


Flash Report

Lebanon at War: Scenarios and Impact

October 2024



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The Lebanon Crisis Analytics Team (LCAT) provides reactive and in-depth context analysis to inform the aid community in Lebanon. The information and analysis contained in this report is therefore strictly to inform humanitarian and development actors and associated policymaking on Lebanon.

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Credit: AFP

Executive Summary

Lebanon faces the threat of worsening economic and humanitarian crises as the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah escalates. Since September 16, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government added the return of displaced residents to northern Israel as an official war aim, military operations have ramped up. Efforts to negotiate peace remain deadlocked. Israel has dismissed ceasefire proposals and is pushing for the enforcement of UN Resolutions 1701 and 1559, while Hezbollah continues its military operations, albeit within a limited scope.

This LCAT flash report explores two possible scenarios: 1) Continued ongoing strikes against Hezbollah, sparing critical infrastructure, and 2) A worse scenario involving a blockade and attacks on essential infrastructure, with severe economic and humanitarian impacts anticipated to last into 2025.



Introduction

Lebanon is now mired in a conflict that has exacerbated its existing economic and humanitarian crises, and threatens to spur added political turmoil. Given Israel's prioritizing of its military goals in Lebanon and the wide gaps in ceasefire demands between Hezbollah and Tel Aviv, LCAT predicts that the war in Lebanon will last at least until the end of January 2025 and the change in US administrations. This report focuses on the economic, financial, and humanitarian effects of the following scenarios:

Scenario 1 – Status quo

Continued Israeli bombing targets ostensible Hezbollah targets across all of Lebanon, with no strikes on key national transport, trade, utility, and energy infrastructure

Scenario 2 – Worse case

Israel imposes a strict maritime and aerial blockade of the country, coupled with extended bombardment of vital infrastructure and ground combat extending as far north as the Awali river

We first present some background on the current conflict, which began in October 2023, followed by the two scenarios, each of which plays out over a three-month time horizon. Both entail a worsening of the situation in Lebanon, though to differing degrees.

Background

On September 16, Israel's Security Cabinet formally adopted a military objective of facilitating the return of its evacuated residents to their homes in the north of the country. Tel Aviv subsequently launched an assassination campaign that killed key Hezbollah leaders – including the organization's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah – and an expanded aerial bombing campaign ostensibly targeting the group's infrastructure. Since September 23, Israel has regularly struck southern Lebanon, wide swathes of the Bekaa valley, and Beirut's southern suburbs, causing casualties and major property and infrastructure damage. Israel has also carried out intermittent strikes on central Beirut – unlike in the 2006 War – and northern Lebanon, as well as on Palestinian refugee camps and along the Beirut-Damascus highway, including near the Masnaa crossing with Syria. On September 30, Israel launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon and called on residents across the region to evacuate north of the Awali river, which empties out into the Mediterranean Sea north of Saida, the country's third-largest city, some 50 kilometers from the border.



Timeline of key events in the escalating war

2024

SEPTEMBER

The Israeli Security Cabinet adopts a new official war goal: the return to northern Israel of residents displaced by Hezbollah attacks.



16



17

Israel remotely detonates explosives planted in some 5,000 wireless pager communication devices distributed by Hezbollah, killing 12 people and injuring 2,323.

Israel remotely detonates explosives planted in handheld radios distributed by Hezbollah, killing 25 and injuring 608.



18



20

An Israeli airstrike in a southern Beirut suburb kills Ibrahim Akil, the head of Hezbollah's elite Radwan Forces, together with 9 other commanders and at least 10 civilians.

Israel significantly expands its bombardment of Lebanon, launching over 1,600 strikes, reportedly its largest-ever wave of airstrikes.



23



27

Israel conducts massive airstrikes in a southern Beirut suburb, killing Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Ali Karake, the organization's head of operations in southern Lebanon.

For the first time in the conflict, Israel conducts a strike within municipal Beirut.



29

OCTOBER



1

The Israeli military announces that it has launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon.

Two Israeli strikes in central Beirut kill 22 people.




10



16

Israel conducts a controlled demolition of the southern village of Mhaibib.



Hezbollah has retained the ability to fire limited rocket barrages and launch unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at northern Israel, including Haifa and surrounding areas.¹ At the time of publication, Israel's ground advances into Lebanon have not extended past a limited number of border villages. Hezbollah has also claimed responsibility for a growing number of operations since the wider conflict broke out, including clashes with Israeli troops. Nevertheless, Hezbollah is unlikely to force Israel to stop its escalated military campaign. Contrary to fears among many in Tel Aviv and Washington, the organization has not been able to inflict significant damage on Israel, such as hitting civilian infrastructure, causing mass civilian casualties, or overwhelming Israel's aerial defense array with rocket barrages aimed at central areas of the country, including Tel Aviv.²




Figure 1: Hezbollah's claims of operations since Israel escalated its campaign in Lebanon on September 17, 2024.

A diplomatic resolution to the crisis appears distant. Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem – the organization's highest-ranking official at the time of publication – has delivered vague and contradictory statements on whether his organization is still demanding a ceasefire in Gaza as a prerequisite to ending its operations against Israel.³ Israel already rejected on September 26 an initial US-French ceasefire proposal that calls for the withdrawal of Hezbollah north of the Litani river, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701.⁴ Israel has since prioritized military objectives, with its demands reportedly exceeding the scope of UN Resolution 1701.⁵

In addition to the implementation of Resolution 1701, Tel Aviv's demands include an international mechanism to prevent the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, particularly across the Syrian border, as well as the option to resume military operations in Lebanon, including ground operations, when it perceives threats from Hezbollah.⁶

¹ LCAT logs all of Hezbollah's claims of responsibility for military operations against Israel, including their target location and distance from the border.

² CNN, [US concerned Israel's Iron Dome could be overwhelmed in war with Hezbollah, officials say](#) June 20, 2024;

Haaretz, [150,000 Missiles Aimed at Israel: How Far Does Hezbollah's Deadly Arsenal Reach](#) October 23, 2023

³ L'Orient Today, [Naim Qassem: Cease-fire is a priority](#) October 8, 2024;

Al-Manar, [حزب الله استعاد عافيته الميدانية](#) October 15, 2024

⁴ Times of Israel, [US frustrated, says ceasefire plan rejected by Netanyahu had been coordinated with him](#) September 26, 2024

⁵ Times of Israel, [US and Arab states reportedly in talks with Iran for ceasefire on all war fronts](#) October 9, 2024

⁶ Times of Israel, [Report: Israel offers stiff demands for Lebanon ceasefire](#) October 13, 2024



Israel has also called for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 – which stipulates the disarmament of militias on Lebanese territory – a demand rejected by Lebanon's Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri, whom Hezbollah has authorized to negotiate on its behalf.⁷ The US has expressed public support for Israel's military aims to reduce Hezbollah's capabilities and said it is not currently calling for a ceasefire.⁸ Washington reportedly sees in Israel's escalated military campaign an opportunity to diminish Hezbollah's political role in Lebanon.⁹

Israel's expanded military campaign has already caused significant casualties, damage, and destruction nationwide: over 1,700 people have been killed and 9,000 wounded (from September 16 to October 23). At least 809,043 people have been internally displaced,¹⁰ and their return – even in the event of a ceasefire – will be complicated by Israel's destruction of Lebanese property, particularly in Lebanese villages along the border.¹¹ At least five Israeli airstrikes have targeted IDPs in ostensibly safe destination areas, including the Chouf, Batroun, and Zgharta districts, raising fears of intercommunal (between Lebanese and foreign nationals) and intracommunal tensions (between Lebanese communities and factions). As a result of sustained Israeli military action, the hospital system is under immense pressure. Unlike during the 2006 War, Israel has not imposed a complete maritime and aerial blockade. Given that a limited number of flights are still in operation at Lebanon's only airport and imports of key goods have continued uninterrupted – including fuel for transportation and backup generators – there is a semblance of normal economic activity. Lebanon's economy will likely contract significantly in 2024, with the effects of the war compounding the negative trend that began the previous year.¹²




Figure 2: Israeli shelling of Lebanon since the start of its escalated bombing campaign (September 23 to October 20, 2024).

⁷ Times of Israel, [Israel denounced for fire on UNIFIL posts as UN says some peacekeepers relocating](#) October 11, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Berri to L'Orient-Le Jour: Resolution 1701, and nothing else](#) October 14, 2024;

This is Beirut, [Berri: Resolution 1559 is 'a Thing of the Past'](#) October 11, 2024

⁸ US State Department, [Department Press Briefing – October 15, 2024](#) October 15, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Now that Hezbollah is defeated, it changes its tone and wants a ceasefire says U.S. State Department spokesperson](#) October 9, 2024

⁹ Axios, [Scoop: U.S. wants to use Hezbollah's weakness to elect new Lebanese president](#) October 4, 2024

¹⁰ IOM, [Lebanon – Mobility Snapshot – Round 55 – 21-10-2024](#) October 21, 2024

¹¹ The National, [Israel demolishes historic Lebanese village in massive detonation](#) October 17, 2024;

The New York Times, [New Images Show Lebanese Border Villages Flattened in Israeli Invasion](#) October 9, 2024

¹² In 2023, the World Bank projected that Lebanon's gross domestic product (GDP) would decrease by 0.6% to 0.9% due in large part to tourism sector losses partly attributable to the outbreak of the cross-border conflict late that year.

