Serail between Major General Hassan Choucair and Major General Abdel Qader Tahan, and between Lebanese Army Intelligence Chief Brigadier General Tony Kahwaji and Syrian Intelligence Chief Hassan Al-Salameh.

National News Agency, [النهار: زيارة مفصلة لوزير الخارجية السوري... ترسم الإطار العملي للعلاقات الجديدة](#) October 11, 2025

<sup>74</sup> WTOP News, [Syria's foreign minister visits Lebanon as the two nations seek to rebuild ties after Assad's ouster](#) October 10, 2025

<sup>75</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> The Media Line, [Lebanon and Turkey Appoint Ambassadors to Syria for First Time in Over a Decade](#) October 26, 2025


<sup>77</sup> The New Arab, [Lebanon appoints Henry Kastoun as new ambassador to Syria](#) October 24, 2025

<sup>78</sup> The Media Line, [Lebanon and Turkey Appoint Ambassadors to Syria for First Time in Over a Decade](#) October 26, 2025

<sup>79</sup> Syrian Arab News Agency, [300,000 Syrian refugees returned from Lebanon since the beginning of 2025-UN Official](#) October 24, 2025

<sup>80</sup> UNHCR, [Syria situation: Crisis Regional Flash Update #50](#) October 24, 2025;

North Press Agency, [Over 300,000 Syrian refugees return from Lebanon in 2025 – UNHCR](#) October 25, 2025



Separately, Disaster Risk Reduction reported a total of 80,950 new arrivals into Lebanon, of whom 26,310 are residing in 156 collective sites.<sup>81</sup>

**On October 26, a 25-year-old man was killed at a checkpoint in the Shatila Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut.**<sup>82</sup> According to the victim's family, the man lost his way while driving home and unintentionally entered Shatila, where he failed to stop at a checkpoint manned by Palestinian security forces. The troops opened fire on his car, fatally wounding him.<sup>83</sup> Six members of the Palestinian National Security Agency were handed over to the LAF in connection with the murder.<sup>84</sup> The incident sparked anger and renewed tensions between Lebanese and Palestinian communities, and reignited the debate over Palestinian weapons, just weeks after the latest round of arms seizures in line with the government's camps disarmament plan.<sup>85</sup>

**On October 28, an unidentified woman was found dead in front of a reported drug den in the Shatila camp.** Following the murder, the Joint Security Force in the camp seized large quantities of narcotics and arrested an alleged drug dealer.<sup>86</sup> The Palestinian National Security Agency handed over one Lebanese citizen and four Syrians to the Intelligence Directorate in connection with the murder.<sup>87</sup> Shatila residents launched a grassroots campaign demanding an end to drug trafficking and denouncing what they describe as an "incitement and defamation" campaign by Lebanese media outlets, which portray the camp as a crime hub.<sup>88</sup>

**The parliamentary session on October 28 was adjourned indefinitely due to lack of quorum, as 63 MPs refused to attend a session that did not address amendments to the Electoral Law.**<sup>89,90</sup> In late September, two consecutive parliamentary sessions lost quorum for the same reason.<sup>91</sup> The Electoral Law was discussed during the October 29 Council of Ministers session, triggering a heated debate that was resolved by an agreement to discuss the issue at the next session. It was agreed that a report should be presented to the committee in charge of the Electoral Law. The committee, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri, is responsible for preparing proposals and amendments and submitting them to parliament.<sup>92</sup>

<sup>81</sup> UNHCR, [Syria situation: Crisis Regional Flash Update #50](#) October 24, 2025

<sup>82</sup> Al Arabiya, [قتل شاب بمخيم شاتيليا بهز لبنان](#) October 28, 2025

<sup>83</sup> Annahar, [إيليو أبو حنا ضحية السلاح الفلسطيني غير الشرعي في مخيم شاتيليا... مصدر أمني للنهائ: لإجراءات عقابية صارمة وسريعة](#) October 27, 2025

<sup>84</sup> Lebanese Army, [الجيش يتسلم 6 عناصر من الأمن الوطني الفلسطيني على خلفية إطلاق النار نحو المواطن إيليو أبو حنا ومقتله](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>85</sup> Lebanese Armed Forces, [الجيش يتسلم 6 عناصر من الأمن الوطني الفلسطيني على خلفية إطلاق النار نحو المواطن إيليو أبو حنا ومقتله](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>86</sup> Asharq Al-Awsat, [غضب لبناني إثر مقتل شاب برصاص مسلحين فلسطينيين داخل مخيم شاتيليا](#) October 27, 2025