World Bank, [Lebanon Economic Monitor – In the Grip of a New Crisis](#) December 21, 2023



Israel's war on Lebanon by the numbers

Statistics as of October 23, 2024



At least **2,574** people killed since the start of the conflict on October 8, 2023



At least **1,964** people killed since September 17, 2024



At least **12,001** people wounded since October 8, 2023



At least **107** paramedics and firemen killed since October 8, 2023



At least **100** of 207 primary health care centers located in targeted areas out of service



At least **13** hospitals completely or partly out of service



Up to **1.4 million** persons displaced since October 8, 2023, according to Lebanon's government




809,043 displaced persons registered by the IOM, 191,402 of them in communal shelters



At least **1,097** communal shelters opened, with **928** at maximum capacity



USD 250 million a month needed for aid for displaced persons, according to the Lebanese government



At least **499,811** people registered leaving Lebanon for Syria since September 23, including 346,529 Syrians



At least **4,157** rounds of airstrikes and artillery fire recorded since September 23



Credit: AP/Bilal Hussein

Scenario Forecasts

Scenario 1:

Conflict continues at current tempo for at least three more months, with no maritime and aerial blockade of Lebanon

Status: Unfolding at the time of publication

Short-term likelihood: Likely

Medium-term likelihood: Somewhat likely

Potential barriers to escalation:

- The US imposes restrictions on Israel's military campaign in a bid to prevent further political and economic degradation in Lebanon
- Hezbollah inflicts a growing number of casualties on invading Israeli troops, prompting Israeli public opinion to turn against the war
- A successful Israeli military campaign forces Hezbollah to make further concessions and accept a ceasefire

Under this scenario, the pace of Israeli bombing remains roughly the same as it has been since September 23. Israel's daily bombings target southern Lebanese towns up to the Awali river, damaging and destroying homes, civilian infrastructure (such as water mains and power grids), roads, and businesses. These strikes are attritional in nature, gradually leveling targeted towns over a three-month period, similar to how Israeli airstrikes destroyed many Lebanese villages within five kilometers of the border between October 8, 2023 and September 23, 2024.¹³

¹³ Financial Times, [Israel's push to create a 'dead zone' in Lebanon](#) June 27, 2024



As part of its campaign to interrupt alleged transfers of weapons to Hezbollah, Israel also launches waves of daily strikes on Bekaa towns northeast of Chtoura, through Baalbek to Hermel, disrupting commercial traffic.¹⁴ Finally, Israel bombs the southern suburbs of Beirut on a daily basis while carrying out intermittent strikes within the municipal boundaries of the Lebanese capital.

Israel's strikes on the greater Beirut area

On October 14, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that his country would continue to strike Hezbollah in Beirut, despite reported calls by the US for Tel Aviv to limit its raids in the Lebanese capital.¹⁵ On October 16, a US State Department spokesperson said that it was opposed to daily strikes in densely populated areas of the city, but that it supported occasional raids targeting Hezbollah.¹⁶ Israel resumed heavy bombing of the greater Beirut area on October 19, after a pair of strikes killed 22 people 10 days earlier.




Figure 3: Number of Israeli airstrikes in the Greater Beirut area per National News Agency reports.

Israel's ground campaign does not extend north of the Litani river, but causes near total destruction south of it, similar to the scale of damage in the Gaza Strip. In addition to bombing, the Israeli military conducts a series of building demolitions.¹⁷

Israel avoids targeting both Beirut's Rafic Hariri Airport – the country's sole civilian airport – and Lebanon's maritime port, allowing trade to continue. This restraint stems from continued US pressure and the Lebanese Armed Forces maintaining tighter control over both facilities.¹⁸ Lebanon's private-sector importers are able to source key goods, such as foodstuffs, medicinal supplies, and fuel, while international organizations and foreign states are able to ship humanitarian aid to the country by sea and air.

¹⁴ BBC, [Israeli strike hits key road used to flee Lebanon](#) October 4, 2024

¹⁵ Jerusalem Post, [Netanyahu: Israel will continue striking Hezbollah across Lebanon, including Beirut](#) October 14, 2024

¹⁶ US Department of State, [Department Press Briefing – October 16, 2024](#) October 16, 2024

¹⁷ Videos have already been circulated showing Israeli troops demolishing buildings in the towns of Yaroun, Maroun al-Ras, Kfar Kila, Adeisseh, Dhayra and Kfar Kila.


The New York Times, [New Images Show Lebanese Border Villages Flattened in Israeli Invasion](#) October 9, 2024;

Asia Intel via X (formerly Twitter), [Proof: The Israeli Combat Engineering Corps blew up a building in Kfar Kila](#) October 8, 2024;

Saad Abedine via X (formerly Twitter), [The Israeli army destroyed the mosque of Dhayra](#) October 13, 2024

¹⁸ The Guardian, [US warns Israel not to attack Beirut airport – as it happened](#) October 7, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Are Beirut's port and airport finally 'distanced' from Hezbollah?](#) October 12, 2024



The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) reaches at least 1.5 million.¹⁹ Lebanon's winter season, during which there are high winds and heavy rains along the coast and snowfall at altitude, poses a severe challenge for maintaining suitable living conditions in the shelters. The large network of public shelters requires sustained support from the government and the international community.

Impacts

Economic

Under this scenario, Lebanon's economy sharply contracts in 2024 and early 2025.²⁰ According to LCAT's regional economic activity analysis, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa contribute approximately 17.5% to Lebanon's GDP. If key economic sectors slow or come to a halt in these regions between late September 2024 and the end of January 2025, Lebanon's economy would shrink by an estimated 12.81%, equivalent to 2.305 billion US dollars (USD).

¹⁹ Lebanon's caretaker prime minister stated that 1.2 million people had been displaced as of October 2, 2024. Since then, there have been additional reports of mass displacement from densely populated areas increasingly affected by Israeli bombing, including a large wave of people reportedly leaving the Sabra and Shatila areas, located on the edge of municipal Beirut on October 6, 2024. Humanitarian organizations should expect ongoing displacement from urban areas in the Greater Beirut area. While Lebanon does not collect census data, an estimated 2+ million people live in areas that are being heavily bombed by Israel, broken down as follows:

- A 2021 UN Habitat city profile for Beirut, citing UN and Government of Lebanon data, estimated that approximately 550,000 people living in the Haret Hreik, Laylake, Chiyah, Bourj El-Brajneh, and Choueifat El-Aamrousiyé areas are being bombed regularly.
- [Registered voter data](#) can be used to estimate the number of people residing in southern Lebanon, with a total of 971,789 registered voters in the districts of Saida, Rachaya, Hasbaya, Marjayoun, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, and Sour. Voter lists do not include minors, but do include voters residing outside the districts or even abroad.
- In the eastern Lebanon districts of West Bekaa, Zahle, Baalbak, and Hermel there are 643,425 registered voters. There are 1.5 million Syrians in Lebanon, 815,000 of whom are registered with UNHCR. Nearly 300,000 Syrian refugees are registered in the Bekaa. Many Syrians residing in Lebanon will likely opt to migrate back to Syria, with an estimated 300,000 having already done so since September 23.

Lebanon's 1,097 communal shelters are currently hosting 191,503 people; 922 of them are at capacity.

ABC News, [Israel's offensive in Lebanon has displaced 1.2 million, prime minister says](#) October 4, 2024;

Al Jazeera Mubasher, [Massive destruction on the southern suburbs of Beirut](#) October 6, 2024;

UN Habitat, [Beirut City Profile 2021](#) June 11, 2021;

Directorat General of Civil Status, [Statistical Map](#);

UNHCR, [Global Focus – Lebanon](#);

Barron's, [Lebanon Says Over 400,000 People Fled To Syria In Around 2 Weeks](#) October 7, 2024

²⁰ Estimates of GDP contraction vary, possibly due to high levels of economic informality, with Fitch Solutions expecting a 5% contraction in 2024 while the Institute of International Finance forecasts a drop of 7%.

FitchSolutions, [Israel-Hezbollah Intensifying War Will Incur Heavier Economic Losses On Lebanon](#) September 25, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [How a year of war has affected the economies of Lebanon, Israel and Palestine](#) October 7, 2024



Scenario 1: Effects of halting economic activity in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa

Using available accounts data from 2018 to 2021 (the most recent years available), LCAT estimated how the value of six key economic sectors – broken down by region – contributed to Lebanon's GDP.²¹ By analyzing the percentage contribution of each sector in each region, LCAT was able to estimate how Israel's projected military actions under this scenario would affect the broader economy. Figure 4 shows that private services, trade, transport, and communications, and manufacturing and utilities are the highest-contributing sectors to GDP (within the formal economy), and indicates the extent to which each of these sectors would contract under Scenario 1.




Figure 4: Size of contribution of economic sectors by governorate to the total GDP - Scenario 1 expected contractions in dotted area.

Under this scenario agriculture, manufacturing, and other vital sectors would likely be severely affected. Agriculture, a primary source of livelihoods in the Bekaa valley, Nabadatieh, and South Lebanon, would suffer from disrupted planting and harvesting schedules, reduced access to irrigation, and the destruction of essential farming equipment and facilities. Factories and other industrial-level operations in the South and Bekaa valley would see their operations curtailed or halted entirely. The critical sectors of trade, transport, and communication networks would also likely suffer under prolonged conflict. With trade routes damaged and transport networks unreliable, it would become increasingly difficult to transport goods, disrupting local businesses and making it more challenging for farmers and manufacturers to bring their products to market.

Total GDP contributions by the agriculture, manufacturing and utilities, construction, and trade, transport, and communications sectors in South Lebanon and Nabadatieh account for some 9.5% of Lebanon's GDP, while in the Bekaa valley it is estimated to be around 8%. With a baseline GDP in 2024 estimated at USD 18 billion (assuming the absence of conflict in Lebanon) **a complete halt to productive sector activities in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley would cause GDP to contract by USD 1.05 billion over a four-month period, a 5.83% decline.**

²¹ LCAT's analysis of Lebanon's Central Administration of Statistics data on National Accounts estimates for 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021. Even the most recently available National Accounts estimates may not fully capture the significant shifts in economic sectors since the onset of the monetary crisis in October 2019. Nevertheless, they do reveal discernible patterns in the contribution of various sectors to GDP. The analysis is also based on LCAT's review of: Eduardo Amaral Hadad and Yasuhide Okuyama, [Spatial Propagation of the Economic Impacts of Bombing: The Case of the 2006 War in Lebanon](#). Review of Middle East Economics and Finance, vol. 12 (3), p. 225-256 November 2016; Eduardo Haddad, [Spatial perspectives of increasing freeness of trade in Lebanon](#). The Annals of Regional Science, vol. 53 (1), p. 29-54, June 2014



In southern Lebanon, an expanded Israeli ground invasion and heavy bombing brings the agriculture sector, which contributes about 80% of the region's economy, to a halt. In the Bekaa valley, heavy waves of bombing lead to significant declines in economic activity.²²

In the service sector, Israel's escalated military campaign further devastates Lebanon's tourism sector, a key segment of the economy.²³ Lebanese diaspora and foreign tourists largely avoid the country for the duration of the conflict, due to foreign travel advisories and the low number of commercial flights into the country.²⁴ A significant decline in the number of returning members of the Lebanese diaspora decreases remittance inflows to Lebanon. There are no reliable statistics on the level of remittances brought to Lebanon via tourists arriving with cash, but the figure is believed to be in the billions of USD.²⁵

According to an LCAT compilation (See figure 4), if the service sector – comprising financial, real estate, business, personal, private education, health, and public services – in South Lebanon, Nabatieh, and the Bekaa were to halt for four months, losses would total approximately USD 565 million. Assuming a prudent 33% spillover effect on other regions' tertiary sectors in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Northern Lebanon, this would contribute to an additional USD 691 million decline in the service sector. **Therefore, the total economic impact on the services sector is estimated at USD 1.256 billion in scenario 1, or 6.98% of total baseline GDP.**

The combined economic impact of scenario 1 over a four-month period is estimated at 12.81% of GDP, equivalent to USD 2.305 billion.

Scenario 1: Projections of property damage in southern Lebanon

In this scenario, LCAT forecasts that at least 30% of structures south of the Litani river would be damaged or destroyed by attritional Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire as well as demolitions by Israeli troops, if sustained over a three-month period.

According to LCAT's estimates – based on building footprint data – there are 135,779 structures totalling 27,512,972 square meters south of the Litani river. Based on Lebanon's formula for compensation payments after the 2006 War, adjusted for inflation, LCAT assumes the cost of rebuilding damaged structures would range from USD 340 to USD 450 per square meter. **Thus, the total cost of building damage compensation below the Litani river would range from USD 2.8 billion to USD 3.7 billion.** Such destruction is equivalent to a range of 15.55% to 20.05% of baseline GDP in 2024.

²² The head of the regional farmers' association said that most of the Syrian laborers who work in the region's agriculture sector – which accounts for around 2% of the national GDP and 17% of the region's economic activities – have left Lebanon. He also noted that only 30% of the region's farmland is located in areas safe from Israeli bombing. Manufacturing has been particularly hard-hit in the northern Bekaa valley, where activity is down 90% according to the Bekaa Industrialists Association, while in central and western Bekaa, it is down 10%.

Al-Mayadeen, [الزراعة في البقاع تواجه "نكبة غير مسبوقه" بسبب العدوان الإسرائيلي](#) October 10, 2024;

Al-Anbaa, [خسائر كبيرة تعرض لها القطاع الزراعي... وأسواق توقفت عن العمل](#) October 13, 2024


²³ Banque du Liban estimated that the tourism sector in 2023 contributed USD 5.41 billion in revenues, or 30.2% of the GDP.

L'Orient Today, [Tourism revenues up slightly in 2023, says BDL](#) June 10, 2024

²⁴ S&P Global estimated that a 70% falloff in tourism revenues could precipitate a 23% drop in GDP, equivalent to USD 1.38 billion over a four-month period.

The National, [Israel-Gaza war may wipe 23% off Lebanon's GDP as conflict hits tourism](#) November 7, 2023

²⁵ Arabian Gulf Business Insight, [Lebanon pushed to the brink by the war next door](#) February 28, 2024



Under this scenario, **Lebanon's chronically underfunded social safety nets struggle to meet the needs of an increasingly impoverished population**, and economic decline leads to higher rates of multidimensional poverty.^{26 27} This necessitates greater assistance on the part of the humanitarian community, which requires considerably more funding compared to the prewar era.²⁸

Food security

Under this scenario, the acute food crisis faced by residents of southern and eastern Lebanon, including IDPs, worsens.²⁹ A significant portion of the nearly 1 million people (many of them now IDPs) already facing food stress prior to the escalation of the conflict fall into food insecurity.³⁰ Syrian and Palestinian refugees are particularly vulnerable to losing access to already weak social safety nets. In districts now facing heavy Israeli shelling, an estimated 640,799 Syrians were food stressed or food insecure in addition to 33,832 Palestinians facing the same conditions between April and September 2024.³¹



Figure 5: Evolution of food SMEB price in 2024.

²⁶ Multidimensional poverty was estimated to affect 79% of the population from 2022 to 2023, while the unemployment rate was estimated at 29.6% in 2022. ILO, [Lebanon and the ILO release up-to-date data on national labour market](#) May 12, 2022

²⁷ Arab Reform Initiative, [Lebanon's Social Protection System Suffers Amidst the Current War: Urgent Action Needed!](#) October 3, 2024

²⁸ To complement the government's ongoing emergency efforts, the humanitarian community launched a Flash Appeal to deliver urgent assistance to 1 million people for the period of October through December 2024. The appeal seeks to raise USD 425.7 million to provide aid to Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian communities in Lebanon. As of mid-October, the appeal secured only 15% of the total amount. The Flash Appeal bolsters the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP), which remains the primary framework for humanitarian and stabilization efforts. By June 30, 2024, only 25% of the USD 2.72 billion requested under LRP to support 3,409,079 people was secured.

OCHA, [Flash Appeal: Lebanon, October - December 2024 \(October 2024\) \[EN/AR\]](#) October 1, 2024;

OCHA, [Lebanon Flash Appeal 2024 | Financial Tracking Service](#) October 2024;

Relief Web, [Lebanon: 2024 Quarter 2 Sector Dashboard - Social Stability - Lebanon](#) August 14, 2024

²⁹ In its latest report, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) projected that 1.2 million people were facing a food crisis in Lebanon through September 2024, with 85,000 suffering from a food emergency. This analysis, published in May 2024, was based on the assumption that the conflict would remain at its previous, lower-intensity level. Under this scenario, heavy Israeli shelling is affecting districts where IPC estimated 930,123 individuals were in food stress, defined as minimally adequate food consumption. Another 469,334 individuals classified by IPC as food insecure, namely those with food consumption gaps or who need vital household assets for minimally adequate food consumption, are in districts heavily shelled by Israel since September 23, 2024.

IPC, [Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Situation Projection Update Analysis - April 2024 - September 2024](#) May 30, 2024

³⁰ The degradation of food security comes on the heels of the exhaustion of a World Bank loan for wheat purchases, the primary support mechanism for bread subsidies. On September 26, Lebanon's economy minister hiked the price of a bread bundle by 18% and the bread bundle price is expected to increase. L'Orient Today, [Price of bread increases to LL65,000 as wheat subsidies end](#) September 26, 2024

³¹ Food security programs are faced with financial constraints and limited scopes, adding to household food insecurity. The World Food Program (WFP) has reduced cash assistance to Syrian refugees while stopping in-kind assistance for 50% of previously aided Lebanese households. On September 29, WFP announced an emergency operation to provide food assistance for public shelters that needs to overcome a USD 105 million gap in funding.