<sup>87</sup> Palestinian Refugees Portal, [القوة الأمنية تدهم أوكار مخدرات في مخيم شاتيليا بعد الكشف عن هوية قاتل المرأة](#) October 28, 2025

<sup>88</sup> LBCI, [Army takes custody of 6 Palestinian security members over killing of Elio Abou Hanna, 5 others detained in separate murder case inside Shatila camp](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>89</sup> Palestinian Refugees Portal, [إعلام لبناني يستهدف مخيم شاتيليا بعد جرائم القتل الأخيرة... والأهالي يردون](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>90</sup> National News Agency, [\(\\*\) يري رفع الجلسة التشريعية بسبب عدم اكتمال النصاب](#) October 28, 2025;

<sup>91</sup> National News Agency, [المجلس لم يلتزم في جلسته التشريعية لعدم اكتمال النصاب يو صعب : محبورون ان نجد حلا والأفضل ألا يكون هناك تشريع في غياب شريحة واسعة](#) October 28, 2025

<sup>92</sup> Nidaa Al-Awsat, [لبنان: الأكتية النيابية تُفقد جلسة البرلمان نصاها بمواجهة الثنائي الشيعي](#) October 28, 2025

<sup>93</sup> National News Agency, [\(\\*\) الجلسة التشريعية : سجال في شأن قانون الانتخابات وإصرار على طرحه ويرى دعا إلى عدم تجاوز «الحالي» والكثائب استعربت والجمهوريّة](#) September 29, 2025;


<sup>94</sup> Lebanon 24, [القوية» تعلق مشاركتها في «الفرعية» وخلييل اتهمهم بتطير الانتخابات](#) September 30, 2025

<sup>95</sup> Nidaa Al-Awsat, [بسبب عدم اكتمال النصاب... يري برفع الجلسة التشريعية](#) September 30, 2025

<sup>96</sup> National News Agency, [أكتية حكومية مع وقف التنفيذ! هذا ما حصل في مجلس الوزراء - حويس عقبي](#) October 30, 2025;

<sup>97</sup> National News Agency, [مجلس الوزراء أقر سلسلة تعيينات الرئيس عون: عدم تأمين النصاب امس يعطل اتخاذ القرار ولا يعطي صورة حسنة عن لبنان الرئيس سلام: السلاح](#) October 30, 2025

<sup>98</sup> National News Agency, [داخل المخيمات خطر على الاستقرار ويجب استكمال عملية تسليم](#) October 30, 2025



# Looking Forward:

## Escalation Scenarios

Through the end of the year, Israel will likely intensify its airstrikes in Lebanon, though in the immediate term Tel Aviv is expected to refrain from launching a widescale campaign similar to the September–November 2024 conflict, provided the US continues to engage the Lebanese cabinet on Hezbollah’s disarmament. Lebanon’s government will face a critical juncture in December, when the LAF is expected to complete the first stage of its weapons dismantlement plan south of the Litani. The government is unlikely to greenlight further stages without political consensus, which appears unlikely since Hezbollah has only accepted disarmament south of the Litani but not elsewhere. The LAF’s reported strategy of “containment” north of the Litani to prevent Hezbollah from transporting weapons into Lebanon<sup>93</sup> is unlikely to satisfy Israel, which accuses Hezbollah of continuing to smuggle and manufacture arms.<sup>94</sup> Even if Washington were to succeed in mediating the start of direct negotiations between Beirut and Tel Aviv, Israel would likely maintain its military pressure to extract concessions from Lebanon, particularly if it perceives that Hezbollah is rearming. As such, humanitarian actors should take the following potential Israeli escalation strategies – drawn from patterns of Israel’s past actions – and their impacts into account.