OCHA, [Lebanon Flash Update #18](#) May 21, 2024;

World Food Program, [WFP Lebanon Situation Report - March 2024](#) April 30, 2024;

World Food Program, [WFP launches emergency food operation to reach one million people affected by the conflict in Lebanon](#) September 29, 2024



District	Nationality	Total Population	Population in food stress	Population in food crisis	People in emergency
Sour	Lebanese	197,068	88,681	39,414	
Sour	Syrian refugees	40,387	20,194	12,116	
Sour	Palestinian refugees	22,748	11,374	5,687	
Bint Jbeil	Lebanese	84,781	42,391	16,956	
Bint Jbeil	Syrian refugees	13,070	6,535	2,614	
Nabatieh	Lebanese	146,560	58,624	29,312	
Nabatieh	Syrian refugees	31,804	14,312	9,541	
Hasbaya	Lebanese	25,759	14,611	4,962	
Hasbaya	Syrian refugees	5,489	40,491	5,784	
Marjayoun	Lebanese	64,527	29,037	16,132	
Marjayoun	Syrian refugees	15,355	6,910	4,607	
Rachaya	Lebanese	31,737	15,869	4,182	
Rachaya	Syrian refugees	10,456	4,182	8,943	
Saida	Lebanese	209,058	94,076	41,812	
Saida	Palestinian refugees	22,406	10,083	5,602	2,241
Saida	Syrian refugees	60,060	27,027	18,018	3,003
Jezzine	Lebanese	27,163	16,298	1,358	
Jezzine	Syrian refugees	4,180	2,508	627	
Baalbek	Lebanese	48,227	48,227	9,645	
Baalbek	Palestinian refugees	1,538	692	385	77
Baalbek	Syrian refugees	186,973	93,487	65,441	9,349
West Bekaa	Lebanese	67,832	30,524	10,175	
West Bekaa	Syrian refugees	95,629	47,815	28,689	
Zahle	Lebanese	140,000	63,000	28,000	
Zahle	Syrian refugees	246,025	123,013	86,109	12,301
Hermel	Lebanese	28,732	12,929	8,620	
Hermel	Syrian refugees	13,151	7,233	4,603	
TOTALS		1,827,564	930,123	469,334	26,971

May 2024 IPC projections for food insecurity in districts that have been heavily bombed since September 2024.

The conflict does not appear to have significantly affected prices as of the time of publishing, though data from the Ministry of Economy and Trade suggest that prices of various food items fluctuated from August to October. In September, the Central Administration of Statistics reported that the consumer price index (CPI) was negative in all governorates except North Lebanon.³² The head of the Food Importers Syndicate Hani Bohsali does not expect food prices to increase by more than 1% or 2% as long as import activity continues in the Beirut port.³³ The intensified conflict foreseen in this scenario would likely lead to greater insecurity along the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon, forcing higher shipping costs due to war-risk insurance, prompting further food staple inflation.

If inflation persists under this scenario for the aforementioned reasons, it would be expected to rise steadily as shown in Figure 5, the Food Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (food SMEB) price evolution in 2024.

³² In September, the CPI decreased by 0.01% in Beirut, 0.22% in Mount Lebanon, 0.28% in Bekaa, 0.34% in South-Lebanon, and 0.77% in Nabatieh. Notably, the CPI increased by 0.17% in North-Lebanon.

³³ Bohsali also clarified that the decrease in supplies to affected areas, due to transportation barriers and risks, coincides with a drop in population in these areas due to displacement.

SBI, بحصلي: لا نقص في التموين... وحركة الاستيراد مستمرة, October 14, 2024



Financial

Under this scenario, Israel's wide-scale military campaign further degrades Lebanon's financial system and threatens to choke off remittance inflows. Lebanon is the world's most remittance-dependent country, and financial transfers serve as a [key informal social safety net](#). Lebanese banks, effectively insolvent since the fall of 2019, continue to pay out small percentages of depositors' largely devalued deposits and to function as conduits for outbound and internal wire transfers facilitating trade finance. Gray-listing³⁴ is not expected to lead to Lebanese banks being decoupled from the international financial system, and inbound transactions will continue.³⁵ Nevertheless, remittances sent to Lebanon face logistical barriers – and potential delays – due to increased scrutiny. While the US continues to financially sanction Hezbollah and its alleged financiers, Washington is reluctant to impose sanctions that threaten flows of wire transfers amid its efforts to influence political outcomes.

Health system

Under this scenario, Israeli shelling kills between 30 to 60 people a day while injuring between 115 and 300.³⁶ After three months, the bombing campaign overwhelms Lebanese hospitals.³⁷

Date	Name	Type	Location
Oct. 5, 2024	Saleh al-Ghandour Hospital	Private	Bint Jbeil
Oct. 4, 2024	Marjayoun Governmental Hospital	Governmental	Marjayoun
Oct. 4, 2024	Mays al-Jabal Governmental Hospital	Governmental	Mays al-Jabal
Oct. 4, 2024	Bint Jbeil Governmental Hospital	Governmental	Bint Jbeil
Oct. 4, 2024	Saint Therese Medical Center	Private	Beirut area - Hadath

Figure 6: Hospitals closed since Israel's escalated military campaign.

Date	Name	Type	Location
Oct. 22, 2024	Bahman Hospital	Private	Beirut - southern suburbs
Oct. 21, 2024	Rafik Hariri Governmental Hospital	Governmental	Beirut - Jnah
Oct. 18, 2024	Fakih Hospital	Private	Saksakiyeh
Oct. 13, 2024	Sheikh Ragheb Harb Hospital	Private	Toul
Oct. 12, 2024	Riyahq Hospital	Private	Riyahq
Oct. 12, 2024	Tamnine General Hospital	Private	Tamnine al-Tahta
Oct. 12, 2024	Tel Chiha Hospital	Private	Zahle
Oct. 8, 2024	Hiram Hospital	Private	Tyre
Oct. 4, 2024	Tebnine Governmental Hospital	Governmental	Tebnine
Oct. 4, 2024	Saint George Hospital	Private	Beirut area - Hadath
Oct. 3, 2024	Bahman Hospital	Private	Beirut area - Haret Hreik
Oct. 3, 2024	Al-Assi Hospital	Private	Hermel
Oct. 1, 2024	Al Zahraa Hospital University Medical Center	Private	Beirut area - Jnah
Oct. 1, 2024	Ghandour Hospital	Private	Nabatieh
Sep. 29, 2024	Qana Governmental Hospital	Governmental	Qana
Sep. 28, 2024	Al-Mortada Hospital	Private	Baalbek (near Douris)
Sep. 27, 2024	Der al-Amal University Hospital	Private	Baalbek
Sep. 25, 2024	Nabih Berri Governmental Hospital	Governmental	Bint Jbeil
Sep. 24, 2024	Kharroubi General Hospital	Private	Sarafand

Figure 7: Hospitals damaged by Israeli shelling since September 23, 2024.

³⁴ At the end of October, Lebanon's financial system will reportedly be placed on the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) gray list. Such a move would increase scrutiny of transactions and likely lead to decreased capital inflows.


Bloomberg, [Lebanon Poised for Watchdog's 'Gray List' Over Dirty Money](#) October 15, 2024

³⁵ LCAT, [Financial Risks for Cash Actors](#) May 2024;

³⁶ LCAT averaged deaths and injuries between September 15, 2024 and October 14, 2024 to produce a high-bound estimate that includes the outlier heavy death toll of 558 on September 23 as well as the average from October 1, 2024 to October 14, 2024 for a low-bound estimate.

³⁷ Compounding mass casualty events, Israeli bombing has damaged hospitals, injured patients, and forced the closure of at least five major medical facilities since mid-September 2024, a trend likely to worsen.

Reuters, [WHO warns of overstretched Lebanese health system after Israeli attacks](#) September 30, 2024



Initially, the Lebanese hospital system manages to avoid fully depleting stocks of critical supplies and continues to handle mass casualty events.³⁸ Israeli airstrikes continue to target first responders, compounding the effects of the 150 paramedics and firefighters already killed since the beginning of the conflict.³⁹ As Israel continues its bombing campaign in the region, as well as in Beirut's southern suburbs, humanitarian organizations prepare for strikes on first responders in the Bekaa valley.

Social stability

The displacement of Shia Muslim residents from southern Lebanon, Beirut's southern suburbs, and the Bekaa valley to safer areas populated by Christians, Druze, and Sunni Muslims fuels intercommunal tensions (which have already begun to manifest to a limited extent).⁴⁰

An uptick in Israeli strikes targeting ostensibly safe destination areas hosting IDPs also sparks a rise in intercommunal tensions. Repeated Israeli airstrikes targeting host communities over the course of three months raise fears among host community members, potentially leading to them refusing entry to additional IDPs and possibly to expulsions.⁴¹

Strikes targeting displaced persons accused of being affiliated with Hezbollah not only increase tensions between host communities and IDPs, but also exacerbate pre-existing political and social rivalries between host communities members.⁴² **Population surges in areas relatively safe from Israeli bombing strain infrastructure in host communities, already reeling under the effects of the 2019 economic crisis.** Since nearly half of Lebanon's population already relies on a chaotic system of water deliveries via tanker trucks,⁴³ a surge in new customers places additional strain on this system, combined with trucks being unable to access areas where shelling has damaged or destroyed roads. Overdemand in areas with large inflows of IDPs reduce meager electricity provision even further⁴⁴ and exhaust privately-operated generator power grids running on fuel imports.⁴⁵ As with trucked water, the delivery of diesel for backup generators is affected by a spike in demand in safe areas.

³⁸ In August, Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health announced that it had organized the stockpiling of supplies for the hospital system to weather four months of war. WHO has been organizing the delivery of critical supplies and coordinating with the Lebanese Red Cross and hospitals with the aim of ensuring adequate blood bank levels.

Al-Arabiya, [المخزون الصحي يكفي لـ 4 أشهر.. لبنان يستعد لحرب أوسع نطاقاً](#), August 13, 2024;

Al-Mayadeen, [Health system can withstand four months of war: Lebanese Health Min.](#) August 9, 2024;

WHO, [Attacks on hospitals and health workers jeopardize provision of health in Lebanon](#) October 16, 2024

³⁹ On October 12, Israel's military threatened to hit ambulances that they alleged were transporting Hezbollah fighters and arms in southern Lebanon.

L'Orient Today, [Abiad reports 150 deaths among healthcare professionals and firefighters, 13 hospitals out of service](#) October 14, 2024;

Al-Jazeera, [Israeli army threatens to attack ambulances in southern Lebanon](#) October 12, 2024

⁴⁰ On September 23 in the mainly-Christian populated Ain el Remmaneh suburb of Beirut, where residents refused entry to displaced persons. A Lebanese investigative outlet reported on other cases of residents in believed safer areas of Lebanon objecting to accepting displaced persons, fearing that Hezbollah members – and thus potential Israeli assassination targets – could be among them.

Lebanon24, [إشكال ليلا في عين الرمانة.. إليكم السبب](#) September 24;

Daraj, [Lebanon as a "Refugee" Awaiting War: Exorbitant Rents, Security Concerns, and Sectarian Fears](#) August 14, 2024

⁴¹ An MP from the Kesrouane-Jbeil governorate on September 26 warned against the entry of figures or munitions that would expose his constituency to danger, an implicit reference to fears Hezbollah officials would be among IDPs. Since then, this sentiment has been echoed by politicians in the Batroun, Zgharta, and Chouf districts. In the Chouf district, where Israeli strikes have targeted IDPs in Barja and Wardaniyeh, a politician from a local influential party said that Hezbollah should refrain from visits to destination areas to ensure the safety of displaced and host communities.

NNA, [وطن الإنسان: "نحذر من تسرب أفراد يتسبون بقتل"](#) September 26, 2024;

Asharq Alawsat, [لا مناطق آمنة في لبنان](#) October 15, 2024;

NNA, [يزنك لاهل منطقة البترون](#) October 14, 2024;

NNA, [عبدالله: الغارات الاسرائيلية لن تثبتنا عن واجبنا الوطني](#) October 12, 2024

⁴² Following an October 14 strike that killed at least 21 IDPs, the head of a Maronite Christian political party aligned with Hezbollah in the Zgharta district accused a rival party of betting on an Israeli victory. An MP representing the district implicitly accused the Hezbollah-aligned political leader of allowing Hezbollah figures to enter the district, implying that this prompted the Israeli airstrike. Such instances, while still rare, could multiply as the war drags on. Several Lebanese political figures have warned that Israeli strikes in ostensibly safe areas are intended to sow political and sectarian discord in the country.

NNA, [عبدالله: الغارات الاسرائيلية لن تثبتنا عن واجبنا الوطني](#) October 12, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [More than 20 dead in Israeli strike on Zgharta](#) October 14, 2024;

Lebanon Files, [باسيل: نرفض الاحتلال الاسرائيلي ونحذر من مؤامرة إفراغ لبنان من الشيعة](#) October 12, 2024

⁴³ International Water Association Publications, [Navigating the water-energy nexus amidst the Lebanese economic crisis](#) May 1, 2024

⁴⁴ By way of illustration, during the 2006 War, state electricity provision in municipal Beirut had faltered by the second week of the conflict as thousands of families flowed into the city.

National Library of Medicine, [Predictors of displacement behaviour during the 2006 Lebanon war](#), *Global Public Health*, 6:5, 488-504 February 15, 2011

⁴⁵ Prior to the expansion of the conflict, state electricity provision was at a minimum, with power plants shutting down temporarily in mid-August due to lack of fuel and Électricité du Liban only able to supply four to six hours of electricity daily.

L'Orient Today, [Government launches urgent investigation into Lebanon's nationwide blackout](#) August 19, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Power supply will increase by '4 to 6 hours,' caretaker Energy Minister says](#) August 27, 2024



Continued conflict also drives tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees. Many Syrian nationals in Lebanon already contend with movement restrictions and sporadic targeted violence.⁴⁶ Since Israel launched its expanded bombing campaign, Lebanese security services have arrested at least three Syrians accused of spying on behalf of Tel Aviv, a trend likely to cause further suspicion among host communities against Syrians.⁴⁷ The Lebanese state had planned to accommodate 200,000 displaced persons in its public shelters, not including Syrian refugees.⁴⁸ **Some 350,000 Syrians have returned to their home country since September 17, a development that could bolster the positions of Lebanese politicians who argue that Syrians in Lebanon can be safely repatriated.**⁴⁹

Shelter

Under this scenario the Lebanese state, UN, and other international organizations face ongoing resource constraints that make it difficult to equip and maintain the country's communal shelters. Displaced persons require shelters that are well equipped for winter, have suitable WASH facilities, and that can scale up capacity if the number of IDPs increases.⁵⁰ An increasing number of overcrowded shelters, combined with the diminishing supply of essential medical supplies, pose a significant threat to public health, especially as winter approaches.⁵¹ The number of IDPs living on the streets, in tents, in unfinished buildings, or in parks – already at 2% as of October 2024 – continues to rise.⁵²

Humanitarian access

As Israel's ground campaign expands, humanitarian organizations find it very difficult to operate south of the Litani river.⁵³ Ongoing military operations preclude the entry of humanitarian aid, while the Israeli military attempts to block or limit the arrival of aid in areas it seeks to control. Israeli bombardment affects humanitarian access logistics, with road closures a daily occurrence. Humanitarian access to the Bekaa valley is also negatively affected.⁵⁴

⁴⁶ L'Orient Today, [Syrian national stabbed to death in Burj Hammoud](#) April 29, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Are municipalities' restrictions against Syrians legal?](#) April 23, 2024

⁴⁷ L'Orient Today, [Lebanese Army arrests 2 Syrian nationals on suspicion of spying for Israel](#) October 9, 2024;

NNA, [توقيف سوري متهم بالعمالة لإسرائيل في دير القمر](#), October 10, 2024

⁴⁸ Presidency of the Council of Ministers, [الوطنية خطة الطوارئ](#) October 31, 2023

⁴⁹ NNA, [تقرير لجنة الطوارئ الـ 27](#), October 24, 2024;

NNA, [جمع آثار مع بلاسختارت مسألة النزوح](#), October 2, 2024;

Tayyar.org, [Bassil: Confronting Israel Requires Responsible Stances Beyond Internal Politics](#) October 7, 2024

⁵⁰ On October 1, the UN launched a funding appeal for humanitarian aid – including food and shelter assistance – that as of publication has a funding gap of nearly 85%. Only 8.5% of the shelter sector needs under the Flash Appeal have been funded. A significant portion of the displaced population in communal shelters are currently residing in educational institutions. As the academic year is scheduled to commence on November 4, it is unclear where else these displaced individuals can be hosted or find accommodation. The Minister of Education has indicated that public schools without a displaced population may be utilized on a two-shift schedule, and there is also a possibility of employing private schools or implementing distance learning measures to accommodate the displaced students.

OCHA, [The United Nations and Lebanese government launch \\$426 million flash appeal for urgent humanitarian aid](#) October 1, 2024;

OCHA, [Lebanon](#) accessed October 21, 2024;

OCHA, [Lebanon Flash Appeal 2024 | Financial Tracking Service](#);

NNA, [رئيس الحكومة عقد سلسلة لقاءات وزارية وديبلوماسية محورها التطورات الحلي: العام الدراسي في 4 ت 2 و 5 كليات في "البنانية" تباشر في 28 الحالي حمية: موضوع](#)

[معبير المصنع محور متابعة من قبل الرئيس ميقاتي](#) October 21, 2024

⁵¹ Relief Web, [Lebanon: Flash Update #35 - Escalation of hostilities in Lebanon, as of 14 October 2024 - Lebanon](#) October 16, 2024

⁵² IOM, [Lebanon - Mobility Snapshot - Round 55 - 21-10-2024 | Displacement Tracking Matrix](#) October 21, 2024

⁵³ Israeli airstrikes on Nabatieh on October 16 targeted the municipality building, killing the mayor, municipal officials, and members of the Civil Defense as they were holding a meeting on aid and relief efforts in the city. On October 10, the UN and partner NGOs delivered a convoy of aid to the towns of Rmeich, Ain Ebel, and Debl. On October 8, OCHA, WFP and UNICEF distributed aid in Tyre. Since then, an Israeli troop presence was reported on October 14 on the outskirts of Debl.


L'Orient Today, [Recap: Israeli army razes entire village, bombs Nabatieh city hall and fires again at a UNIFIL watchtower](#) October 17, 2024;

OCHA, [Lebanon - Flash Update #34](#) October 12, 2024;

Al-Jadeed, [مراسل الجديد: ما اشيع عن انزال جوي](#), October 14, 2024

⁵⁴ On October 14, Israeli airstrikes damaged a convoy of Lebanese government-dispatched aid trucks coordinated with the Red Cross and the UN that were traveling through the village of Al-Ain.