## Israel intensifies its targeted assassination campaign

Since the start of the CoH, Israel’s targeted assassinations have largely been directed against alleged Hezbollah military operatives in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley. Israel could escalate this policy by conducting more strikes in Beirut’s southern suburbs or along major thoroughfares in areas considered safe from bombing, such as its July 3, 2025 strike in Khaldeh.<sup>95</sup> Targeted assassinations in areas with residents opposed to Hezbollah may stoke intercommunal and political tensions. Israel might opt to strike alleged Hezbollah military personnel in their homes in southern Lebanon, as it routinely did in the months preceding the wide-scale conflict that began in September 2024, or in urban areas, like its March 22, 2025 strike in Tyre<sup>96</sup> and an April 1 strike in the southern suburbs of Beirut.<sup>97</sup> An increase in such strikes – few of which have been conducted since the CoH went into effect – would risk increased civilian casualties and could precipitate a limited-scale displacement of residents in affected areas.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>93</sup> L’Orient Today, [The limits of the strategy to contain Hezbollah](#) October 28, 2025;

Lebanon Debate, [شمال الليطاني تحت عين الجيش: حواجز ثابتة لمراقبة نقل السلاح](#), October 9, 2025

<sup>94</sup> The Wall Street Journal, [Hezbollah Is Rearming, Putting Cease-Fire at Risk](#) October 30, 2025;

L’Orient Today, [Tom Barrack: Lebanon will risk 10,000 more lives to not have a conversation with Israel](#) November 2, 2025

<sup>95</sup> National News Agency, [إستهداف سيارة على لوتوستراد خلدة](#), July 3, 2025


<sup>96</sup> The New Arab, [Hezbollah mourns top commander killed in Israeli airstrike on Lebanon’s Tyre](#) March 23, 2025;

<sup>97</sup> L’Orient Today, [At least 4 dead and 7 injured after an Israeli strike targeted a Hezbollah official in the southern suburbs of Beirut](#) April 1, 2025

<sup>98</sup> The run up to the widescale conflict on September 23, 2024 offers an example, when the number of IDPs rose from 96,829 on June 25 to 113,729 on September 17 as Israel escalated its military actions. Israel averaged 7.9 airstrikes a day in July 2024, 10.5 in August 2024 and 13.3 between September 1 and 17, 2024, according to LCAT’s log of reported airstrikes.

International Organization for Migration, [Mobility Snapshot - Round 38](#) June 27, 2024;

International Organization for Migration, [Mobility Snapshot - Round 47](#) September 17, 2024



## Israel expands its strikes on civilian infrastructure

Israel could expand its strikes on civilian infrastructure beyond the engineering and construction facilities that Tel Aviv alleges are used by Hezbollah. Israeli bombing might target transportation infrastructure, following media leaks in which Israeli officials accused Hezbollah of smuggling weapons into Lebanon, including via seaports.<sup>99</sup> For example, Israel could conduct limited UAV strikes on containers or storage facilities near the Beirut or Tripoli ports, similar to its past strikes on the Latakia seaport in Syria.<sup>100</sup> Such strikes would increase shipping insurance premiums for import-dependent Lebanon, contributing to inflation. Israel could also target trucks deemed to be moving arms in Lebanon, or warehouses – including in areas normally considered safe from being targeted by Israeli forces. Israel may also elect to strike financial infrastructure linked to Hezbollah, echoing its past strikes on Al-Qard al-Hassan offices in October 2024<sup>101</sup> and a money exchange office in Beirut the following month.<sup>102</sup> Such strikes would discourage investments in Lebanon, depress business activity, and potentially give rise to political and intercommunal tensions.

## Israel increases evacuation notices

Israel could increase the frequency and scope of its evacuation notices ahead of airstrikes, which have been issued infrequently since the CoH. Evacuation warnings in Beirut's southern suburbs on June 5 and in towns in southern Lebanon on September 18 caused fearful residents to temporarily flee.<sup>103</sup> Escalated use of this tactic could contribute to limited-scale displacement from areas perceived as unsafe, reversing the trend of returns – other than to towns near the border with Israel – since the start of the CoH.

## Israel conducts more frequent and deeper ground raids

Tel Aviv could test President Aoun's October 30 order to the LAF to confront Israeli incursions, issued after Israeli troops staged a deadly cross-border raid in Blida. Since Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon on February 18, 2025, Israeli troops have regularly crossed the border to demolish buildings in Lebanese territory. Israel could opt to conduct airborne raids, such as the one it staged outside Damascus in August 2025.<sup>104</sup> Deeper and more frequent incursions along the border raise the possibility of an altercation with LAF troops, which could jeopardize Washington's engagement with the Lebanese cabinet on disarmament.<sup>105</sup> If the LAF were to not confront Israeli troops, Hezbollah could elect to stage public demonstrations against perceived lack of state action, raising the possibility of civil strife.