L'Orient Today, [Day 374 of the Gaza and Lebanon wars](#) October 14, 2024



WASH

Sustained Israeli bombardment creates significant water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) challenges for the Lebanese state. Some 200,000 people seek shelter in already crowded communal accommodations, which require sustained deliveries of drinking water and hygiene kits over a period of three months. Since these shelters need showers and toilets, Lebanon's state-run public shelters system is heavily reliant on international support.^{55 56} Areas coming under heavy Israeli bombardment experience garbage and sewage collection interruptions, as happened in the southern Beirut suburbs.⁵⁷

An Israeli ground invasion up to the Litani river severely damages water and sanitation services and prevents maintenance from being carried out. Risks of waterborne diseases persist⁵⁸ and there is a real threat of cholera.⁵⁹

Education

Under this scenario, public and private schooling do not resume until a ceasefire is reached.⁶⁰ Educational facilities continue to be used as shelters.⁶¹ A delayed start to the school year worsens dropout rates as students seek to support their families. The government fails to announce plans for remote learning or temporary education centers. In any case, internet connectivity issues and frequent power outages across Lebanon render these educational modes impractical.

⁵⁵ The humanitarian community launched a three-month Flash Appeal (October to December 2024) seeking USD 425,745,000 to support the government's emergency response. This funding will provide aid and protection to 1 million people. Only 16.8% of the appeal has been funded. The Flash Appeal complements the Lebanon Response Plan (LRP) 2024, which seeks \$2.72 billion but has only received 25% of requested funding.

⁵⁶ OCHA noted that the WASH sector stock is depleting at a quick rate, highlighting the need for hygiene kits, baby kits, and drinking water, among other supplies.

OCHA, [Lebanon - Flash Update #34](#) October 12, 2024

⁵⁷ Already, the northern Bekaa region is reportedly suffering from an accumulation of waste due to diesel shortages in local municipalities. Municipalities throughout the Bekaa are reportedly struggling to conduct waste collection services due to the displacement of their laborers, many of them Syrians who returned to their home country.

Government of Lebanon, [Setting the stage for long term reconstruction: The national early recovery process](#) August 29, 2006;

NNA, [حيشي: لتأمين حاجات المجتمع النازح والمضيف](#) October 14, 2024;

Al-Modon, [الحرب تقلص اليد العاملة السورية... الأجور تضاعفت والنقص كبير](#) October 15, 2024

⁵⁸ The South Lebanon Water Establishment announced on October 12 that seven of its employees have been killed in the past year while working to ensure the continuity of services, a trend likely to worsen with a sustained ground invasion extending up to the Litani river.

NNA, [مياه الجنوب: ارتفاع 7 شهداء من خيرة شباننا وموظفينا حتى اليوم](#) October 12, 2024

⁵⁹ Despite Lebanon declaring itself to be cholera-free in July 2023, on October 16, Lebanese authorities announced the detection of the first case of cholera since the start of the conflict in October 2023. The next day, the World Health Organization stated that there was a high risk of cholera spreading, especially since displaced persons from southern Lebanon and Beirut do not have immunity to the communicable disease.

UN, [Lebanon: Cholera fears for communities uprooted by war](#) October 17, 2024;

Anadolu Agency, [Lebanon reports 1st cholera case amid Israeli offensive](#) October 16, 2024

⁶⁰ The Education Minister has tentatively pushed back the start of the public school year to November 4, a date that won't be met in this scenario.

⁶¹ Approximately 60% of public schools are being used as public shelters while 400,000 students have been displaced.

The National, [Lebanon's embattled public schools to stay shut until November](#) October 6, 2024;

AP, [The UN says over 400,000 children in Lebanon have been displaced in 3 weeks by war](#) October 15, 2024



Credit: Reuters

Scenario Forecasts

Scenario 2:

The conflict expands over the course of three months, Israel heavily targets state infrastructure, and an Israeli blockade constrains the Lebanese economy

Status: Not yet occurred

Short-term likelihood: Unlikely

Medium-term likelihood: Somewhat likely

Potential Trigger Points:

- Hezbollah launches successful attacks on Israeli civilian infrastructure or inflicts mass civilian casualties that precipitate domestic political pressure for retaliatory strikes on Lebanon's key civilian infrastructure
- Sustained Hezbollah rocket fire on northern Israel prompts Tel Aviv to broaden its invasion
- Successful Hezbollah attacks lead Israel to carry out regular strikes on perceived safe areas of Lebanon in a bid to foster political turmoil and hamper Hezbollah's efforts
- Amid tit-for-tat strikes between Iran and Israel, Tehran attempts to bolster its military presence in Lebanon and transfer weapons to Hezbollah, sparking Israel to impose a blockade



Under this scenario, Israel bombards key Lebanese civilian infrastructure and imposes a strict maritime and aerial blockade, as it did during the 2006 War. In a bid to pressure Hezbollah domestically, Israel's navy cuts off critical imports, including fuel needed for power plants and "backup" electrical generators. Fuel shortages lead to economic chaos and localized telecom breakdowns.⁶² Under the pretext of its campaign to assassinate Hezbollah officials, Israel conducts regular airstrikes in areas of Lebanon that had been perceived as safe. These strikes are interpreted in Lebanon as Israel aiming to sow domestic strife. At least three strikes a week hit municipal Beirut, targeting Hezbollah officials and figures affiliated with the organization, as well as officials from allied groups. This follows the precedent of Israel's strikes in the Cola, Bachura, Basta, and Noueirih areas of central Beirut. Israel also regularly bombs destination areas for IDPs, in line with its strikes in the Chouf, Batroun, and Zgharta districts. **This scenario entails the displacement of over 1.5 million people, including significant numbers of residents of western and central Beirut districts, driving intercommunal and political tensions.**

Israeli ground forces attempt to enter areas north of the Litani river, stretching up to the western Bekaa and greater Beirut area.⁶³ The Israeli military, replicating its tactics from Gaza, unleashes mass bombardment of areas its ground troops plan to enter or from where they have come under fire. Israeli troops also conduct wide-scale demolitions of buildings in areas they enter. In a more advanced version of this scenario, Israeli ground troops stage raids north of Saida on the highway stretching through Khaldeh to southern Beirut. However, as of publication, and based on the present trend of limited advances of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, this appears highly unlikely by the end of January 2025.

Impacts

Economic

Under this scenario, Lebanon – an import-dependent country – experiences a major decline in economic activity since it cannot source key goods due to damaged or destroyed roadways and fuel shortages. Heavy infrastructure damage cuts GDP by 15% to 25%.⁶⁴ This leads to higher unemployment, disproportionately affecting vulnerable people working informal or seasonal jobs and increasing poverty. The agriculture sector in heavily bombed areas grinds to a halt. Farmers are unable to access or irrigate their fields amid Israeli bombardment, fuel shortages, and challenges in getting their produce to markets. Tourism also suffers a near total collapse. Finally, the economic consequences extend long after the war ends, including a lengthy rebuilding process of key infrastructure and the emigration of skilled workers, negatively affecting economic growth.⁶⁵ Postwar, there would likely be a massive wave of illegal migration from Lebanon to Cyprus via sea.⁶⁶

⁶² On October 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on the Lebanese people to overthrow Hezbollah to avoid Gaza-like destruction, interpreted in Lebanon as an instigation to turmoil and potential civil war.

BBC, [Beirut residents ignore Netanyahu's call to rise up against Hezbollah](#) October 9, 2024

⁶³ While Israel has stated that it is conducting "limited and localized" ground incursions into Lebanon, it has called for the evacuation of residents of a growing number of towns and villages to the north of the Awali river.

Al-Jazeera, [Israel says troops crossed into Lebanon as ground offensive launched](#) October 1, 2024;

AFP, [Israel army expands evacuation calls for areas in south Lebanon](#) October 13, 2024

⁶⁴ BlomInvest Bank, [Estimate of the Impact of the War in South-Lebanon on Lebanese GDP](#) September 26, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [How a year of war has affected the economies of Lebanon, Israel and Palestine](#) October 7, 2024;

The National, [Lebanon's economy may shrink by up to 25% in 2024 as war intensifies](#) September 24, 2024

⁶⁵ World Bank, [Lebanon Economic Monitor - Fall 2023 : In the Grip of a New Crisis](#) December 21, 2023

⁶⁶ Al-Jazeera, [Cyprus concerned over spike in arrivals of Syrian refugees from Lebanon](#) April 2, 2024





Figure 8: Size of contribution of economic sectors by governorate to the total GDP - Scenario 2 expected contractions in dotted area.

In this scenario, LCAT projects a 21.9% contraction in Lebanon's baseline GDP, equivalent to USD 3.938 billion. LCAT's estimates assume a full halt to economic activity in the Bekaa and southern Lebanon. LCAT assumes no contraction in the agricultural sector in the Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North governorates, but a 50% contraction in the manufacturing, utilities and services sectors in these areas. Meanwhile, LCAT assumes a 75% contraction in the trade and transportation sectors in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North Lebanon.

Israeli shelling would likely cause tens of billions of US dollars in property damage countrywide, leaving hundreds of thousands of IDPs homeless and unable to return when fighting ends.

In this scenario, LCAT projects that at least 60% of structures south of the Litani river could be damaged or destroyed by attritional Israeli airstrikes, artillery fire, and demolitions if sustained over a three-month period. This follows the precedent of the Gaza war, during which Israel's concentrated fire and demolitions have damaged some two-thirds of the built environment, and severely damaged or destroyed one-quarter.⁶⁷ LCAT also projects that at least 25% of structures north of the Litani river, stretching as far as the Awali river – areas where Israel has ordered residents to evacuate – could be damaged or destroyed.

According to LCAT's estimates based on building footprint data, 135,779 structures totalling 27,512,972 square meters are located south of the Litani river. Based on Lebanon's formula for compensation payments after the 2006 War, adjusted for inflation, LCAT assumes the cost of rebuilding damaged structures would range between USD 340 to 450 per square meter. **As such, the total cost for building damage compensation below the Litani river would range from USD 5.6 billion to USD 7.4 billion.**

⁶⁷ AP, [Gaza is in ruins after Israel's yearlong offensive. Rebuilding may take decades](#) October 9, 2024



According to LCAT's estimates, there are 114,538 structures totalling 29,695,531.3 square meters in the area stretching from the Litani to the Awali. These include Saida, Lebanon's third-largest city. **As such, the total cost of building damage compensation in this area would range from USD 2.5 billion to USD 3.3 billion.**

In total, Israeli ground invasion and bombardment under this scenario would necessitate between USD 8.1 to USD 10.7 billion in estimated compensation costs for damaged buildings between the border and the Awali river.

An Israeli blockade of Lebanon leads to market chaos, spurring a wave of panic buying, hoarding, and black market activity. Market chaos leads to accelerated inflation and possibly hyperinflation. Prices skyrocket, keeping pace with the amount that people are willing to pay to procure essential goods on the black market.^{68 69}

⁶⁸ Already since Israel expanded its bombardment on September 23, media reports have emerged of shortages in some supermarkets of basic goods such as rice, canned food, and milk due in part to panic buying, possible profit-seeking hoarding, and strains to distribution networks.

This is Lebanon, [سبلع أساسية فقدت من الأسواق... اللبناي تحت رحمة تجار الأزمات](#) October 11, 2024

⁶⁹ The Syndicate of Foodstuff Importers reiterated that the supply of essential goods country wide is enough to cover demand. While Lebanon reportedly has five months worth of food and medicine stocks, the transport of these essential goods are dependent on fuel and serviceable roadways. Lebanon's fuel importers stock for shorter time periods. The country's private sector fuel importing syndicate said on October 11 that it has stocks sufficient for three weeks, due to high demand from consumers.

Lebanon Economy, [البيحصلي: العرض يفوق الطلب وليس هناك مبرر لنقص البضائع](#) October 14, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Lebanon has enough food stocks for 5 months, reassures Minister Salam](#) August 8, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Lebanese importers confirm general stock of medications sufficient for five months](#) September 25, 2024;

This is Lebanon, [إشربان الصادرات "في خطر... الصواريخ الإسرائيلية تتقرب طريق المصنع"](#) October 11, 2024



To understand the economic impact of disruptions to Beirut port activity, LCAT calculated changes in all CPI categories. The following chart shows the extent to which import volumes dropped in 2020, compared to the trend observed between 2014 and 2023.




Figure 9: Lebanon's imports, exports, and trade balance by value (in billions of USD) from 2014-2023.

The LBP/USD exchange rate fell from 2,059 LBP in December 2019 to 8,286 LBP in December 2020, a 302% decline. To account for the impact of LBP depreciation and parse out the effect of import volumes on consumer prices, the increase in the LBP/USD was subtracted from the growth rate of each CPI category. The following CPI categories increased beyond the 302% depreciation rate (the remaining percentage increase is in parentheses):

- Alcoholic beverages, tobacco (90%)
- Food and non-alcoholic beverages (100%)
- Clothing and footwear (257%)
- Restaurant and hotels (307%)
- Furnishings, household equipment, and routine household maintenance (353%)

Prices are therefore expected to increase by at least the aforementioned percentages, accounting for only the supply and demand dynamics in case imports halve. The examined period spans the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused severe global supply chain disruptions, including a 10% increase in global food prices in real terms.⁷⁰ However, inflation, even after accounting for the impact of currency depreciation, still far exceeds the expected increase caused by pandemic-induced supply slowdowns. Therefore, this analysis suggests that the prices of items in the previously listed consumption categories would likely increase, by an uncertain proportion, in a scenario according to which port activity is disrupted and import volumes contract by more than half their current levels.

⁷⁰ [FAO Food Price Index](#)



Food security

Wide-scale Israeli air and artillery strikes, coupled with a ground invasion and a naval and sea blockade, precipitate a significant and severe food crisis,⁷¹ jeopardizing the food security of millions of Lebanese. The consequences are particularly harsh for vulnerable groups such as impoverished residents in the peripheries of the country and Syrian and Palestinian refugees. Heavily dependent on imports, Lebanon is unable to source essential supplies for ensuring food security in the event of a blockade.⁷² In this scenario, Israeli strikes damage and destroy roadways leading from Syria and eastern Lebanon to the heavily populated coastal areas, ruling out overland routes as a feasible substitute for maritime ones. In southern Lebanon, with a wide-scale Israeli ground invasion underway and minimal to no humanitarian access possible, food security levels plummet. Food insecurity increases in heavily populated areas of coastal Lebanon, including Beirut, which is dependent on severely curtailed maritime consignments of foodstuffs. Diesel needed for back-up power generators used by bakeries and local food production plants is largely unavailable. Transportation networks are targeted at a similar rate to the 2006 War, when Israel destroyed over 100 bridges and overpasses as well as 137 roads.⁷³

Financial

Under this scenario, remittance flows to Lebanon are heavily curtailed compared to Scenario 1. To cover demand for payouts of transfers from abroad, Lebanon's banks and money transfer bureaus source USD cash via air freight shipments.⁷⁴ Although banks and money transfer bureaus have physical USD cash reserves, these would be depleted if Beirut's Rafik Hariri International Airport closes. A panic surge in inbound wire transfers via banks and transfers via money service bureaus for cash payouts in Lebanon quickly overwhelms the ability of these institutions to make payouts. Informal money transfer operators, commonly known as Hawalas, are unable to fill this gap. While their methods of settling accounts are opaque, they are still dependent on sourcing US dollar banknotes for any payouts and are unlikely to have vault reserves larger than banks or other operators. Tourism, including by diaspora Lebanese, plummets, curtailing remittance inflows brought into the country by individuals. **With banks and money service bureaus unable to fulfill cash payouts, humanitarian organizations contemplate alternate means of bringing in USD banknotes for their logistic operations and cash payout programs.** The LBP falls precipitously against the USD, though not to the same degree as in the 2019 financial collapse, since the economy's progressive dollarization has already made the country dependent on the US dollar for major transactions, while the LBP is used as a secondary currency for smaller transactions and payments.

Health System

Under this scenario, a surge of casualties overwhelms the healthcare system. Deaths average from at least 50 to 100 a day, to over 200 a day, in line with peak days since September 17 – excluding the outlier death toll of over 500 on September 23 when Israel launched a massive wave of airstrikes.⁷⁵ Expanded Israeli ground operations force most hospitals south of the Awali river to close, placing further strain on other healthcare providers to treat the rising tide of injured people. Attritional Israeli bombardment damages and disrupts operations at hospitals in the Bekaa valley and southern Beirut suburbs. With private sector imports largely crippled, Lebanon's healthcare system becomes increasingly dependent on critical aid shipments of medical supplies from international organizations and foreign donor states.

⁷¹ Since the 2019 economic collapse, the IPC's analyses of Lebanon have been negative, with the latest analysis finding that 1.26 million residents were likely to face acute food insecurity in the coming months, even without a major escalation.

IPC, [Lebanon: Acute Food Insecurity Situation Projection Update Analysis - April 2024 - September 2024](#) May 30, 2024

⁷² Israel allowed limited humanitarian supplies to arrive overland from Syria in the 2006 War, however this did not extend to the south of the country.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ LCAT, [Financial Risks for Cash Actors](#) May 2024

⁷⁵ CNN, [What happened in Lebanon and why is Israel attacking Hezbollah?](#) September 24, 2024



Social stability

Political tensions worsen in Lebanon as Hezbollah's rivals perceive a weakness in the organization due to Israel's assassination campaign.⁷⁶ Foreign diplomatic efforts also contribute to domestic political destabilization.⁷⁷ Any attempt to elect a new president – a process that has already been deadlocked for two-years – that bypasses Hezbollah sparks political turmoil, including the possibility of violent clashes.

Political tensions are heightened by the mass displacement of Shia Muslims to majority Christian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim populated areas. Amid the stresses of a high-intensity conflict that destroys the country's key civilian infrastructure and causes shortages of essential goods, humanitarian organizations observe how the trend of solidarity among communities is beginning to crumble. An increase in Israeli strikes on what were once relatively safe destination areas prompts efforts to expel IDPs as residents seek to avoid being targeted in Israeli strikes. Sectarian-based fears and conspiracies increase, leading to clashes between members of host communities and displaced persons, Lebanon's security forces struggle to deploy amid fuel shortages and damaged road networks.

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Shelter

In this scenario, the Lebanese state, the UN, and international aid agencies are unable to meet the minimal requirements of IDPs in communal shelters. Lebanon's emergency response logistics – including the establishment of more shelters – face severe strains, such as bottlenecks of critical supplies and organizational difficulties caused by communication outages. Shelters on the boundaries of targeted areas are at risk of being affected by Israeli shelling, and damage to infrastructure near shelters leads to power outages and water cuts. In certain instances, strikes on or very near shelters lead to casualties and more displacement.