<sup>99</sup> The New York Times, [U.S. Middle East Envoy Presses Lebanon to Disarm Hezbollah](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>100</sup> BBC, [Syria blames Israel for rare air strike on main port of Latakia](#) December 7, 2021;

The Guardian, [Israeli airstrike sets port of Latakia ablaze, says Syrian media](#) December 21, 2021

<sup>101</sup> Al Jazeera, [Israel bombs Hezbollah-linked finance group in Lebanon](#) October 21, 2025

<sup>102</sup> The New Arab, [Israel strikes hit central Beirut amid ceasefire announcement](#) November 27, 2025

<sup>103</sup> National News Agency, [تحليل للمسيرات المعادية في اجواء الضاحية وحركة نزوح كثيفة بعد تهديد العدو بقصف عدد من الابنية](#) June 5, 2025;

National News Agency, [حركة نزوح من كفرتينيت باتجاه النبطية](#) September 18, 2025

<sup>104</sup> Times of Israel, [IDF said to raid Syrian army site near Damascus with helicopters, ground troops](#) August 28, 2025

<sup>105</sup> US Senator Lindsey Graham, [@LindseyGrahamSC](#) October 30, 2025



## Reconstruction

Humanitarian actors should expect little progress in this area, nearly a year after the CoH went into effect. The US and regional states are unwilling to facilitate foreign funding for reconstruction until Lebanon disarms Hezbollah and implements reforms, a stance that seems fairly intractable.<sup>106</sup> On October 14, President Aoun said that the Lebanese state cannot bear reconstruction costs alone – estimated at USD 11 billion by the World Bank – and needs an international conference to raise donations.<sup>107</sup> The Lebanese government and the World Bank have so far prioritized efforts to rehabilitate electricity and water infrastructure.<sup>108</sup> On June 25, the Bank approved a USD 250 million project for repairs to public utilities. Lebanon's parliament, however, has yet to approve the loan and might not for some time due to legislative gridlock over amendments to the Electoral Law.<sup>109</sup>

On October 29, the cabinet approved a framework for kick-starting a process to determine compensation for owners of damaged residential properties.<sup>110</sup> Without foreign funding, widescale rehabilitation of damaged and destroyed housing units – estimated at USD 4.6 billion nationwide – is not possible.<sup>111</sup> The Ministry of Social Affairs in the past month launched a program to provide rent support to 10,000 IDPs.<sup>112</sup> This is less ambitious than Hezbollah's program that reportedly aided 140,000 beneficiaries this past year.<sup>113</sup> The Lebanese state's inability to facilitate reconstruction and provide support for IDPs risks further eroding trust in it among residents of conflict-stricken areas.

## Looming Waste Crisis

Lebanon's garbage crisis resurfaced when, in response to the closure of the Jdeideh landfill, the waste collection company Ramco announced that it would halt collection in several districts, including Beirut, Metn, and Keserwan. Even though the landfill's operational mandate was extended through 2026, this is only a short-term solution.<sup>114</sup> Poorly managed and overflowing landfills can contribute to skin diseases, respiratory problems, cancer, and other pollution-related illnesses.<sup>115</sup> In 2024, as Israel escalated its bombing campaign, waste collection lagged – not only due to infrastructure damage but also due to massive internal displacement – which put pressure on host community waste facilities.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>106</sup> US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack via X, [@USAMBTurkiye](#) October 20, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [Washington's Grip Extends To Aid For Lebanon](#) August 14, 2025;

Nida al-Watan, [الفرصة الأخيرة: لبنان في عمق العاصفة](#) October 10, 2025

<sup>107</sup> Nida al-Watan, [عون: لا قدرة للدولة على إعادة الإعمار](#) October 14, 2025;

World Bank, [Lebanon's Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Estimated at US 11\\$Billion](#) March 7, 2025

<sup>108</sup> Nida al-Watan, [عون: لا قدرة للدولة على إعادة الإعمار](#) October 14, 2025;

World Bank, [Lebanon: New US 250\\$Million Project to Kickstart the Recovery and Reconstruction in Conflict-Affected Areas](#) June 25, 2025