Telecom outages

Under this scenario, Lebanon's population is forced to contend with severe and sustained telecommunication network outages.⁷⁸ Within weeks, assuming sharply curtailed supplies in diesel fuel needed for power generation at telecom stations, the network faces widespread outages.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ On October 12, the leader of the largest political party opposed to Hezbollah endorsed the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which if enforced would mandate the disarmament of Hezbollah. While the party did not call for its near-term implementation, it did say it was trying to open a discussion on the topic, a move that will increase tensions with Hezbollah and its political allies.

L'Orient Today, [The war and Hezbollah seemingly worsen divisions among Christians](#) October 15, 2024;

L'Orient Today, [Bassil: The FPM is not 'in a situation of alliance' with Hezbollah](#) October 22, 2024

⁷⁷ The US has reportedly seen Israel's escalated military campaign as an opportunity to box-in Hezbollah politically and push for the election of Lebanese Army commander Joseph Aoun as president.

Axios, [Scoop: U.S. wants to use Hezbollah's weakness to elect new Lebanese president](#) October 4, 2024

⁷⁸ In the 2006 War, Israeli bombardment targeted fixed and mobile telecom networks, destroying 13 transmission stations. In Gaza, Israel has repeatedly targeted the local communication grid, leaving the enclave disconnected from the internet for days at a time.

Government of Lebanon, [Setting the stage for long term reconstruction: The national early recovery process](#) August 29, 2006;

The Washington Post, [Why Gaza keeps losing communications](#) January 18, 2024

⁷⁹ It is unclear how effectively backup connectivity options based on connections to satellites such as Starlink or VSAT could be scaled up in Lebanon amid a wide-scale conflict. On October 10, a Lebanese outlet reported that discussions between Lebanese authorities and Starlink were at an impasse, preventing distribution of the devices.

Majalla, [ماذا لو انقطع الانترنت والاتصالات وعزل لبنان عن العالم؟](#) October 10, 2024



Humanitarian access

Under this scenario, an Israeli maritime and naval blockade limits humanitarian access. During the 2006 War, Israel allowed limited humanitarian shipments via Beirut's port and airport, including food and medical aid flown in by Egyptian military planes and humanitarian aid arriving on Greek military vessels.⁸⁰ These consignments could not, however, prevent shortages of key goods, such as fuel.⁸¹ **Humanitarian actors should expect a repeat of this situation under a worse case scenario.**⁸²

Beyond the challenges of shipping key goods into Lebanon, humanitarian access is cut off to broad swathes of Lebanon, including most of southern Lebanon up to the Awali river. Intense bombing hampers the movement of humanitarian convoys to the Bekaa valley and the southern Beirut suburbs. Destruction of roadways, bridges, and overpasses pose another barrier to overland humanitarian consignments.⁸³

WASH

In this scenario, humanitarian actors should anticipate acute nationwide challenges to accessing potable water, water for sanitation, and other supplies for hygiene due to heavy Israeli bombardment.⁸⁴ Such damage to WASH infrastructure as well as shortages of supplies to overcrowded communal shelters for IDPs increases the likelihood of outbreaks of waterborne diseases, such as diarrhea, hepatitis A, and cholera, as well as respiratory ailments and skin diseases, echoing experiences in Gaza.⁸⁵

Education

In this scenario, the academic year is postponed until a ceasefire allows IDPs to relocate from their shelters, most of which are public schools. Worsening telecom outages rule out distance learning and the Lebanese state is unable to establish temporary education hubs. Beyond disruption to their education, children are especially vulnerable to conflict and will require familial support, which could be lacking or unavailable to many, to cope with the war. UNICEF has warned that prolonged interruptions to schooling would increase the risks of child labor and child marriage.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ Masrawy, [طائرة مساعدات مصرية تصلان بيروت ضمن حيس المساعدات](#) July 31, 2006;

Government of Greece, [Distribution of the second part of Greek humanitarian aid in Lebanon](#) July 22, 2006

⁸¹ OCHA, [Lebanon Crisis Flash Appeal 2006](#) July 24, 2006;

US State Department cable (via WikiLeaks), [Lebanese Economy Devastated by Air Strikes and Blockade](#) July 19, 2024

⁸² Throughout the Gaza war, Israel has repeatedly curtailed the key of goods to the coastal enclave, including most recently in its offensive in northern Gaza in mid-October 2024.

AP, [US warns Israel to boost humanitarian aid into Gaza or risk losing weapons funding](#) October 15, 2024

⁸³ In the 2006 War, Israel destroyed over 100 bridges and overpasses as well as 137 roads.

AP, [US warns Israel to boost humanitarian aid into Gaza or risk losing weapons funding](#) October 15, 2024

⁸⁴ In the 2006 War, Israeli bombs damaged the two water pipelines supplying southern Beirut, extensively damaged water systems in south Lebanon, and disrupted pumping, storage, and distribution in Baalbek.

Government of Lebanon, [Setting the stage for long term reconstruction: The national early recovery process](#) August 29, 2006

⁸⁵ MSF, [Gaza: Lack of clean water brings disease and suffering](#) February 8, 2024;







HRW, [Gaza: Israeli Aid Obstruction Inflaming Polio Outbreak](#) August 26, 2024;

WHO, [Urgent Hygiene Crisis: Combatting Diarrhea and Skin Infections in Gaza](#) September 13, 2024

⁸⁶ UNICEF Lebanon, [Caught in the Crossfire: The Impact of Six Months of Conflict on Children in Lebanon](#) April 2024



Summary Table

	Scenario 1: Status quo	Scenario 2: Worse case
 <p>Israeli strikes</p>	Israel continues the current tempo of bombing, with daily strikes across the South and Bekaa, near-daily strikes in the greater Beirut area, and intermittent strikes elsewhere	Israel widens its bombing campaign to include regular strikes in the greater Beirut area, including within municipal Beirut
 <p>Israeli ground invasion</p>	Israel's ground troops aim to capture areas up to the Litani river	Israel's ground troops aim to enter areas up to the Awali river and western Bekaa
 <p>Infrastructure damage in Lebanon</p>	Lebanon's sole civilian airport and its maritime ports remain open. Key roadways are not damaged	Israel imposes a maritime and aerial blockade on the whole of Lebanon, significantly reducing imports and causing shortages of key goods, including fuel. Key roadways, bridges, and overpasses are damaged or destroyed. Telecom networks face widespread outages
 <p>Length</p>	At least through the end of January 2025	At least through the end of January 2025
Impacts	Scenario 1	Scenario 2
 <p>Economic</p>	Lebanon's GDP contracts by 12.81%; economic activity in the South and Bekaa comes to a halt	Lebanon's GDP contracts by at least 21.9%, due to a halt in economic activity in the South and Bekaa and significant declines in economic activity in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and the North
 <p>Food Security</p>	A significant percentage of the estimated 930,123 people facing food stress become food insecure, adding to the 469,334 already classified as food insecure	The food security status of millions shifts to at risk due to foodstuff shortages. Diesel needed to run back-up power generators for bakeries and local food production plants becomes largely unavailable. Fuel supplies for food transportation dwindle, while road networks are crippled



Financial	Banks and money transfer operators continue to operate; Remittances continue to flow into the country	Banks and money transfer operators unable to source enough US dollar banknotes to meet demand as shipments of cash through Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport end. Black markets develop amid skyrocketing inflation
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Health system	Israeli shelling kills between 30 to 60 people a day while injuring between 115 and 300, overwhelming hospitals with mass-casualty incidents	Israeli shelling kills 50 to 100 people a day and injures over 200, while hospitals south of the Awali river are forced to close. Lebanon's healthcare system becomes dependent on aid shipments of medical supplies from international organizations and foreign donor states
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Social stability	Mass displacement and Israeli strikes on destination areas spark tensions between host communities and IDPs, heightening sectarian and political tensions	Political violence increases in frequency and scope, stemming from tensions brought on by attempts by Hezbollah's rivals to override the organization's objections on key issues such as the presidential elections. Numerous host communities demand displaced persons leave destination areas
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Shelter	Lebanese state and partner organizations face significant funding gaps leading to a reduction in essential supplies at shelters temporarily housing 200,000 people	The Lebanese state, the UN, and international aid agencies are unable to meet the minimal requirements of displaced persons in communal shelters, because communication outages create bottlenecks of critical supplies and organizational complications
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Humanitarian access	Humanitarian organizations discontinue operations south of the Litani river, while access is hindered in the Bekaa	The most pressing humanitarian access priority becomes continued delivery of food, fuel, and medical aid to Lebanon
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

WASH	Poor hygiene in communal shelters raises the risk of outbreaks of waterborne diseases. Garbage and sewage services discontinued in heavily bombed areas	Humanitarian actors encounter nationwide challenges accessing potable water, water for sanitation, and other hygiene supplies due to heavy Israeli bombing, leading to the likely spread of waterborne and skin diseases
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

Education	Public and private schooling does not resume	Public and private schooling does not resume
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

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


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Contact

Team Lead

Crisis Analytics | Lebanon
lb-lcat@mercycorps.org

Laila Al Amine

Country Director | Lebanon
lamine@mercycorps.org



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