<sup>109</sup> Asharq Alawsat, [لقاء موسع بجنوب لبنان للتباحث في إطلاق خطط إعادة الإعمار](#) November 1, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [Diaspora vote: Parliament doors closed to Berri as Cabinet meeting awaited](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>110</sup> Lebanon Prime Minister's Office, [2025 جلسة 29 تشرين الأول](#) October 29, 2025;

Al-Akbar, [نقاش متأخر سنة في آلية إعادة الإعمار](#) October 29, 2025

<sup>111</sup> World Bank, [Lebanon's Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Estimated at US\\$11 Billion](#) March 7, 2025

<sup>112</sup> L'Orient Today, [Berri says government 'did not even greet' south Lebanon residents who returned home](#) October 9, 2025;

Ad-Diyar, [حنين السيد للديار: سنعلن عن امان آونفتح باب التسجيل قبل نهاية العام](#) September 7, 2025;

Ministry of Social Affairs, [الوزيرة السيد حالت في الجنوب وصولاً الى بنت جبيل: العمل جار على إعداد خطة شاملة لإعادة الإعمار والتعافي](#) October 25, 2025


<sup>113</sup> L'Orient Today, [South Lebanon reconstruction: Israel and Hezbollah play same card against Lebanese state](#) October 13, 2025

<sup>114</sup> L'Orient Today, [Jdeideh landfill reopens temporarily, awaits Cabinet decision Thursday](#) October 7, 2025;

L'Orient Today, [Greenpeace: By expanding the Jdeideh landfill, Lebanon prolongs crisis](#) October 10, 2025

<sup>115</sup> Raseef 22, [أزمة النفايات في لبنان... وجه آخر لتعقيدات المشهد السياسي - رصيف](#) 22 July 8, 2025

<sup>116</sup> Raseef 22, [أزمة النفايات في لبنان... وجه آخر لتعقيدات المشهد السياسي - رصيف](#) 22 July 8, 2025



Experts continue to urge the government to adopt a national waste strategy based on sorting at the source, recycling, and waste-to-energy solutions.<sup>117</sup> Currently, however, recycling initiatives are marginalized, while funds meant for municipal development are funneled toward private waste management companies operating with little oversight.<sup>118</sup>

## Flooding

A lack of rainfall has spared Lebanon the October floods that, in recent years, have affected areas across the country.<sup>119</sup> Flooding is expected once the first major rainstorm of the year hits, threatening thousands of households<sup>120</sup> and the already struggling agricultural sector. Last year, nationwide flood damage was assessed to be around USD 15 million.<sup>121</sup> The Lebanese Ministry of Public Works and Transport has announced a plan to reduce road flooding, stressing the responsibilities and roles to be played by municipalities, contractors, and citizens.<sup>122</sup> Although the government has implemented standard measures to address flooding risks, such efforts are hampered by Lebanon's degraded infrastructure – including ill-maintained drainage ditches and sewers, faulty waste and garbage management, and lack of funds.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>117</sup> Asian News, [أزمة النفايات في لبنان تعود... والسلطات تبحث عن مخرج - وكالة أنباء آسيا](#), October 8, 2025

<sup>118</sup> L'Orient Today, [Lebanon's waste crisis: Five points to better understand the issue](#), October 9, 2025

<sup>119</sup> Lebanon 24, [على الرغم من التحذيرات... طرقات لبنان تغرق بأمطار الشتاء الأولى](#) (صور وفيديو), October 1, 2023;

Roya News, [الأمطار تغرق شوارع بيروت وطريق المطار](#), October 16, 2023;

Kataeb.org, [فيضانات وسيول تغرق طرقات لبنان](#), October 10, 2024;


<sup>120</sup> UNDRR, [Lebanon floods, 2024 - Forensic analysis](#), September 12, 2024

<sup>121</sup> Climate Centre, [Climate Fact Sheet 2024 - Lebanon](#), 2024




<sup>122</sup> Enmaeya, [Lebanon Launches Plan to Stop Flooding on Roads During Rain](#), October 10, 2025

<sup>123</sup> Now Lebanon, [A tragedy every winter](#), December 29, 2023;



Asia News LB, [الطرقات اللبنانية مهددة بالغرق مع اقتراب الشتاء - وكالة أنباء آسيا](#), September 6, 2025






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**Team Lead: Crisis Analytics | Lebanon**  
[lb-lcat@mercycorps.org](mailto:lb-lcat@mercycorps.org)



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